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ABSTRACT 
 
With global environmental systems under increasing Anthropogenic influence, 
conservationists and environmental managers are under immense pressure to protect and 
recover the world’s imperiled species and ecosystems. This effort is often motivated by a 
sense of moral responsibility, either to nature itself, or to the end of promoting human 
wellbeing over the long run. In other words, it is the purview of environmental ethics, a 
branch of applied philosophy that emerged in the 1970s and that for decades has been 
devoted to understanding and defending an attitude of respect for nature, usually for its 
own sake. Yet from the very start, environmental ethics has promoted itself as 
contributing to the resolution of real-world management and policy problems. By most 
accounts, however, the field has historically failed to deliver on this original promise, and 
environmental ethicists continue to miss opportunities to make intellectual inroads with 
key environmental decisionmakers. Inspired by classical and contemporary American 
philosophers such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and Richard 
Rorty, I defend in this dissertation the virtues of a more explicitly pragmatic approach to 
environmental ethics. Specifically, I argue that environmental pragmatism is not only 
commensurate with pro-environmental attitudes but that it is more likely to lead to viable 
and sustainable outcomes, particularly in the context of eco-social resilience-building 
activities (e.g., local experimentation, adaptation, cooperation). In doing so, I call for a 
recasting of environmental ethics, a project that entails: 1) a conceptual reorientation 
involving the application of pragmatism applied to environmental problems; 2) a 
methodological approach linking a pragmatist environmentalism to the tradition and 
process of adaptive co-management; and 3) an empirical study of stakeholder values and 
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perspectives in conservation collaboratives in Arizona. I conclude that a more pragmatic 
environmental ethics has the potential to bring a powerful set of ethical and 
methodological tools to bear in real-world management contexts and, where appropriate, 
can ground and justify coordinated conservation efforts. Finally, this research responds to 
critics who suggest that, because it strays too far from the ideological purity of traditional 
environmental ethics, the pragmatic decision-making process will, in the long run, 
weaken rather than bolster our commitment to conservation and environmental 
protection. 
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PREFACE 
This dissertation is a proposal for a pragmatic reorientation in environmental 
ethics. This proposal is best understood as three component pieces distinguished by their 
approaches. The first part, composed of Chapters 1 and 2, is mostly philosophical and 
historical. The second part, Chapters 3 and 4, is methodological or practical. Chapter 5 is 
the third piece and is more empirical in nature. There may be, admittedly, a natural 
inclination to search for a climactic chapter in this dissertation, but I have to dissuade the 
reader from doing so. I follow the logic of Charles Sanders Peirce here, who gave the 
following recommendations on improving the force of philosophical inquiries:  
Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far 
as to proceed only from tangible premisses which can be subjected to 
careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its 
arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not 
form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose 
fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and 
intimately connected.1 
Therefore, each of the segregated pieces of the dissertation should be viewed as 
multiple types of arguments sharing a common cause: why we might want 
pragmatism in environmental ethics. Having said that, each piece will aid in 
clearing conceptual baggage for the next, and therefore similar topics of 
discussion will emerge and re-emerge throughout the dissertation, but if the reader 
should want to skip part 1 and begin at part 2, there should not be a significant 
                                                          
1 Charles Sanders Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce's, eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul 
Weiss (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1932), 5.256. 
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disadvantage in doing so. Following Peirce, I believe this is the best way to 
arrange a full-throated argument for a pragmatic reorientation in environmental 
ethics.  
Chapter 1, as the tittle alludes, is a critical appraisal of the field of academic 
environmental ethics. This appraisal is conducted with the help of an increasingly popular 
computational text analysis tool called topic modeling. Topic modeling allows 
researchers to gauge levels of thematic diffusion from one corpus (group of textual 
documents) to another. These corpora act as proxies for the latent themes extant in the 
popular discourse. A quick comparison of the themes between an environmental ethics 
corpus and the Congressional Record (as a policy proxy), shows no similarities between 
the two discourses. Chapter 1 ends by acknowledging methodological deficiencies and 
offers some solutions to calibrate future studies.  
Chapter 2 begins by discussing the philosophical and historical reasons why, if we 
buy the evidence presented in Chapter 1, we do not find any correspondence between 
environmental ethics and the specific policy record of the United States Congress. This 
would include Western philosophical ancestry in environment ethics that places undue 
focus on articulating a small subset of approaches, namely those based around an intrinsic 
theory of value. This alienates much of the emerging sustainability scholarship which 
focuses on competent management in service of creating fair and just future conditions 
for humans and nature alike. This critique is followed up by discussing an emerging 
pluralistic perspective in ethical thought called pragmatism. The purpose of proffering a 
pragmatism is not to raze or indict environmental ethics, but to cultivate a more open 
dialogue about whether we want to die on the hill of philosophical purity. Importantly, 
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the discussion around pragmatism is not just that it is a contrarian position, but also will 
include good reasons in its own right for making this pragmatic turn, namely, that it is 
entwined with the principles of a deliberative democratic process. 
Chapter 3 begins the methodological or practical section of the dissertation. Here, 
I discuss at length an emerging style of environmental management increasingly 
supported by resilience scholars because its designed to engage with uncertain socio-
ecological conditions to develop an adaptive capacity in local or regional communities. 
Adaptive co-management is an integrative approach which institutionalizes social-
learning—via intervention, monitoring, and evaluation—and community solidarity 
through stakeholder engagement, deliberative encounters, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms with vertical and horizontal linkages to State agencies. Although this type of 
management takes many forms in practice, the principles underlying it are shared across 
cases. The import here is that these principles form a peculiar correspondence with the 
pragmatic ethos, that is, they both are empirical, experimental, and pluralistic. Chapter 4 
develops a pragmatic method based on this ethos to find areas where a pragmatic 
environmental ethics overlaps with and departs from the maturing adaptive co-
management scholarship, especially the scholarship which discusses the practical (as in, 
in practice) aspects of adaptive co-management. 
The third part of the dissertation begins (and ends) with Chapter 5. Here, two 
groups engaged in environmental management are examined with the implicit purpose to 
discover a latent pragmatism in stakeholder attitudes. One, the Cienega Watershed 
Partnership in the Las Cienegas National Conservation Area in southern Arizona is a 
proper and enduring adaptive co-management implementation while the other, the White 
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Tank Mountains Conservancy in central Arizona, enjoys a more ambiguous designation. 
Both cases are focused on different resources but share a similar organizational structure. 
Interview questions were designed along the lines of a socio-ecological inventory and 
interviews were subsequently coded with codes (and themes) based on the pragmatic 
ethos. The results suggest that the explicit adaptive collaborative case comports with 
pragmatic themes more closely than that of the case which lacks identity. I follow these 
findings by making recommendations catered explicitly to the less polished case.  
The dissertation closes with a summary and directions for future exploration. 
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PART I: Philosophical Argument 
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1. APPRAISING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
Conservationists and environmental managers are under increasing pressure to 
protect and recover the world’s imperiled species and ecosystems. In her 2014 Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book, The Sixth Extinction, science journalist Elizabeth Kolbert chronicles 
the loss of global biodiversity, a narrative that places most of the blame at our own 
doorstep.2 As the world’s population booms and countries continue to develop, more land 
is converted to agriculture, more fish are pulled from the sea, more fossil fuels are burned 
and more waste is produced, all as urbanization spreads across the landscape to 
accommodate half the world’s citizens that live in them.3 The evidence suggests that the 
increasing stress human activities have placed on the Earth’s ecosystems and biodiversity 
has led to an accelerated extinction rate well beyond the non-anthropogenic background 
rate of species loss.4 Moreover, the extent of human influence on Earth is not confined 
only to the biotic realm. Our fingerprints are increasingly visible on a range of global 
hydrological, atmospheric, and geochemical systems, prompting an array of geologists, 
ecologists, historians, and environmental writers to claim we are in a new epoch 
appropriately called the Anthropocene, or the “Age of Humans”.5  
While the effects of our influence are becoming more clear, some—especially 
more preservation-minded environmentalists—have expressed consternation over this 
                                                          
2 Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 
2014).  
3 United Nations, 2014. http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-
prospects-2014.html 
4 Jurriaan M. De Vos, Lucas. N. Joppa, John L. Gittleman, Patrick R. Stephens, and Stuart L. Pimm, 
Estimating he Normal Background Rate of Species Extinction. Conservation Biology, 29 (2015): 452-462.  
5 Paul J. Crutzen,“Geology of Mankind,” Nature 415 (2002): 23; Joseph Stromberg, “What Is the 
Anthropocene and Are We in It?” Smithsonian Magazine, January 2013. 
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-is-the-anthropocene-and-are-we-in-it-164801414. 
 
3 
 
designation, arguing that we should not be so hasty in formalizing our domineering 
relationship with the planet.6 The primary concern is that we would enter new territory, a 
place that would require us to relinquish certain values and practices (e.g. wilderness 
preservation) and adopt unsavory others (e.g. assisted migration, designed ecosystems).7 
Additionally, many are beginning to believe that we must shed our antiquated 
commitments to nature preservation and thus can no longer take a hands-off approach to 
biodiversity conservation, ecosystem protection, and general environmental awareness. 
Others recognize that the Anthropocene necessitates a more active, and sometimes 
innovative, role in conservation efforts. For instance, Hulme and Murphree (1999) detail 
an ideological shift away from conservation directed by international conservation 
organizations toward community-based conservation initiatives in Africa, allowing locals 
to flex more control over their environments.8 Kareiva and Marvier (2012) decidedly 
entice large corporations and their economic influence to participate in conservation 
efforts.9 This approach, while controversial, intends to change corporate culture 
considering that businesses are perhaps some of the worst offenders when it comes to 
planetary harm. James Hansen (2012), a former NASA climate scientist who has been 
notably outspoken about the potential dangers of a transient climate, an activity that has 
drawn ire from the ‘science is objective’ crowd.10 Simply put, the argument is that the 
                                                          
6 Ben A. Minteer and Stephen J. Pyne, After Preservation: Saving American Nature in the Age of Humans,  
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015.  
7 Emma Marris, Rambunctious Garden: Saving Nature in a Post-wild World. New York: Bloomsbury, 
2011. 
8 David Hulme and Marshall Murphree. "Communities, Wildlife and the ‘new Conservation’ in 
Africa." Journal of International Development 11, no. 2 (1999): 277–85. 
9 Peter Kareiva and Michelle Marvier, "What Is Conservation Science?" BioScience 62, no. 11 (2012): 
962–69. 
10 James Hansen, “Game Over for the Climate.” New York Times, May 2012, A29. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html 
4 
 
Anthropocene will require additional human interventions to assuage the current 
destabilization of global systems and place us on a path toward human sustainability. 
Because some intervention is necessary, the human-epoch and its related affects (e.g. 
global climate change) has been referred to as a super wicked problem. This challenge is 
characterized by the recognition that there is limited time to take meaningful action, 
ineffective (including non-existent) leadership, the irony that problem causers are also the 
problem solvers, and lastly, that despite the pace at which undesirable changes are 
occurring, planned responses are not timely.11  
If these authors and activists are correct, then we must think more intently about 
at least two basic, key questions: 1) What outcomes are desirable? and 2) How can we 
achieve these desirable outcomes? While these academic discussions are normally 
directed at the global scale, the most immediate and, arguably, effective interventions 
will need to be spearheaded by smaller collectives and communities where ideas are 
contextual and resulting changes are more exact and tractable. These critical questions 
might then be re-cast as: 1) What does the community desire?, 2) What actions lead to 
desired outcomes?, and further, 3) Does a community’s actions cohere with its 
neighbors? Even narrowing the spatial focus to the community level, the Anthropocene 
illuminates the necessity for a multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary approach to resolve these 
problems.  
The first question—on what conditions are desirable—is primarily a normative 
problem while the second—how we get there—is both a political and practical question. 
                                                          
11 Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein and Graeme Auld, “Overcoming the Tragedy of Super 
Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change,” Policy Sciences 
45, no. 2, (2012): 123–152. 
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On the latter, we have a rich and wide-ranging environmental management tradition that 
has produced results through thousands of case-studies, experiments, and observations. 
While much more work still needs to be done (and is underway), we at least have a first 
salvo of environmental management research and practice to toss at undesirable 
anthropogenic changes. Relatedly, there is an academic discipline whose stated purpose 
is to help us navigate difficult moral environmental quandaries aptly referred to as 
‘environmental ethics.’  
With its formalization in the 1970s alongside other applied ethics movements, 
environmental ethics sought to provide philosophical answers to contemporary 
environmental problems. After nearly 50 years amidst the multitude of known 
environmental crises and the appearance of novel ones, we therefore might have expected 
such a field to help make clear the normative dimensions of environmental interventions 
and management, to support sound policy, and to articulate our responsibilities to both 
the human and nonhuman worlds.12 If ethicists have indeed succeeded in settling the 
debates surrounding which behaviors count as supportive of environmental values 
(defined in a number of ways), then we can try to uncover to the extent to which this 
scholarship has percolated into the public sphere. Other forms of applied ethics that 
emerged contemporaneously have seen a measurable level of success in this regard. For 
example, Bioethics has, on many accounts, been successful in influencing and helping to 
shape public debates in medicine and clinical care and is now established as a legitimate 
regulatory and informative field in the United States and around the world.13 
                                                          
12 Ben A. Minteer, Refounding Environmental Ethics: Pragmatism, Principle, and Practice. (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2012), 2.  
13 Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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The first argument in this dissertation is that the ink spilt by environmental 
ethicists has had little demonstrable impact on environmental policy and those who 
formulate and implement it.14 This observation will be supported by a computational 
approach known as topic modelling. Topic modelling has emerged as a useful tool for 
distilling themes latent in large sets of related textual documents.15 This method is 
employed here to analyze the diffusion (or lack thereof) of language used by 
environmental ethicists into larger policy circles.  
I follow this motivating, introductory chapter by diving deeper into the 
philosophical issues at stake, explaining what I understand to be a discipline that has 
unintentionally hamstrung itself in terms of utility and efficacy for non-philosophers. I 
close the second chapter by outlining and proposing an alternative formulation of an 
environmental ethic—one rooted in philosophical pragmatism—that I believe avoids the 
pitfalls of the dominant approach to environmental ethics and one that is more useful to 
conservationists and environmental practitioners. In Chapter 3, I discuss the relevance of 
a type of environmental management—adaptive co-management—that embraces social 
learning and democratic norms; characteristics that, I argue, are essential if we are to 
overcome the forthcoming global permutations. The task taken up in Chapter 4 is to build 
a theoretical bridge between the philosophy of pragmatism and the aforementioned 
schema of adaptive co-management. The foundation of this bridge will be built with the 
aid of interviews from experts in the theory and practice of adaptive co-management. 
                                                          
14 Not only do I intend this dissertation to be critical of the field of environmental ethics for failing to 
influence outcomes, but also to those legislative and policy experts who have done little to protect the 
environment. 
15 Matthew Purver, Thomas L. Griffiths, Konrad P. Körding, and Joshua B. Tenenbaum, “Unsupervised 
topic modelling for multi-party spoken discourse,” in Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on 
Computational Linguistics and the 44th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics 
(ACL-44), 2006: 17–24.  
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Chapter 5 details two specific case studies where community-level interventions using an 
adaptive co-management framework are underway. Chapter 6 follows up the case studies 
by highlighting both the efficacy and efficiency of the ACM/pragmatic approach while 
putting the impotence of mainstream environmental ethics on display. Chapter 6 also 
contains concluding remarks including areas that deserve further attention. 
A Computational Complement 
The primary and most influential works in the field of environmental ethics (EE) 
are textual in nature, taking the form of journal articles or books. In judging the efficacy 
of the EE program, we can employ tools that aid in the analysis of textual sources. An 
early attempt at locating points of diffusion16 between the EE vernacular and the policy 
realm was organized by early environmental philosopher and legal theorist Christopher 
Stone.17 Stone’s (2003) scholarship highlights two bits of evidence to support the 
hypothesis that environmental ethics has had little influence in management and policy 
discussions.18 First, he first notices that the most stringent pieces of legislation 
championed by environmentalists today, i.e., the Wilderness Act (1964), the National 
Environmental Policy Act (1970), and the Endangered Species Act (1973) were drafted, 
debated, and signed into law before EE emerged as a formal academic field. Still, some 
of the authors of these statutes may have appealed to or were motivated by ideas that are 
now a part of the academic EE discussion (such as, for example the earlier writings of 
                                                          
16 Following Dearing and Cox (2018), diffusion is the social phenomenon whereby some novel language or 
concept (referred to as an ’innovation’ in the literature) that begins in one social circle, moves to others. 
U.S. governmental policy and legislation surrounding the use of seatbelts is a prime example.  
17 His work, “Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects” has shown 
impressive stamina as an anchor to the non-human rights movements. See: Anna Grear, "Should Trees 
Have Standing: 40 Years on," Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 3, Special Issue, (2012): 1. 
18 Christopher Stone, “Do Morals Matter? The Influence of Ethics on Courts and Congress in the Shaping 
of U.S. Environmental Policies,” University of California-Davis Law Review 37, no. 13 (2003), pg 13-52. 
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Aldo Leopold or Rachel Carson), so it is my view that uncovering this evidence, if 
possible, is worthwhile.19 Starting at the ‘beginning’ of EE as an academic field in the 
late 1970s and looking forward to 2003 (when Stone’s study was conducted), he digs into 
digital judiciary and congressional documents but finds no explicit appeals to ideas that 
are presumed to have influenced legislation pre-environmental ethics. Admittedly, 
government documents are only a portion of the potential sources in which one might 
look to find the influence of disciplinary EE.20 Curiously, Stone goes on to suggest that 
environmental philosophers simply had not spent enough time deliberating and 
expounding on the foundations that would support a pro-environmental ethics and 
therefore the legislative bodies in the United States did not have the material necessary to 
synthesize into their policy discussions.  
Writing in response to Stone’s analysis, the environmental philosopher Bryan 
Norton offered a friendly rebuke, arguing that the study’s outcome is disconnected from 
its premises (a concern I share).21 In his critique, Norton suggests that a chasm has 
formed among environmental ethicists where one camp, composed primarily of non-
anthropocentric philosophers such as Holmes Rolston III and J. Baird Callicott, is 
focused on undermining anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics, while the 
                                                          
19 We know that President Theodore Roosevelt for instance was heavily influenced by both the 
preservationist John Muir, who defended the beauty and sacred qualities of nature, and Gifford Pinchot, 
who represented the more utilitarian, “wise use” wing of the conservation movement. These two figures are 
often referred to as forefathers in American environmental thought and are therefore strongly associated 
with academic environmental ethics. Indeed, their ideological differences simulate the current impasse in 
environmental ethics quite closely.  
20 An analysis of the grey literature in conversation biology is more likely to use language we associate 
with environmental ethics than governmental documents. What we would find, I assume, would be an 
overwhelming moralist majority although this trend might be softening. Either way, phrases such as 
‘intrinsic value’ are likely to be used abstractly and carry little practical weight, even in these grey 
documents.  
21 Bryan G. Norton, “Which Morals Matter? Freeing Moral Reasoning from Ideology,” University of 
California-Davis Law Review 37, no. 13 (2003), pg 81–94.  
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other sees all approaches as tools for crafting working, pluralistic environmental policy.22 
This mainstream vs ‘sidestream’ debate, to borrow Norton’s language, is a newer 
injection into the environmental ethics conversation. Yet in his study, Stone hunts for 
environmental ethics influence narrowly defined as above, that is, non-
anthropocentrically. Norton proposes that if the scope of what counts as an environmental 
ethic were enlarged, then we might more readily identify points of diffusion in the greater 
policy discourse and we might use those points as anchors in the search for common 
ground between policy and ethics. If the scope of an environmental ethic is only as wide 
as to accept non-anthropocentrism, then poverty, intergenerational justice, and even 
climate change could fall outside of the mainstream ethics program given the centrality of 
human interests in the moral discourse surrounding these concerns. Like Norton and 
other pluralistically-oriented ethicists, I find this narrow view to be mistaken.  
Despite Stone’s assumptions about what ideas should be included in 
environmental ethics proper, conducting an empirical search for evidence of influence 
(i.e. language diffusion) remains an important mission given the core belief that the 
discourse cultivated and maintained by (environmental) ethicists ought to shape norms 
and behaviors. With Peter Singer, I believe that there are such people as moral experts23 
and that if they do exist, ethicists are more likely (but not necessarily) to be candidates 
than the layman in this arena. This is not to say any ‘expert’ ought to wield this 
responsibility in a manner unbecoming of the title, by, for instance, declaring this or that 
action to be inside or out some ethical boundaries as if reacting to a good or bad smell. In 
my mind, this places the expert at the center of debates involving value claims; a place 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 92 
23 Peter Singer, "Moral Experts," Analysis 32, no. 4 (1972): 115–17. 
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that I feel is particularly appropriate for the pragmatist ethicist who might provide 
guidance on the resolution of conflict and, following Andrew Light,24 fulfill a public 
commitment to translating moral claims. Because of this latter responsibility (one that 
happens to be basal to the pragmatic ethos), I often think of pragmatic ethicists as capable 
moral experts.25 The question as to whether or not environmental ethicists have largely 
been ignored is an empirical claim, one that I hope to address here in part. This analysis 
is motivated by a desire to see environmental ethicists move policy toward pro-
environmental outcomes. 
The first novel contribution in this dissertation picks up where Stone left off. 
Using more sophisticated tools and a more expansive corpus, I ask the same question that 
Stone did: “Has environmental ethics had—and how might it have—an impact on public 
policies?”26 Our approaches are different, however. Stone and his team conducted what 
amounts to a supervised word or phrase query (e.g. Googling). This means that they 
produced a list of key words, derived from their domain expertise in environmental ethics 
and policy, and sought out those particular words in judicial and legislative documents. 
Topic modeling, on the other hand, is an unsupervised natural language processing 
technique that sorts groups of meaningful words together to create themes, or topics in 
the nomenclature.27 As will be detailed below, this method can aid in the uncovering of 
                                                          
24 Andrew Light, “Methodological Pragmatism” in Animal Welfare and Hunting, edited by Erin McKenna 
and Andrew Light, 119–139. Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2004. 
25 I do not believe those of other philosophical alignment are incapable of filling this role. I am merely 
suggesting that this responsibility seems to be particularly suited for someone with a pragmatic bent 
because of the specific commitments one would have if they were to be accurately called a pragmatist. 
These commitments will be made clear in Chapter 2.  
26 Stone, “Do Morals Matter?”, 14.  
27 David M. Blei, “Probabilistic Topic Models,” Communications of the Association for Computing 
Machinery 55, no. 4, (2012), 77. 
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latent meanings in the analyzed text. Stone’s argument relied on the existence of a few 
select words, whereas topic modeling does not. Instead, the outputs of topic modeling can 
be compared to one another to understand a fuller context of the discourse and be used to 
estimate diffusion.28 Despite the difference in approach, I also hypothesize that I will fail 
to discover diffusions of ideas from the discourse of academic environmental ethics into 
the Congressional Record. 
Topic Modeling. 
The level of policy I have chosen to examine, and the only one featured here in 
this dissertation, is the legislature of the United States Government for a few reasons: (1) 
in early 2017, the United States Government Publishing Office made available digital 
copies of the Congressional Record which are more easily analyzed with the help of 
sophisticated computational tools, (2) environmental legislation enacted by the United 
States Congress has arguably the widest reaching impact in terms of agencies responsible 
for both compliance and enforcement, and (3) the opportunity costs of deliberation within 
a Congressional session are high. That is, if any particular issue is discussed by the 
United States Congress, we can assume it maintains a high level of priority and 
importance. And (4), the congressional discourse is supposed to be reflective of 
constituent concerns and public events and therefore representative of affairs pressing on 
the collective consciousness.  
The political ideologies of congress members are typically categorized by 
examining roll call votes and bill co-sponsorships. These larger political categories are 
                                                          
28 David Crystal, Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 
2008), 145. diffusion ( n. ) A term used in sociolinguistics and historical linguistics for the increased use of 
a language or linguistic form throughout an area over a period of time. 
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useful in understanding the sorts of constraints a lawmaker has (e.g. their vote for a 
measure may be cast primarily for political and electoral security29). However, one 
limitation with solely looking at votes and co-sponsorships are that holding to party lines 
has become increasingly more common, now to the point where there is little cooperation 
between parties.30 Certainly, there must be personal differences between members of 
Congress that can be washed out when the scope of analysis is so large as to only capture 
whether a lawmaker is a member of the Democratic or Republican party. Correia et al. 
(2015) demonstrate that party-line politics are becoming increasingly common and this 
polarization is visible in the language of congresspeople.31 Therefore, we share the 
assumption that the values and agendas of congressional members are more accurately 
determined by both examining the normal determinants—roll call votes and co-
sponsorships—in addition to the language they use on the floor (during debates and 
proceedings for instance). Fortunately, these data (i.e., text) are accurately captured by 
professional stenographers with the United States Government Publishing Office (GPO). 
Each day after a legislative session, the so-called Daily Digest, which captures nearly 
every word uttered (or yelled) and document submitted ‘for the record’ in the Senate and 
House of Representatives, is published for public access. At the end of a congressional 
session (approximately 2 years), these daily versions are bound into a continuous volume, 
                                                          
29 Richard T. Carson and Joe A. Oppenheimer, “A Method of Estimating the Personal Ideology of Political 
Representatives,” The American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (1984): 163–178. 
30 Clio Andris, David Lee, Marcus J. Hamilton, Mauro Martino, Christian E. Gunning, John Armistead 
Selden The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the U.S. House of Representatives 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0123507 
31 Rion B. Correia, Kwan Nok Chan, and Luis M. Rocha, "Polarization in the US Congress," The 8th 
Annual Conference of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), Lisbon, Portugal, June 23-24, 
2015. 
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which we know as the Congressional Record, dating back to 1873. These records are 
primed for emerging computational tools and textual analysis.  
Content analysis is a hybrid of quantitative and qualitative methodology. With the 
adoption of sophisticated computer algorithms that can analyze so-called ‘big data’, this 
threshold is increasingly crossed.32 A content analysis is designed to elucidate either the 
manifest or latent content of a particular data set (typically text).33 Collecting manifest 
data, while still somewhat interpretative, means the analyst has designed a coding scheme 
prior to conducting the analysis and is placing words/phrases into the appropriate bins or 
categories during it (e.g. the occurrence of the words hamburger, pizza, soda in some 
analyzed text belonging to a predetermined category called ‘edibles’). Latent analysis is 
the more subjective approach which requires the researcher to judge the underlying 
meaning and purpose of the text (e.g. the occurrence of the words hamburger, pizza, soda 
can indicate the text may be referring to the American diet). A strictly qualitative content 
analysis will typically allow the codes to emerge from the text (although the text is 
usually chosen intentionally). Here, I carry a general idea of what a category might be 
into the analysis (e.g., ‘intrinsic value’, ‘pristine’, ‘preservation’ in EE literature), but do 
not specifically define them. I am also accepting the common assumption that spoken and 
written words are not random—they are chosen to convey a specific meaning and to 
occlude an infinite number of other interpretations implying that there may be a hidden 
                                                          
32 Kimberly A. Neuendorf, “Content Analysis in the Interactive Media Age,” in The Content Analysis 
Guidebook, (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2017): 204. 
33 Ulla.H. Graneheim and B. Lundman, “Qualitative Content Analysis in Nursing Research: Concepts, 
Procedures and Measures to Achieve Trustworthiness,” in Nurse Education Today 24, no. 2 (2004): 105–
112. 
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structure to the text.34 Because I will be analyzing the content from a data-set that is too 
large for a human and a highlighter, I first make use of an increasingly popular 
computational complement to content analysis called topic modeling.35 The primary 
difference between these two approaches is that the topic modelling process occurs 
unsupervised (i.e., via a computer program) whereas content analysis is normally actively 
interpreted as the researcher sifts through data.  
Topic modeling is especially suited to uncover the latent meanings of a given 
body of text because it assumes that the topics ‘exist’ in the author’s mind before the 
document is produced.36 That is, it is an attempt to uncover what the author(s) had been 
influenced by when the text was created. The output of a topic model is two-fold. First, 
the model produces a vector of words that can be interpreted (subjectively by the 
researcher) to compose a single topic.37 The second output is the corresponding 
percentage occurrence of the topics in the corpus itself. By creating a probability 
distribution of topics present in the text, we get a better idea about what the purpose of 
the text is, its hidden structure.38 However, it is worth noting that topic models are best 
used as a single piece in a salvo of interpretive methods. Topic models are unable to 
                                                          
34 Tim Rapley, "Studying Discourse: Some Closing Comments," in Doing Conversation, Discourse and 
Document Analysis, (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2007): 126–132. 
35 Anke Piepenbrink and Ajai Guar, “Topic Models As A Novel Approach To Identify Themes In Content 
Analysis,” Academy of Management Proceedings, (2017). 
36 Jonathan Chang, Jordan Boyd-Graber, Sean Gerrish, Chong Wang, and David M. Blei, “Reading Tea 
Leaves: How Humans Interpret Topic Models,” Neural Information Processing Systems, (2009), 1-9. 
37 David M. Blei, Andrew Y. Ng and Michael I. Jordan, “Latent Dirichlet Allocation,” Journal of Machine 
Learning and Research, 3, no. 30, 2003. 
38 David M. Blei, “Probabilistic Topic Models,” Communications of the Association for Computing 
Machinery 55, no. 4, (2012), 77–84.  
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capture collocate words and do not adequately expose nuances in language such as 
homophones or colloquialisms.39  
Methods. 
According to the White and Marsh (2006), uncovering hidden meanings in text 
can be done by following a set of steps which I now, in part, address.40 I created two 
corpora derived from the Congressional Record. I initially downloaded 45 documents in 
the Record repository (CONC hereafter) between and including the years of 1988-1993.41 
This range was chosen intentionally given 10 years is roughly the latency we could 
reasonably expect the important environmental moments of the decade, including the 
establishment of environmental ethics as previously mentioned, to diffuse into other 
discourses.42 Similar to random sampling in human subjects research, random selection 
of documents assuages systemic bias and allows us, ideally, to make inferences about the 
whole set, the whole discourse in this case. Each document, containing roughly 2 million 
words, was then converted to .txt files using AntFileConverter—free software offered by 
Lawrence Anthony out of Waseda University, Tokyo43—to be more digestible by 
computational tools. To build the Environmental Ethics corpus (EEC hereafter), I 
downloaded 45 original articles (i.e., no book reviews or commentaries) from the earliest 
environmental ethics journal, aptly named, Environmental Ethics, spanning 1979-1983.44 
                                                          
39 Kenneth D. Aiello, “Systematic Analysis of the Factors Contributing to the Variation and Change of the 
Microbiome, “PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2018: 48. 
40 Marilyn Domas White and Emily E. Marsh, “Content Analysis: A Flexible Methodology,” Library 
Trends 55, no 1, (2006): 22–45. 
41 https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/crecb 
42 James Dearing and Jeffrey Cox, "Diffusion of Innovations Theory, Principles, And Practice," Health 
Affairs 37, no. 2 (2018): 183-90. 
43 Anthony, L. (2017). AntFileConverter (Version 1.2.1) [Computer Software]. Tokyo, Japan: Waseda 
University. Available from http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software 
44 More information on this journal and its contents can be accessed at: 
http://www.cep.unt.edu/enethics.html  
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Each of the documents in this corpus averaged 10,000 words, a concern that I will touch 
on in the concluding section here. 
After building both CONC and EEC corpora, I then randomly pulled 10 
documents from each set to save countless hours of data cleaning and corresponding 
computing time.45 A smaller subset of the CONC corpus (E-CONC hereafter) was then 
constructed by selecting 10 documents that contained both keywords “environment” and 
“ecology” to improve the possibility that it will share similar themes with the EEC 
corpora. CONC results are nevertheless presented here as a proof of concept—that the 
topic modeling process is sensitive to the extant text—but not to be used as evidence for 
diffusion of lack thereof (Appendix A). The primary comparison will be between E-
CONC and EEC.   
A stop-list, a list of words that directs topic modeling programs to ignore select 
words, was created iteratively to push out words that would appear in trial runs.46 The 
models were created using the software MALLET.47 The user dictates the parameters for 
the breadth of the model. In this case, MALLET was instructed to compute 20 topics per 
corpus and 20 words per topic, which are standard settings. These topics can then be 
compared to one another to investigate areas of overlap and differential understanding of 
shared themes. In this case, finding topics, or even a small group of words, shared 
                                                          
45 A document consisted of a single journal article in the EEC corpora, while a document in the CONC 
corpora was a pdf supplied by the Congressional Record repository. The researcher (or someone) has to 
make sure that the documents are fit for analysis by adjusting pages, columns, and spelling mistakes from 
the OCR/file converting process.  
46 Iterative creation of a stop-list just means running the modeling software with a default stop-list 
containing functional and common words first. Initial runs will present words used with less frequency, but 
ones that do not help define a topic (such as: they, however, been, later etc.). These words are manually 
added to the stop-list and models are recomputed until the researcher is satisfied.  
47 Andrew Kachites. McCallum, "MALLET: A Machine Learning for Language Toolkit." 
http://mallet.cs.umass.edu. 2002. 
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between the environmental ethics documents (EEC) and the Congressional Record 
(CONC) would signal that the ethical arguments were piercing the congressional 
discussions. Conversely, finding no shared topics would suggest that environmental 
ethical literature has not yet leached into relevant policy discussions.48  
Results. 
Each column of 20 words represents the contents of a single topic that I named (in 
bold) based on my interpretation of the word cluster. Unsurprisingly, when E-CONC 
topics are compared to EEC topics there is no overlap between the two corpora.  Here, 
only a cursory look at the topics that appear most frequently in the E-CONC model 
suggests the contents of the narrowed Congressional Record reflects a more practical and 
applied discourse taking place. This is evidenced by the collection of words like 
Pollutants, Sanitation, Contaminants, and Restore which I have interpreted to compose a 
topic I call Pollution (See Table 1). Likewise, the EEC model (see Table 2) presents 
vectors of words that are associated with the themes commonly evident in environmental 
ethics literature. The topic ‘wild nature’ for instance is composed of words like 
landscape, wilderness, nature, aesthetic, while the topic ‘aldo leopold’ is defined by the 
common occurrence of ‘forestry, essay, conservation, and of course, leopold.  
 
  
                                                          
48 Caveats to this claim will be discussed below.  
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Table 1. Six (of twenty computed) topics derived from ten documents containing 
“biodiversity” and “ecology” from the Congressional Record (1988-1993).  
 
pollution 
environmental 
education 
managed 
areas restoration 
marine 
ecosystems 
environmental 
science 
sanitation center park species marine science 
pollutant environmental national landscaping water advisory 
degradation education commission resistant waters authorized 
petition university system drought section assessment 
guard establishment secretary interior pursuant board 
estuaries hayward service projects federal demonstration 
community award areas plant quality management 
cost foster management lands end respect 
carry establish title recreation criteria made 
balanced sound area gate pollution acquisition 
contaminants findings property golden coastal reduction 
implement ideas american facilities date appropriated 
restore networks funds plants control equipment 
financial center's recognized native pollutants budget 
disposal natural natural authorize discharge arrangement 
designating sector sites implement estuary identify 
implementing grants authority program land methodologies 
approve act assistance exotic provide adequacy 
army promote units introduction enactment products 
contiguous science cultural restoring adding uncertainties 
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Table 2. Six (of twenty computed) topics derived from 10 randomized documents from 
the journal of Environmental Ethics (1979-1983). 
      
 terminology aldo leopold wild nature living things community ethical foci 
environmental leopold nature life property nature 
ethics forest natural human land indian 
nature erosion aesthetic animals locke american 
view leopold's american beings economic world 
aesthetic fundamentals landscape things policy indians 
ethical essay beauty sense theory european 
environment conservation objects moral commons natural 
world aesthetic interest living locke's view 
moral forestry painting nonhuman public martin 
people analysis art characteristics resources ethic 
good forests century point ethic attitudes 
man philosophy passmore person people behavior 
person work time animal hardin persons 
make standards attitudes western price spirit 
university service scientific plants economists ibid 
philosophy southwest western obligations consumers western 
terms responsibility science creatures preferences soul 
press district york thought harm attitude 
values missouri wilderness space problem human 
theory fire history position land respect 
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A comparison of both models does not support the idea that there is earnest 
diffusion occurring between the two corpora where the corpora are proxies for larger, 
respective discourses. If diffusion were to be detected, then similar topics would be 
present, and the word composition within those topics would share further similarities. 
Differences in words between similar topics is also part of a full analysis as these can 
give clues regarding the different foci of the topic in use (e.g. the topic ‘value’ as 
environmental vs ‘value’ as economic). Given the results, there are at least two 
possibilities. One, there is no diffusion. Two, there is diffusion that went undetected due 
to a flaw in the experimental design.49 Because of this second option, I feel there are 
additional measures required to safeguard the claims made here.  
Future Directions. 
The purpose of this experiment was to examine whether the selected corpora (and 
specific methodology) is indeed representative of reality. That is, I wanted to ensure that 
the topics that emerge through topic modeling jibe with the major moments in the 1970s 
in the case of the Record and, given my domain knowledge, the relevant discussions in 
the case of the Environmental Ethics. With these two topic models, I hypothesized that I 
will fail to discover diffusions of language from the discourse of academic environmental 
ethics between the Congressional Record. This hypothesis was tenuously supported. 
While the results presented here should not be surprising, topic modeling is, admittedly, 
just one part of a constellation of textual analyses that would need to be deployed in order 
to fully grasp the level of diffusion (if any) between discourses.50 This would include 
                                                          
49 Of course, it’s possible that there was both a design flaw and no diffusion to be detected.  
50 Aiello, “Systematic Analysis of the Factors Contributing to the Variation and Change of the 
Microbiome,” 49. 
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keywords analysis which uncovers statistically significant words in a selected corpus, 
collocate analyses which provide fuller context of word usage by displaying statistically 
significant co-occurring words.51 Further, there is some inconsistencies between the 
ECONC and EEC corpora that should be resolved in future iterations. Namely, the total 
number of words in the EEC corpus is a fraction of the amount in the ECONC corpus, 
therefore, to borrow Anthony’s analogy, it could be like comparing a galaxy with a single 
star.52 Lastly, the overarching argument proffered here could be bolstered by tweaking 
both the hypothesis and corresponding data sources utilized in the topic modeling 
experiment. As alluded to in the footnotes, two additional textual reservoirs—grey-
literature in conservation biology and/or natural resource management and also 
environmental legislation which provides an interesting opportunity to trace legislative 
changes such as the first Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 and its most 
recent iteration, ESA 1982—are potential places in which we might find legitimate 
appeals to EE concepts.  
Concluding Thoughts 
While this experiment was limited in scope, adding more robust corpora and 
employing additional computational tests, shows promise for a more convincing line of 
argumentation. Due to methodological (and time)53 constraints, these future directions 
could not be pursued at this time. There are, however, plans to pick this project up in 
                                                          
51 Laurence Anthony, “Issues in the Design and Development of Software Tools for Corpus Studies: The 
Case for Collaboration,” in Contemporary Corpus Linguistics, ed. Paul Baker, London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2009: 93 
52 Ibid. 92. 
53 Known as data-munging or data cleaning, documents require spellchecking, formatting, and grammar 
corrections before they can be fully utilized by tools for computational text analyses.  
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collaboration with experts in computational text analyses leading to, we anticipate, far 
more robust conclusions.   
For now, we have some evidence that corroborates the results of Stone’s (2003) 
initial investigation. A study affirming Stone’s conclusions more than 15 years later is not 
trivial, though it may seem. Environmental ethics emerged from the primordial applied 
ethics soup in the early 1970s and therefore, as is widely repeated by some of its 
founding thinkers, intent on “descend[ing] from the ivory tower and directly engage 
real-world issues.”54 Stone surmised that one possible way to test the efficacy of this 
promise to engage was to try to uncover references to environmental ethics in policy and 
judicial documents. Although I support Stone’s effort, a noteworthy distinction between 
us is my sympathy for pragmatism while he would likely describe his ethical orientation 
as a strong non-anthropocentrism. This, to me, signals a shared impulse that it’s not 
enough to continuously supply ethical arguments into the ether, but we must know if they 
are working, if there is uptake, if they are informing the thinking of policy-makers who 
wield incredible power. Areas of study like environmental sociology55 and conservation 
psychology56 are investigating questions of ethical import in their respective fields, but 
there is not yet a dedicated area of study whose focus is to gauge the effectiveness and 
reach of ethical arguments in the policy realm. For now, it is an esoteric task, but one that 
is becoming increasingly feasible with the introduction of advanced computational 
methods like topic modeling.   
                                                          
54 J.Baird Callicott, Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy, (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1999), 28.  
55 Bradley H Brewster and Puddephatt, Antony J., eds. Microsociological Perspectives for Environmental 
Sociology (London: Routledge, 2016). 
56 Susan Clayton and Gene Myers, Conservation Psychology: Understanding and Promoting Human Care 
for Nature, (West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2015). 
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Moreover, I do not intend for this line of argumentation to stand on its own. This 
is just the first half of one prong of a three-pronged argument that academic 
environmental ethics could benefit from overt pragmatic import. The other half in 
Chapter 2 directly engages with the philosophical commitments of non-anthropocentrist 
environmental ethics and pragmatism while adding historical context.  
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2.  ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: PROMISE AND PROBLEMS 
The “Earthrise” photograph, taken in 1968 from moon’s orbit, is perhaps the 
“most influential environmental photograph ever taken.”57 Not to be outdone by their 
predecessors, Apollo 17 astronauts gave us the “Blue Marble”: the first time the entirety 
of our planet was captured in a picture on the way up to the moon. Both pictures turned 
out to be watershed moments in global, and especially American, environmentalism. 
According to historian Robert Poole these space missions and the overview effects58 they 
begat helped galvanize a new environmental awareness—an 'age of ecology’—in the 
early 1970s.59 Along with these fresh perspectives from space, nature photography from 
the likes of Ansel Adams and Eliot Porter had already been dancing through the minds of 
Americans. Literary works exploring the human-nature relationship, books like A Sand 
County Almanac (1949) by Aldo Leopold, Silent Spring (1962) by Rachel Carson, and 
Edward Abbey’s Desert Solitaire (1968), were likewise well-known and often invoked in 
everyday discourse. At the same time, other environmentalist ideas that grabbed public 
attention during this period often took on a survivalist and apocalyptic tone, including 
Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb (1968) and 1972’s Limits to Growth report by the 
Club of Rome, both of which became integral to the deeper green movements as a 
continuum of environmental consideration and consciousness formed. All of this, of 
                                                          
57 “Apollo Astronaut Shares Story of NASA’s Earthrise Photo,” NASA, Last Updated: Aug. 7, 2017, 
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/home/earthrise.html. 
58 David B. Yaden, Jonathan Iwry, Kelley J. Slack, Johannes C. Eiechstaedt, Yukun Zhao, George E. 
Vaillant, Andrew B. Newberg. The Overview Effect: Awe and Self-Transcendent Experience In Space 
Flight,” Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 3, no. 1 (2016): 1. This is said to be 
an increased awareness or feeling of connectedness that was first experienced by astronauts as they saw the 
earth completely enveloped by space. 
59  Donald J. Wuebbles, “Celebrating the "Blue Marble," Eos, Transactions, American Geophysical Union 
93, no. 49 (2012): 509–510.  
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course, under the backdrop of the growing concern about the possibility of nuclear war 
and continental scale devastation.60  
Academic environmental ethics appropriately saw its formalization during this 
time period (i.e., the early 1970s), although initially it was merely an uncoordinated set of 
individual philosophers who were sympathetic to environmental causes.61 Eventually, 
however, the field carved out its own space in the applied ethics movement and by the 
1980s academic philosophers such as Holmes Rolston III, J. Baird Callicott, Mark 
Sagoff, and Bryan Norton were writing prolifically in this new field, each representing 
distinct schools of thought within the broader environmental ethics movement. These 
pioneering authors, and a growing number of others like them, sought to clarify—often in 
dramatically different ways—our moral relationship with nature and its constituents.62  
The New Zealand philosopher Richard Routley, in his seminal 1973 essay “Is 
There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?”, which is generally considered the 
first paper published on environmental ethics proper by a trained philosopher, inquired as 
to whether the traditional moral foundation of Western philosophy was actually 
                                                          
60 Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement 
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005); Roderick Frazier Nash and Char Miller. Wilderness and the 
American Mind: Fifth Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Benjamin Kline, First along the 
River: A Brief History of the U.S. Environmental Movement (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2011). 
61 “A Very Brief History of the origins of Environmental Ethics for the Novice” Center for Environmental 
Philosophy at the University of North Texas, accessed December 13, 2018, 
http://www.cep.unt.edu/novice.html. 
62 In one sense, this was nothing new for philosophers; inquiry into nature goes back more than 2500 years, 
beginning, some scholars say, with a group of transient Greeks we refer to as the Presocratics. Although the 
contents of their investigation had little to do with the present conceptualization of environmental ethics, 
the philosophical (and scientific) heritage established by these Greeks, and those that came after them, laid 
the intellectual foundation for the kind of moral theory many ethicists still rely on today (a particular issue I 
explore in the next section).  
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compatible with a proper ethic of the environment.63 He concluded that, since mainstream 
Western moral traditions suggest the destruction of the environment is in itself free of 
moral consequence if it does not harm humans, it was an inadequate basis for an 
environmental ethic that sought to treat nature as a subject of direct moral concern. Not 
only would this new and more non-anthropocentric environmental ethic be critical of 
those who would indifferently abuse natural areas, but it would implore witnesses to 
reveal these behaviors as impermissible. Environmentalists and nature sympathizers, 
Routley suggested, were unlikely to be content (or ought to be discontented) with their 
beliefs without challenging others’ views and attempting to influence pro-environmental 
change:  
But aren't environmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, 
…respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when 
engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a 
morally impermissible way? No, what these people do, is to a greater or 
lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For 
example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples 
who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible 
and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue 
whales for private profit.64 
This is meant to suggest that an environmentalist of any variety—whether advocate or 
philosopher (or both)—maintains, at least according to Routley, an obligation to produce 
                                                          
63 Richard Routley, “Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?” Proceedings of the XVth World 
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and influence pro-environmental behaviors. It is a directive that lays out a potential 
policy imperative for the field of environmental ethics: the recognition of nature’s moral 
standing (what many environmental philosophers frame as the acknowledgment of its 
intrinsic, and not just instrumental value) is supposed to compel behaviors and policies to 
protect species and landscapes deemed to possess this value.  
This activist decree quickly became embedded in the ethical programs of 
environmental philosophers of every flavor. Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess’s Deep 
Ecology, initially presented in the same year as Routley’s paper appeared, is perhaps the 
most well-known perspective articulating a fundamental obligation toward activism as 
part of its “platform.” Indeed, Naess, in his outlining of the non-anthropocentric 
foundations and entailments of the deep ecology movement, declares that the “forcefully” 
normative principles underlying it are only worth holding if we act upon them.65 North 
American versions of deep ecology, imported by George Sessions and Bill Devall, were 
deeply influential to the architects of ‘radical’ activist (and at times, subversive) 
organizations like Earth First!66 and the later splinter group, the Environmental Liberation 
Front.67  
The more measured, academic versions of environmental ethics, championed by 
early ethicists such as J. Baird Callicott, Kenneth Sayre, and Bryan Norton, equate the 
practice of environmental philosophy to social activism to varying degrees. Callicott 
notes that philosophy has a tradition of engendering social transformations—not through 
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taking up arms or other physical acts of rebellion, but by merely questioning the received 
narrative handed down by the powers that be (e.g., the church and the state).68 Callicott 
critiques the attitudes of Ken Sayre and Bryan Norton—again, both early advocates of the 
activist agenda within environmental ethics—claiming their positions are anti-
philosophical. Callicott discusses the emergence of environmental ethics as part of the 
applied movement, stating, that it was a “…deliberate reaction to what was perceived as 
the reigning neoscholasticism and in a deliberate attempt to help society deal with real-
world problems…”69 He therefore worries that philosophers like Norton and Sayre, who 
do not focus on articulating foundational ethical arguments like he might prefer, 
undermine this applied mandate and therefore will not help engender moral 
transformations towards pro-environmental attitudes. I take his meaning here to be that 
their environmental arguments do not have the same guttural punch as an argument Dave 
Foreman (co-founder of Earth First! and frequent castigator of all anthropocentric ideals) 
might support. Offering a description about the state-of-affairs, Sayre states, “If norms 
encouraging conservation and proscribing pollution were actually in force in industrial 
society, it would not be the result of ethical theory; and the fact that currently they are not 
in force is not alleviated by any amount of adroit ethical reasoning.”70 I find this assertion 
perfectly reasonable and supported by the empirical investigation in the introductory 
chapter. We can admit this reality and simultaneously bemoan its solidity. While Callicott 
reminisces about a time when the Socrates or Kant or Locke could upend their 
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contemporary intellectual systems, the contingency of ideas—the speed, the depth, the 
reach—is unlike their respective times. In addition, the ecological threats were not as 
immediate. Doubtless, the likes of Norton are happy to take refuge in such an anti-
philosophical camp if it means that the task of influencing environmental legislation and 
policy is approached from a non-fatalistic perspective (dare I say, with pragmatic 
optimism), the opposite of which Callicott holds closely.71   
Although they are philosophically divided over many of the theoretical 
commitments of environmental ethics, both J. Baird Callicott (a non-anthropocentrist) 
and Bryan Norton (a “weak anthropocentrist” or an environmental pragmatist) both 
believe that the ways in which their work is borne out into action and policies that 
support those actions are of primary importance.72  Callicott suggests that assenting to the 
intrinsic value of nature has led to major policy successes such as the adoption of the 
United Nations Earth Charter in 2000 while Norton might argue that the Charter simply 
includes good environmental policy that would exist without the belief in nature’s 
immutable value. Debate about the practical effects of an institutional and formalized 
environmental ethics continues to drive discussion in the field (e.g. Norton, 2015; 
Minteer, 2012; Callicott, 2013; Maboloc, 2016).73 
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In light of this activist precept, I used the introductory chapter to explicitly inquire 
as to whether or not the products of environmental ethicists—which we might think of as 
a philosophical arm of the environmental movement74—had permeated outside 
philosophical circles, namely, into environmental management and policy forums. The 
evidence presented there allowed me to assert that the ethicists’ discourse had, at the very 
least, not diffused into the United States legislature, where some of the most 
consequential and wide sweeping environmental policy is discussed, created, and 
implemented. I interpret this result to mean that the voices of the ethicist community have 
largely been ignored by at least some of those they wish to influence.  
Why has this happened?  In the next section I offer one possible explanation for 
this exclusion; a philosophical reason having to do with the inability of environmental 
ethicists to maintain applicability in the real world due to their unwavering, non-
anthropocentric commitments.   
Foundationalism in Environmental Ethics 
Although there are likely several explanations for why environmental ethics has 
so-far failed to enter some of the most important environmental policy circles, especially 
those that relate to the coordination and management of diverse locales, I want to suggest 
here that the main problem lies with the ideological commitments held by the majority of 
theorists in this field. According to some friendly critics, “environmental ethics has 
developed under a narrow predisposition that only a small set of approaches in the field is 
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worthwhile….”75 From these unshakable commitments—usually a position of non-
anthropocentrism only emphasizing nature’s intrinsic value—management decisions are 
supposed to be deduced.76 For instance, the prominent environmental ethicist Holmes 
Rolston III once stated (in a discussion of the plight of biodiversity in, and impoverished 
communities surrounding, Nepal’s Chitwan National Park): “If I did not believe…that 
tigers have intrinsic value, if I did not believe that species lines are morally considerable, 
if I thought the values of tigers were only those that this or that culture chooses to assign 
to them, or not, I would not be making such efforts to protect them.”77  
This declaration came in response to a series of challenges made by early 
environmental pragmatists in the late 1990s, most notably Ben Minteer and Bryan 
Norton. These pragmatists were keen to point out what they believed to be the primary 
problem with the foundationalism that had arrested most environmental ethicists at the 
time, certainly those like Rolston in the non-anthropocentric mainstream. In his critique, 
Minteer, invoking a Deweyan perspective of a “public philosophy,” worried that because 
most environmental ethicists had pre-occupied themselves with anchoring their ethics 
within principles ostensibly viewed to be metaphysically and epistemologically 
unshakable, the rich diversity of human values—which does not neatly fit within these 
principled constructs—is largely ignored.78 For his part, Rolston replied to Minteer’s 
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argument by flatly admitting to his tolerance for foundationalism.79 In particular, Rolston 
attempted to lay out how his philosophy actually squared with a culturally sensitive 
environmental ethic. As he wrote, “Should our environmental ethics be more 'culturally-
occupied' (aka culturally constructed)? Ought it to be built up when various parties, 
choosing their values in nature, meet together democratically and put their puzzle pieces 
together?”80 Rolston further suggested that to ‘correctly’ value a thing, we must acquire 
some knowledge about that thing.81  
No pragmatist would seriously decry an attempt to understand the contents of 
nature and its processes through the lens of scientific investigation, so to Rolston, this 
must mean that the real search for the true state-of-affairs, a quest that, according to him, 
can be free from the false constructs of “interactive experience”, is to rely on our 
privileged access to the ‘Real’ state-of-affairs. Whatever is gleaned in this pursuit is the 
sort of knowledge that counts and that ought to be guiding us in our valuations. 
Complicating this endeavor is the feeling that these values are objective so, in this 
pursuit, we are also looking for accuracy, for the correspondence of our knowledge with 
metaphysical reality. I am personally puzzled how this can be done absent experience 
although, admittedly, experience can sometimes lead to false conclusions. In expanding 
his point, Rolston suggests that his conviction to nature conservation is completely reliant 
on his apparent access to ‘privileged’ information about ‘nature for real.’82 Agreeably, 
Minteer explains in a follow-up paper that pragmatists can, without contradiction, be 
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open to the kind of pursuit advocated by Rolston, although the articulation of 
environmental obligations is less universalist, more a question of context, and a process 
ultimately dependent on human valuers rather than the discovery of purported “objective” 
values in the environment. Indeed, there is a widespread intuition among pragmatists that 
there is more than crass instrumentalism available when attempting to justify the defense 
of nature and its resources, perhaps even something approaching intrinsic value, though a 
version that lacks the “trumping” power Rolston and others wish it to have in public 
debate.83  
Having said this, the problem, in my reading, still remains for Rolston: how can it 
be possible that this axiological investigation is transcendent of human experience? In 
opening his initial rebuttal to Minteer, he speaks passionately about the great 
conservation and humanitarian work he and others have done in the Chitwan National 
Park—experiences that were no doubt formative (or at least reinforcing) to his belief in 
such noble causes. I find it hard to believe that Rolston would have instead ignored tigers 
and people had he a little doubt about the existence of nature’s intrinsic value. Indeed, 
engaging and reflecting on these experiences, as will be detailed in the proceeding 
section, is a pragmatic dictum. The view held by Minteer and Norton (and myself, for 
that matter) is that we can and do conceive of natural features and goods because the type 
of knowledge that is accessible by all people—not just the ones that have the luxury to 
ponder philosophically dense and contentious metaphysics—is borne out of our 
experiences with our environments.84  
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Norton and Minteer’s pragmatic critique of non-anthropocentric environmental 
ethics also attracted the attention of J. Baird Callicott, another founder of the field and 
with Rolston one of the more ardent ecocentric philosophers in the tradition.  Callicott 
sought to correct what he argued were misleading representations of his work by Minteer 
and Norton, suggesting that his fortified version of Aldo Leopold’s land ethic is not 
anchored as axiomatically as might be believed on Minteer’s reading.85 In his defense, 
Callicott resorts to whataboutism, claiming that Norton ignores the dogmatism apparent 
in the rest of our American democracy—from Christian fundamentalists to neoclassical 
economists—suggesting that he himself is but a low-hanging fruit and of little 
consequence to the everyday lives of concerned citizens. Callicott reiterates that his 
philosophy is reportedly contingent on emergent observations from large domains of 
natural and social sciences which support a Leopoldean land ethic. Because our capacity 
for the type of moral extension advocated by Leopold (from humans to animals to land) 
is built-in, according to Callicott (via an evolutionary-Humean account of the 
development of our moral sentiments), we have an obligation to uphold such an ethic. 
This ethical system purports to maintain a sensitivity to evolutionary and ecological 
theory. Indeed, Callicott has revised his conceptual arguments based on new information 
brought to light in the field on ecology.86 However, these claims (e.g. group selection has 
conferred “affective moral [responsiveness]”87) that seemingly support the whole 
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program, are treated as basic; that is, they are psychologically appealing premises that 
prop up proceeding claims that comprise his worldview. The difference between this 
‘weaker’ version of foundationalism and the stronger, epistemological version eschewed 
by pragmatists is that the weaker only has psychologically justified premises which 
maintain fallibility. Norton claims that Callicott has not made his position distinct 
between the two types of foundationalism (strong, epistemological and weak, 
psychological) he identifies.88 Pragmatism likely falls within this weakened version as 
described by Norton.  
The intensity and fervor with which those like Rolston and (to a lesser degree, 
Callicott) hold their views when juxtaposed with the economic/utilitarian alternative to 
environmental ethics is understandable. But this attitude, I believe, is set up by a false 
dichotomy. The view that there are only two ways—non-anthropocentric/intrinsic versus 
anthropocentric/instrumental—and you have to choose one, is, in my mind, unfounded. 
The remainder of this section will continue to briefly track the development of 
environmental ethics, highlighting how it failed to separate itself from Western 
philosophical formulae. This hitchhiking ultimately led to a focus on articulating 
foundations at the expense offering practical guidance regarding environmental action 
and decision making. 
To get the clearest idea about the development of modern, mainstream 
environmental ethics, it may be prudent to consider the contents of Western philosophy 
that was antecedent to it. Greek philosophy, which primarily inquired about how we 
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ought to behave toward one another and how to please the gods, serves as the basis for 
what we call Western philosophy.89 Many came before Aristotle, but his prolificity and 
brilliance anchor him as the father of ancient or old philosophy such that St. Thomas 
Aquinas, distinguished in his own right, famously referred to Aristotle as “The 
Philosopher.” Relevant to this discussion, Aristotle suggested that the ‘principles of 
things’ was “first philosophy.” We understand the axioms from his extensive work, such 
as the law of noncontradiction, to be a blend of the domains of what are now referred to 
as logic, metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. He expertly used these now distinct areas 
of investigation to elucidate this first philosophy. Although Aristotle’s mentor Plato also 
discussed a first philosophy, two concepts that would preoccupy philosophical minds for 
centuries emerged more prominently in Aristotle’s work.90 These two ideas, closely 
related by their absolutism, are logical universals (i.e. a proposition that is either true or 
false in all possible, real or imagined, scenarios)91 and the concept of epistemological 
foundationalism, that is, a theory of knowledge suggesting there are beliefs that do not (or 
cannot) require experiential verification. Despite this potentially puzzling feature, these 
foundations are viewed as necessary so that we might have justification for beliefs.   
Foundationalism, according to Aristotle was the solution to an epistemological 
dilemma called ‘infinite regress’ or ‘limitless dependence.’ This dilemma just states that 
if we have good reasons for believing a claim that follows some premise, we are 
assuming that the premise must be the result of other good reasons where it itself is a 
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conclusion. Simply put, there must be some justification in believing any initial premise 
(e.g. if p and q because of r, then what good reasons for r?). Taken to its logical 
conclusion, we might spend our whole lives seeking justification for believing a single 
claim, looking for evidence at each step piecemeal. It is possible that some form of 
foundationalism and its connected philosophies has since remained historically popular 
throughout the Western world due to the uptick in monotheistic religious belief beginning 
two millennia ago. Divine command and religious canon provide a foundational ontology 
and corollary epistemology: we are justified in believing the claims that properly utilize, 
say, the Judeo-Christian Bible as source material because it allegedly comprises direct 
messages from the Creator. The most prominent foundationalist was probably René 
Descartes (1596-1650), himself a devotee to the Christian tradition, who wrote what is 
arguably the most well-known phrase (or some derivative) in philosophy: ego cogito, 
ergo sum. This is a Latin translation of “je pense, donc je suis” which appeared in 
Descartes (1637) Discourse on the Method. The loose, English version is the celebrated: 
“I am, I exist” or “I think, therefore I am.”92 The context of the phrase is to demonstrate 
that even in the face of hyperbolic doubt (i.e. all of Descartes’ sensory organs were 
malfunctioning or providing false information due to physical or supernatural reasons), 
the fact that he can ponder the possibility of being misled must mean there is something 
capable of pondering—his mind. Descartes utilizes this foundation throughout his work, 
particularly in the Meditations, to begin justifying other, derivative knowledge, namely 
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the existence of God.93 Descartes remained an influential figure in all domains of 
philosophy as he appeared to be a replacement to the Aristolean creed, also serving as the 
catalyst for what is known as modern philosophy. This time period has been prolific, 
producing familiar thinkers such as David Hume, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, 
Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, many of which seems to take a foundationalist epistemology 
as granted.  
This is, I suggest, where the preoccupation with a foundationalist theory of value 
preferred by many ethicists (including most environmental ethicists) might have begun. 
Indeed, in one of the early and most well-known arguments in environmental ethics 
advancing a biocentric theory of value, Kenneth Goodpaster (1978) examines the 
question, “In universalizing our putative moral maxims, what is the scope of the variable 
over which universalization is to range?”94 Although Goodpaster sought to clarify the 
“framework for moral consideration”95 such that the ethical extension Aldo Leopold 
advocates in A Sand County Almanac96 is made logically possible, Goodpaster falls into 
the familiar foundationalist trap, ultimately outlining “a ‘life principle’ of moral 
considerability. He, like other environmental philosophers, laments the inability of 
conventional Western ethical theory to account for the environment in a direct moral 
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sense, but Goodpaster stops short of offering an alternative to narrow, principle-driven, 
line-in-the-sand positions. He does close the essay by admitting that more thought needs 
to be given to the “balance of competing claims”97—a crucial task indeed to the 
supposedly applied field of environmental ethics; but one whose resolution does not seem 
available given such a dogmatic adherence to a single, universal moral principle 
purported to govern human-nature relations.  
In Nature in Common, Ben Minteer (2009) gives a brief historical account to 
explain the emergence and sustained preference of non-anthropocentric arguments by the 
first salvo of (mostly American) environmental philosophers. He discusses the primary 
non-anthropocentric rejection of more anthropocentric approaches by Routley and 
Goodpaster, a move these philosophers defend by claiming that mainstream ethical 
theory appears to justify some form of human chauvinism.98 It does seem that 
environmental ethicists readily adopted a non-anthropocentric principle (i.e. nature has 
intrinsic, immutable value) largely without challenging the inherited formula that 
underlies these undesirable Western ethical theories, although they expressly rejected 
these theories as insufficient for the development of a robust environmental ethic. That is, 
for an ethical theory to have any potency, the belief is that it must rest on some 
uncompromising foundation and only be composed of a kind of common denominator.99 
Up until the late 19th century, few alternatives to this thinking were given consideration. 
Likewise, nonanthropocentrists swapped one foundationalist stance, i.e., 
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traditional/anthropocentric ethical projects that had proved destructive for the 
environment, for foundationalist biocentric or ecocentric arguments asserting the intrinsic 
value of nature. I believe this move resulted in a philosophical stalemate, while also 
taking attention away from the applied promise of environmental ethics.  Instead, it 
forced a “first-principles” argument over whose foundation is the most unshakable, a 
debate that may be philosophically interesting but that does not get us very far in 
understanding the interplay and utility of alternative environmental ethics in decision 
making and practice. Enlightenment thinking may have pigeon-holed us into believing 
we already had all the tools and maxims necessary (i.e. reason) to sort out philosophical 
problems, but this unchanging nature is precisely why I think we may have run aground 
in the environmental enterprise. Unfortunately, to the field’s principle-driven theorists, 
suggesting an approach that rejects the central role of foundational principles in 
environmental ethics amounts to heresy and has been widely controversial.100 In the 
following section, however, I  seek to explore and defend an alternative, an approach that 
has become known as “environmental pragmatism.” As we will see, this mode of 
environmental ethics focuses less on authoritative statements of principle and more on 
processes of inquiry and decision making101 and its applicability in an environmental 
context. 
A Pragmatic Alternative  
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While the received narrative of environmental ethics suggests a very black-and-
white set of choices—one in which various non-anthropocentric arguments dominate as 
the only viable alternative to what it said to be an arrogant anthropocentric outlook—here 
I will argue that pragmatism is better suited as a forward-thinking environmental ethics 
precisely because it can capture the real plurality of values (including human-regarding 
ones). Instead of beginning with incontrovertible rights-and-wrongs and fixed moral 
universals, most progenitors of pragmatism instead suggests that we ought to recognize 
and promote ethical pluralism, contextualism (i.e., the importance of distinct historic, 
cultural, and social-ecological settings in shaping what we know and value), and a 
general process of experimental inquiry into our moral, social, and political lives. Early 
American pragmatists such as Charles Pierce, John Dewey, and William James, however, 
were not explicitly concerned with environmental conditions and what today we could 
call “environmental ethics” in their work. In the rest of this section, I will therefore 
consider the origins of pragmatism to highlight and magnify certain elements and  
articulate how the pragmatic worldview has been appropriately seated within an 
environmental philosophy.102  
According to philosopher A.C. Grayling (2005), American philosophical 
pragmatism began as a riposte to the prevailing philosophies in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. These philosophies, as detailed in the previous section, were marked by a 
certain metaphysical and epistemological absolutism, and therefore plagued by abstract 
and rigid understandings of truth, facts, and values according to the pragmatists. An 
intellectual bravery spurred the early pragmatic thinkers to establish their own ‘school’ of 
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thought, to push back against the dominant philosophical theories. The two primary 
sources of this bravery were probably the post-Civil War frontier spirit which saw these 
philosophically-inclined Americans consuming less of the Continental and British 
philosophies. And secondly, Darwin’s theory of evolution, because it pressed forward the 
idea that adaptation is the result of a naturally selective process inspired early pragmatists 
to fashion a parallel problem solving and truth-seeking process, what we can think of as 
akin to the natural selection of ideas.103  
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) is widely credited for kicking-off the 
pragmatic movement. One of the few defining features of the early pragmatic school was 
their experience-based approach to the ‘verification’ of claims, and this position was one 
that Peirce belabored.104 In his earliest works, Peirce began connecting the norms of 
knowledge generation recognized in the scientific method with his own pragmatic 
worldview. He suggested that philosophers tended to raise frivolous reasons for doubting 
claims (and, in turn, propose outlandish thought-experiments such as the previously 
discussed Cartesian demonic inception) and that this did not capture the lived experience 
of the collective human mind. Instead then, what we ought to do is comfortably utilize a 
scientific method, treating new information as hypotheses, in everyday knowledge 
acquisition. We then come closer to an understanding of any given claim or proposition 
through its empirical and practical effects. If, for instance, we have just learned that 
knives are sharp, then we might hypothesize that they are capable of cutting, engage in 
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the act of cutting with a knife, and therefore expect them to be used for such future tasks. 
As contemporary philosopher Robert Talisse describes, this anticipatory focus usurps the 
sometimes non-sensical explanations we might hear from philosophers.105 The analysis 
that ‘the knife instantiates the Platonic form of the sharp’ is too abstract to be useful in 
everyday life and therefore is not part of the pragmatic agenda. Instead, Peirce thought 
we should be using words to convey their practical effects: the knife is sharp therefore it 
cuts. Capturing and deploying a ‘method of science’, Peirce says, will lead to a 
convergence between our opinions and the facts.106 He further attaches a moral claim to 
this cognitive pursuit; clarifying that what remains of the utmost importance is a 
dedication to seeking out the truth. We ought not be dissuaded from this truth-seeking 
practice due to a consternation that we were wrong, or more eloquently said by Peirce, 
that our ideas were “rotten.” Importantly—and to reiterate—Peirce did conceive of there 
being an objective truth ‘out-there’ but the way to move closer to (but perhaps never 
reach) this truth was through a scientific method.  
Peirce’s focus on the experiential and the verifiable was welcomed by his fellow 
pragmatists, but also critiqued for filtering out claims of aesthetics and values. William 
James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952) believed that the contents of 
knowledge include claims about faith and values. James was keen to pick up on this point 
as the offspring of an especially religious father, Henry James Sr, and in some accounts, 
by various near-death experiences.107 The narrow sense of pragmatism (or as James 
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would have preferred to call it, humanism108) that Peirce offered would not allow one to 
test faith claims as hypotheses in some sort of scientific experiment. James, along with 
many other of his popular scientific contemporaries (such as Thomas Huxley), sought to 
insulate religious belief from the deluge of scientific theories that emerged in the late 19th 
century into the 20th and of which could be conceived as offering an alternative, secular 
explanation of reality. With James, the power of pragmatism came from the belief that 
“truth [is what] happens to an idea.”109 He continues:  
…the ordinary agreement-formula—just such consequences being what 
we have in mind whenever we say that our ideas ‘agree’ with reality. They 
lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, into 
or up to, or towards, other parts of experience with which we feel all the 
while—such feeling being among our potentialities—that the original 
ideas remain in agreement.110 
Like Peirce, James wanted to put beliefs up to the tribunal of experience, but he also 
thought beliefs need not originate with experience. To explain this caveat, it is first 
important to understand that James thought we should not endlessly search for a truth that 
mirrors some ultimate reality, departing somewhat from Peirce. He suggested that we 
cannot know when our knowledge accurately hangs with this ultimate reality and 
therefore, we ought not care if it does. The test is simply whether our beliefs are 
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instrumental in the long-run navigation of our lives or not.111 Further, there are situations, 
that could warrant the acceptance (or consideration at least) of non-evidentiary claims, 
especially applied to the belief in religious deities. James’s pragmatism is consistent with 
the idea that belief in a higher power can confer benefits (salvation, entrance into heaven, 
etc.) and if it pays to hold these benefits, then that belief is personally true. Presumably, 
no evidence will be supplied (until, possibly, after death) to support a religious doctrine, 
but what outcome might be expected—heaven versus hell, for example—should play a 
role in the sanctioning of a claim or belief.112 James thought that this decision was simply 
unavoidable and that each of us would run up against this issue at some point in our lives. 
The problem is, as has been stated, that there is scant physical, testable evidence for the 
existence of God. Regardless, James thinks, we must choose to believe or not.113 
Moreover, whichever religious paradigm you find yourself in, the rest of your beliefs 
(and therefore actions) would be fundamentally different than if you were to choose the 
other side. Because we are forced to decide, without the aid of empirical evidence, and 
that this decision is “momentous”, we turn toward the dividends the belief in God is said 
to pay out. These perceived dividends are all one needs to justify the belief in God.  
The important point, though, was that James widened, philosophically speaking, 
and popularized Peirce’s pragmatism. While ingesting Peirce’s initial iteration of the 
pragmatic worldview in a small discussion circle they referred to as the Metaphysical 
Club, nearly simultaneously James was finding and notating appeals to what he viewed as 
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‘practicalism’ in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.114 Louis 
Menand—who provides the definitive history of the Club and its interlocuters—suggests 
that James may have arrived at the pragmatist station without Peirce’s influence given 
James’s dedication to the doctrine of free-will inspired by a French philosopher Charles 
Renouvier some years earlier.115 The connection here is similar to that of James’s 
argument for the belief in God. James argued that while no evidence may arise to confirm 
or disconfirm a metaphysical determinism,116 we might as well reject this, and take the 
position that free-will is the true state-of-affairs by first believing that it is true. The 
feeling of overseeing one’s own destiny is worth the possibility of being wrong about 
determinism. In fact, there is no punishment. Between this premise and the might-as-
well-ness of religious belief, James was often criticized for a seeming wantonness of 
conviction.117 Indeed, Peirce himself was amongst James’s critics and this disagreement 
over the permissiveness allowed in James’s version of pragmatism forced Peirce to invent 
a new ‘school’ to distinguish his views from James’s, which he called pragmaticism.   
While William James was indeed the most vocal orator and popularizer of 
pragmatism—which he publicly attributed to Peirce in an attempt to pull him (Peirce) 
from self-inflicted poverty—John Dewey utilized the populist appeal of pragmatism to 
blur the lines of philosophy and carry it further into the American zeitgeist. Dewey, 
originally a disciple of Hegelian thinking, distinguished himself early as an educational 
reformer, although the areas he went on to reform transcended education. Dewey’s 
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contributions are numerous, but his argument encased in The School and Society is 
perhaps the most enduring as it relates to pragmatism (a later work, Education and 
Democracy, would compete for that title as well). In it, Dewey’s pragmatism blooms and 
he suggests that learning-by-doing is one of the most effective pedagogical approaches 
that more institutions ought to be undertaking.118 This folds into his view that the norms 
of science experimentation are simply refined and systematized versions of the way 
humans think generally.119 Importantly for Dewey, he understands activities of learning, 
inquiry, and experimentation as social enterprises. Dewey’s pragmatism ultimately had 
more in common with James than it did with Peirce, but this point about social groups 
and community shares its intellectual origins with Peirce’s view that truth is that which 
stands up to scrutiny by peers. Dewey’s conception of truth followed from this 
involvement within social groups, an idea he referred to as warranted assertibility.120 
Dewey understood that even the systematized version of inquiry (read: scientific testing) 
does not necessarily lead to capital-T truth, as Peirce explained. Instead, results we get 
from rigorous experimentation and from general problem-solving behaviors merely lead 
to claims that we would have reasons to put forth in a public setting. That which we are 
warranted in asserting is best seen as a statement of probability. Contra to his analytic 
philosophical critics such as Bertrand Russell, Dewey clarifies that for us to consider 
these assertions knowledge, is appropriate.121 The first admission in the process of 
inquiry is to acknowledge that evidence, reasons, procedures, and the like are not 
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infallible and therefore the conclusions we might reach through this process are not 
either. Indeed, what might be entered as evidence for or against some proposition could 
change at any given moment.122 In the present though, for something to be asserted with 
warrant just means that those who hear a claim are likely to nod their heads, that there is 
a consensus surrounding the good reasons to accept the truth of the idea.  
It should be no surprise that Dewey’s conception of truth (settled on through the 
process of “competent inquiry”123) relied on the engagement with a community of 
interlocutors. Much of the advocacy he went on to practice involved imagining a society 
that emulated his scientized understanding of truth (i.e. that the products of inquiry are 
self-corrective because they are exposed to groups of deliberators). In the nomenclature 
of political systems, this is essentially a participatory democracy.  
The late Richard Rorty, probably the most well-known neo-pragmatist (and 
responsible to no small degree for the revival of pragmatism in philosophical and cultural 
circles in the last third of the 20th century), took up issue with Dewey’s alleged worship 
of the scientific method and the institution of science in general, though he did champion 
a loose Deweyan theory of truth.124 One of the main contentions is that Rorty perceives 
an elitism conferred by a scientific standard of knowledge, one that might privilege 
information that has its origins in the institutions (i.e. loose organizations governed by 
similar rules and codes of conduct) of science.125 Like his pragmatic predecessors, Rorty 
was discontented by the dominant philosophical trend during his formative years. Rorty, 
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in his eloquence, discussed the utility of his neo-pragmatism as “merely…an effort to 
clear away some alder and sumac, which sprang up during a 30-year spell of wet 
philosophical weather - the period that we now look back on as 'positivistic analytic 
philosophy'.126 And so he felt even more strongly about retrieving the concepts of 
knowledge and truth from the grips of Science and placing it into the hands of the 
commoner, true to his Trotskian (or at least socialist) upbringing.127 While Rorty thinks 
of this as a point of departure between himself and classical pragmatists (esp. Dewey), 
Ben Minteer points out that he probably was much more similar to Dewey than he chose 
to believe, especially given Rorty’s very Deweyan reliance on experimental inquiry.128 
Richard Bernstein, whom I reference in the next major section, also takes issue with 
Rorty’s characterization of Dewey’s politics. Indeed, if it hasn’t been made clear at this 
point, Rorty was as known for his pragmatism as he was for his apparently controversial 
positions—an opinion of himself that Rorty was disappointed with.129  
One of the lasting impressions Rorty left, especially as it pertains to the pragmatic 
mode of environmental ethics, is a distinction between private and public philosophy. In 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty discusses the state-of-affairs that would obtain 
if we give up on making our private and public beliefs commensurate with one 
another.130 What this does, Rorty claims, is it confers the existence of what he calls, the 
‘liberal ironist’; a human that desires the end of (human) suffering, but simultaneously 
does not see the purpose in entertaining the sort of moral thought experiments like the 
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Trolley Problem,131 because they are infinitely unlikely to occur as constructed. Indeed, 
Rorty thinks that this search for either metaphysical or theological formulae redirects our 
attention away from engaging in the actual abatement of suffering as we are compelled to 
first seek out an answer we may never find before acting. We find ourselves hung-up here 
because of philosophy’s inherent resistance to holding more than one theoretical 
justification for being both as an individual and as a citizen. Rorty discusses the discord 
between Nietzchean autonomy and Deweyan communitarianism—where each blames the 
other for leading to irrationality and moral failure. If only, he laments, we could rid 
ourselves of this orderly predisposition (one that a majority of ‘nonintellectuals’ are 
committed to, he admits), we would find ourselves in a utopic society populated by 
ironists that creates solidarity between citizens and squelches cruelty.132  
Although there are numerous pragmatists that might have been summoned here to 
support the explication of an environmental pragmatism (e.g. Jurgen Habermas, George 
Mead, W. V. O. Quine, and others), their exclusion is due to the breadth and depth of the 
pragmatic tradition. The topic of concern in the proceeding section—the commitments 
staked out by pragmatists—were primarily developed by the three classical pragmatists 
profiled in this section (i.e. Peirce, James and Dewey). Rorty’s inclusion here as the sole 
neo-pragmatist is primarily due to his Deweyan torch-bearing and his public- and 
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political-facing philosophy which has been, in my view, a weakness in environmental 
ethical discourse. Thus, Rorty serves as a source of inspiration toward the improvement 
of our relationships with one another in an environmental context. Although he has been 
roundly criticized, even by fellow pragmatists like Richard Bernstein,133 I see Rorty as a 
kind of keystone species for the proliferation of a pragmatic ethics, especially applied to 
the environment.  
The Pragmatic Commitments. 
Reflecting on the 100 years of pragmatic writing that preceded him, the 
contemporary neo-pragmatist Richard Bernstein (mentioned above) described his own 
version of the pragmatic ethos as possessing a handful of defining features: 1) anti-
foundationalism, 2) fallibilism, 3) obligation to membership in a critical community, 4) 
reflexivity to contingency, and 5) pluralistic.134 A short summary of these elements is 
helpful in understanding the distinctiveness of philosophical pragmatism -- and its 
suitability for the more experimental, democratic, and naturalistic mode of environmental 
ethics I defend in this dissertation. 
The first commitment, anti-foundationalism, is an epistemological position 
referring to the importance of experience. Pragmatists argue that we do not gain 
knowledge (including facts and values) absent experience. Experience is essential to our 
intellectual development. Therefore, contra to the foundations upon which supposed 
innate, intuitive knowledge rests, pragmatism suggests that these foundations either do 
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not exist or are, at the very least, are not accessible by us. This view allows the pragmatist 
to avoid entering the metaphysical debate altogether.  
Secondly, due to the way we must go about retrieving knowledge (i.e. 
empirically), we have no guarantee that it is correct, that is, all knowledge is fallible. We 
must rely on our sense organs and the signals they send to our brains to gain and maintain 
knowledge, but we each have innumerable examples when our experiences and more 
poignantly, our memories of events, have been faulty. Simply put, we could be wrong. 
If the information we retrieve through experience is potentially false, how do we 
go about minimizing and correcting our mistakes? The third component of the pragmatic 
ethos suggests that we can easily test our knowledge against the collective experience. 
This requires one to become a part of a critical, democratic community whose members 
reflect upon propositions, either accepting or criticizing them in good faith. Over time, 
knowledge is vetted by the critical community, comparable to the way the modern 
scientific method (i.e. hypothesis testing and peer review) is deployed. This of course, 
does not mean consensus comes without risk. Just as we have individually made 
perceptive mistakes, it is possible for a group to do the same (e.g. uninformed readers of 
very subtle, satirical publication The Onion for instance).  
Fourthly, pragmatists are sensitive to the inescapable uncertainty in “…the 
universe, our inquiries, our lives”135 and simply accept that decisions often need to be 
made without perfect information. Most metaphysical arguments seek to remove chance, 
contingency, and risk to justify universal maxims (e.g. the debate over free-will versus 
determinism: either that all actions are the antecedent of some other action thus none of 
                                                          
135 Richard J. Bernstein, “Pragmatism, Pluralism and the Healing of Wounds,” Proceedings and Addresses 
of the American Philosophical Association 63, no. 3 (1989), 9. 
53 
 
our choices are really ours, or there is true autonomy and our thoughts/actions are ours). 
Although metaphysical arguments are not empirical, we can suppose that the same way a 
hypothesis would be rejected if there were some countervailing evidence, universality 
fails if one chance event is not accounted for in a metaphysical argument. Because this 
area of philosophy has been largely ignored by pragmatists due to this lack of experiential 
validation, the rejection of metaphysics is both a reason for doing so and a result. The 
focus then is on the actual contents of experience and not on what some philosophy says 
we should be experiencing.136 
Pragmatism, while bearing some intellectual relation to it, also departs from the 
tradition of analytic philosophy (the two developed alongside one another in the late 19th 
century although analytic wisdom supplanted pragmatism in influence as the 20th century 
wore on). Critically speaking, analytic argumentation engenders confrontation and attack 
through pointed debate. The objective of a debate is to win, either through making 
genuinely superior arguments or making your opponent appear inferior. There is an 
inherent obsessiveness in the analytic program that stresses accurate and precisely 
defined terms and structural logic. The claim here is not that accuracy or logic is 
somehow undesirable, but it does have some time insensitive qualities. Debate indeed 
does have its place in society, such as in front of a judge, but the possibility for social 
learning is muted compared to a dialogue. Pragmatists prefer to recognize and resolve 
disagreements in a so-called “dialogical encounter” where differing points of view are 
considered in the best possible light and are not so hastily dismissed or assailed. As 
evidenced within the Plato’s account of the Socratic Dialogues (probably the most well-
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known ‘academic’ example of this methodology) this does not always lead to consensus. 
Allow me to make at least one more appeal to authority: Nelson Mandela credited the 
successful dissolution of South Africa’s apartheid to the use of the dialogic method that 
allowed for “justice and social cohesion.”137 Regardless, skepticism about the efficacy of 
dialogue as a teaching and learning instrument is indeed welcome. Responding to 
critiques in depth is beyond the scope of this paper however.138 Analytic skills are not 
discarded in a dialogical encounter. Pragmatists just posit that the lack of sensitivity and 
dominating attitude that is engendered from argumentation is unlikely to help reach an 
amicable result.  
This is the basis for the fifth axiom, pluralism.139 The recognition of many 
perspectives, experiences, and modes of thinking do not cloud the decision sphere. 
Rather, differences and uniqueness are encouraged as it may lead to intellectual 
innovation. New ideas are more likely to arise out of dissimilar groups than within 
homogenous ones. This is especially relevant in environmental management where tunnel 
vision and attitudes about “the right way” are prevalent. 
To summarize: Because we have no access to intuitive knowledge, we must gain 
it through experience. Due to chance and contingency, our knowledge via experience 
could be partial or wrong (fallible), therefore we must share our experiences and 
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knowledge with one another to reduce the chance of being mistaken. This sharing 
community functions best if members can engage in productive dialogue. The community 
must, further, be open-minded to multiple points of view in order for this dialogue to 
occur.  
Pragmatism as an Environmental Ethics? 
The pragmatic focus on experience as the birthplace of (any and all) knowledge 
means that experience is also the origin of value. Kelly Parker (1996) succinctly offers 
the pragmatist line on values: “The question of ethics—‘What is good?’—ultimately 
brings us back to questions about what is experienced as good in the interaction of the 
organism with its environment.”140 This expression is a recapitulation of what the early 
pragmatists thought about the emergence of truth and value. Here Parker highlights the 
implicit transactional and relational nature of our existence—a major concern of 
Dewey’s—and how we can start to think about connecting old-school pragmatism to 
contemporary environmental problems. Dewey considers a so-called ‘consummate 
experience’ as one in which an individual is actively engaged with and absorbed by their 
environment and is perceptive of this relationship.141 This is the pinnacle of aesthetic 
experience as a person in this mode is deriving value from the both the action (as an 
interactive being) and a follow-up, reflective phase that can ascribe said action as having 
some value. For example, hearing a joke told by a comedian can beget laughter (the 
action); contemplating why it was funny and spurring one to re-tell the joke puts a cap on 
the experience, making it consummatory.  
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The environment, and others within it, grants these experiences. Whatever the 
‘good’ is, will largely depend on what space the person asking the question occupies. If 
we are serious about living meaningful lives, then we ought to also take seriously the 
context in which those lives occur—that is, the environment. This requires investigation, 
it requires empirical work so that we may create an understanding of what people are 
valuing and how they continue to seek said value out. It should be clear though, that 
because pragmatists think it is a mistake to separate humans from nature, there is 
therefore a bi-directionality in impact; that is, insofar as the environment has influence on 
any individual, that individual influences their environment. This attitude holds for the 
multitude of environments in which humans derive value. In philosophical terms, this 
means that pragmatists reject a spectator theory of knowledge—that what we know is 
simply piped in from somewhere—and accept that knowledge (again, this includes the 
generation of values) is created through continuous interactions with others and our 
environments.  
As much as I believe environmental pragmatism seeks to move away from what 
we typically consider academic philosophy, intellectual divisions are still created as if it 
were fastened securely within it. The so-called “substantive” environmental pragmatists 
such as Bryan Norton and Ben Minteer prefer that we do not forget about the likes of 
William James, John Dewey, Charles S. Peirce and the rest of the principal figures. I tend 
to agree more with the “methodological” pragmatist Andrew Light, who worries that 
using these names (and their philosophical commitments) to replace the more familiar, 
contemporary voices in environmental ethics does not dissuade philosophers from 
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discussing metaphysical properties, far removed from every day environmental issues.142 
Rather, it may continue to muddy the waters and hamstring the promises of 
environmental pragmatism. It is also possible that we avoid an overreliance on appealing 
to ‘authorities’ to frame the kinds of questions we want to address. The world in which 
pragmatism was created is now vastly different, so we should avoid, inasmuch as 
possible, a sole interest in importing hundred-year-old arguments. Light argues, however, 
that this need not always be the case. Certainly, we should not abandon all attempts to 
press and argue over the most ethical positions and to describe our duties with the natural 
world in philosophical terms. There is indeed value to be derived from the examination of 
the hard work others have done (hopefully this has come across in the intellectual review 
above). However, if all philosophers have to offer are esoteric ramblings, then we remain 
self-serving and irrelevant to the larger environmental management community which 
neutralizes the benefits of a pragmatic environmental ethics in my view. In fact, this 
position was held by Dewey himself, who suggested that “philosophy recovers itself 
when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes 
a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men [and 
women].143 Light notes, and the empirical work I presented in the introduction of this 
dissertation affirms, that the majority of those relevant policy makers (and thus their 
policies) are overwhelmingly directed toward humans, signaling a niche that 
environmental philosophy has yet to fill. We should, in addition to fulfill these 
‘traditional’ philosophical duties, serve as moral interpreters. He calls upon philosophers 
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to fulfill this “public” task, namely, to translate moral, philosophical views into more 
digestible arguments that are more likely to be picked up on to create and justify policy, 
even if the views do not resonate with their own perspective.144  
I feel that this is an important step to distance environmental ethics from its so-far 
deserved stereotype as just another brand of ivory-tower philosophy in search of 
metaphysical foundations. Not that the pragmatist commits himself to any sort of 
theoretical justification for this move, but insofar as it is required, it is found within 
Rorty’s private vs. public distinction (discussed above). Andrew Light follows Rorty’s 
distinction and argues that a compatibilism between divergent camps might be achieved 
if we separate our disagreements into these two conversational spheres.145 The pragmatist 
can offer contingency—descriptions about potential states-of-affairs that motivate 
discussion and action towards those desirable states.146 For environmental issues, this 
side-steps metaphysical disagreements over whether or not conservation efforts like de-
extinction returns the full value (or any) of a species and focuses on the practical 
consequences (e.g. the potential effects of species revival).  
A series of legitimate critiques directed toward pragmatism must be addressed 
through the course of this research. For instance, there is some worry that the reliance on 
the democratic process distracts from the real problem of procedural justice, e.g. non-
present voices, including non-humans, or future voices. The pragmatist who 
optimistically believes that deliberation should involve all actors who might be affected 
by decisions is certainly naïve. In practice, this move is difficult to pull off. Some parties, 
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despite their stake in particular situations, will decide not to exercise their ability to 
participate for any number of reasons ranging from ambivalence to a sympathy for 
intense individualism. Further, the willingness and ability of interlocuters to actually 
reach fair and just resolutions is a fairly optimistic perspective—an increasingly 
untenable position given the current political divisions in the United States. Because 
pragmatism is said to prop up the democratic value of compromise, one can imagine a 
debate settling on the least common denominator, which does not typically result in good 
(i.e., protective) results outcomes for the environment. And lastly, pragmatism assumes 
that decision making contexts work alongside concerns of procedural justice, but yet, no 
empirical evidence has been laid forth to protect these claims. Each of these detractions, 
and others, are broached in the fourth chapter in the context of environmental 
management. No promises can be made that these concerns can be assuaged in light of 
the commentary there, only the acknowledgement that this is far from a perfect enterprise 
and much more work is in order.  
Conclusion  
So far, the evidence presented suggests that the narrow language of environmental 
ethics, as described by its own progenitors, has not been able to pierce the policy 
discussions held at the highest level in the United States. The natural language processing 
approach, topic modeling, uncovered no evidence to suggest that both larger themes nor 
any specific language used to construct moral arguments for the protection of the natural 
world in the most formative time (the late 1970s) diffused into the Congressional Record 
roughly a decade later. Admittedly, this is a somewhat disappointing, but unsurprising 
conclusion given, as I’ve argued here, the foundationalist formula that was retained by 
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the early environmental ethicists as the field branched off the trunk of Western 
philosophy. In my view, the disappointment is warranted. The purpose of doing 
environmental ethics is to bring awareness to the moral issues that underlie 
environmental problems, therefore ethicists should be interested in the efficacy of their 
approaches, the loudness of their voices, the bite of their arguments. They ought to be 
interested in creating inroads with conservationists, land managers, natural resource 
technicians, and perhaps most importantly, policy makers. On some of these fronts, there 
is perhaps success to be lauded.147 Between Stone (2003) and the topic modeling 
experiment performed in the previous chapter, it appears that the effort to influence 
policy has not been as successful. Considering that the body of work is now approaching 
50 years old and is core to legitimate research programs in universities in the United 
States and across the world, this is disconcerting result, one that prompts the line of 
questioning presented in this chapter. That is, there are perhaps philosophical reasons (i.e. 
that the overwhelming focus on foundational, metaphysical arguments is confusing and 
strange to outsiders) that this uptake in policy has been slow or non-existent. A remaining 
and important piece to discuss is the questionable import that environmental ethics might 
have for practitioners and will be broached in the proceeding chapters. But briefly here, 
the concern is in regard to how environmental ethics can guide decision making in 
various ecological contexts, in areas that exist on the spectrum between completely wild 
to thoroughly urban.     
I therefore suggest, as a hypothesis, that pragmatism applied to the environment, 
which is largely influenced by 19th century philosophers living in the United States, more 
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likely tracks the lived experience of members in the environmental management 
community because focuses on value pluralism, recognition of context, attention to 
contingency, and deliberation as a means to problem-solve as its ethos. I do not advocate 
that the current environmental ethics program be replaced by this pragmatism. My wish is 
to merely help to construct an ethical program for the environment which is responsive to 
increasingly socially diverse locales and unpredictable climatological conditions. We 
have a human sustainability problem and I believe an evolution toward planetary 
stewardship is one of the key pieces necessary to move forward more humbly as a 
species. In some places that means we might most effectively offer an argument for 
protection by an appeal to a non-foundationalist version of the intrinsic value of nature; in 
others, we might have to live with the fact that an ecosystem services argument will be 
the most potent. The upshot of rejecting foundationalism is that you might realize that 
various ethical arguments for environmental protection do not need to stand in 
juxtaposition with one another. Rather, they can be viewed, by analogy, as screws with 
which you need to match the proper drive.   
To find on-the-ground support for this alternative to environmental ethics 
narrowly conceived—pragmatism—an in-depth look at the innerworkings of 
management and practice in two on-going environmental interventions will be 
undertaken in Chapter 4. My plan for arriving at this evidence is to utilize a tradition 
within the management community called adaptive co-management. I will discuss the 
suitability of this management tradition in Chapter 3 but will first provide a lay of the 
land of the adaptive co-management tradition in Chapter 2.  
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The real cases deploying this management framework will serve as the laboratory 
to test these pragmatic claims. This, however, is not simply a question of does adaptive 
co-management work, but how does it work, are the results better than alternative 
schemes, what limitations faced by practitioners can be addressed by the 100 years of 
pragmatic thought?  
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PART II: Methodological Argument  
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3. CONTEXTUALIZING ADAPTIVE COLLABORATIVE MANAGEMENT 
In response to our increasing commitment to manage the environment, unintended 
consequences and ecological stochasticity remains the cause for some trepidation. The 
difficulty of successfully implementing an environmental intervention in a complex 
ecosystem is compounded by surprise and uncertainty inherent in these systems. This fact 
is not a new revelation, but has indeed been one of the reasons some environmentalists 
prefer a hands-off management—or unmanaged—approach (although many will argue 
that this perspective has become untenable as humans increasingly shape their 
environments to meet the needs of a growing global population). In response, the 
framework of adaptive management evolved as a riposte to the anxiety of surprise, 
uncertainty, and inefficiency of management decisions. Together, with the democratic, 
collaborative governance tradition that has its own origin story, adaptive management has 
formed the aptly named adaptive co-management framework. 
One of the more recent, widely circulated publications, simply named Adaptive 
Co-Management, arose out of a series of meetings discussing the evolution and 
convergence of the adaptive management and co-management theories.148 The result was 
a bridging of narratives that took the participatory focus of collaborative management and 
married it with the methodical, learning-by-doing style of adaptive management. With 
this synthesized management approach, relevant stakeholders devise plans, typically with 
many alternatives, reflecting upon successes, failures, while taking advantage of group 
expertise to (re)inform their policy and practice. To better uncover some of the issues 
with adaptive co-management and also explicate its strengths, breaking the framework 
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down into its component pieces is a necessary first step. The proceeding two sections will 
do just that and will be followed with a more in-depth discussion specifically about 
adaptive co-management. 
Adaptive Management 
Much of what we now understand to comprise modern-day ecology, biodiversity 
conservation, and the new science of sustainability can be attributed to various watershed 
moments in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. For instance, as Georges Cuvier 
campaigned for the idea that species can actually disappear, the concept of extinction 
(and of limits) was being demonstrated in real time all across the globe. If any historical 
case of species disappearance in America stands out, it is probably the passenger pigeon. 
Famously, John James Audubon (of the National Audubon Society fame) described his 
55-mile day trip across the American mid-west in 1813 not as secluded and dull as we 
might expect. Instead, he claimed his caravan across the plains was overwhelming and 
crowded. Audubon estimated that he was joined by over a billion passenger pigeons 
overhead; with flocks so dense that they had blotted out the mid-autumn sun.149 
Unfortunately, the last surviving passenger pigeon died in 1914, just 100 years after 
Audubon’s journey due to the mistaken view that we could not hunt enough of them.  
The example of the passenger pigeon demonstrates how at times we have tended 
to manage resources myopically, specifically without consideration that natural 
resources, often viewed simply as a storehouse of goods, could be finite. Systems of 
resource (loosely defined to include biodiversity) management have been designed and 
implemented by various governmental and institutional bodies enforce a rule of 
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sustainable harvest and use so that we might not repeat these past mistakes. Over time, as 
research in and monitoring of our natural resources increased in competency, many 
different frameworks have evolved to help address our limitations in planning and 
understanding. One such framework is adaptive management, which emerged out of a set 
of theories related to workplace efficiency in the beginning of the 20th century.   
History. 
Frederick Winslow Taylor developed his theories of workplace management with 
consideration of President Theodore Roosevelt’s near simultaneous call for the 
conservation of America’s natural resources. Taylor opens his seminal work—The 
Principles of Scientific Management—lamenting the waste of the country’s resources, but 
also arguing that our inefficiencies in harvesting, manufacturing, and distribution are of 
equal concern if we are really worried about resource waste. This form of loss, Taylor 
argued had not yet garnered “public agitation” as much as the cries to simply prohibit 
resource extraction. In this context, Taylor proposed that to absolve our “suffering 
through inefficiency”, we must take a scientific approach to workplace management that 
relies on laws, rules, and principles.150 And Taylor took this suffering literally and 
suggested that relieving the burden on the working class and crushing poverty was 
directly linked with the reduction of natural and human capital wastes.151 Using the 
hypothetical example of a bricklayer on the job, Taylor claimed that improved efficiency 
(and therefore, greater production and less waste) might not come through assumptions 
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about the best procedures handed down through generations of bricklayers (or other 
workers), but through an intentional combination of testing and experience. Although 
Taylor failed to acknowledge that it is possible that intergenerational knowledge (like the 
kind that could be handed down from master to apprentice) could rest on a strong 
experimental foundation, he emphasized the need for continued reflection and 
improvements to carve the most efficient path forward.152  
In the early to mid-1900s, natural resource managers began viewing themselves as 
part of the larger professional, scientific community. This charge was led mostly by 
famed conservationist Gifford Pinchot who established the Society of American Foresters 
and recruited and trained career foresters through an endowment to Yale University 
(where renowned conservationist Aldo Leopold attended). Pinchot was a proponent and 
popularizer of Taylorism (known more broadly as the efficiency movement) and, indeed, 
his utilitarian conservation ethic was almost solely informed by Taylor’s scientific 
efficiency mantra. While serving under President Theodore Roosevelt as his Chief of the 
United States Forest Service, Pinchot helped to link resource conservation to the wider 
efficiency movement as it began permeating throughout the United States. Pinchot’s 
embrace of Taylorism (and market driven resource extraction) ran up against many of the 
traditional nature preservationists, most notably, Sierra Club co-founder John Muir who 
held a more aesthetic and spiritual outlook toward nature and were deeply suspicious of 
the “wise use” philosophy of resource management. Although the likes of Muir did not 
agree with Pinchot’s methods, they were a vast improvement of the boom-and-bust style 
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of nature management that proceeded the 20th century and Taylorism.153 According to 
Carl Walters, one of the early, leading minds on adaptive management, it was common 
for managers to believe that resources were so abundant that the stock might as well be 
infinite and therefore little to no long-term planning was necessary and scarcely took 
place. Problems could simply be solved by waiting until the next season’s crops or 
cultivating in a different plot. It became clearer that this myopic, reactive management 
would not suffice if the burgeoning population were to have their demands satisfied. 
Guided and urged on by an increasing public awareness, a transition began as Taylorism 
and the search for efficiency took root in the newly-formed professional circles of 
resource managers. The case could be made that sustainability was an undercurrent in the 
early theory building adaptive management writings.154 Since these original writings 
however, contemporary commentators have linked adaptive environmental management 
with the more normative, human-centered version of the concept that now enjoys wide 
layman’s use.155  
This morally charged version departs somewhat from the original understanding 
and purpose of management: “alteration undertaken in order to make the environment 
what was conceived as a better place to live in—more productive food, shelter, water, 
mineral resource, or other useful products.”156 C.S. Holling is keen to note the inertia that 
this style of management has built and acknowledges that, at the same time, the world is 
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shrinking—cities are growing, more and more land is converted from natural landscapes 
to cultivated ones and signs of human activity are ever-present—and so we must abandon 
the view that space and resources are unlimited. Unlike when previous generations were 
told “Young Man, Go West,”157 there is no more “West.” Instead, of seeking out a new 
“unexploited resource, an unsettled piece of land, a new river to dam,” there is now a 
kind of impasse that was not experienced in the same way by “our fathers.”158 His 
opening statement in the seminal work Adaptive Environmental Assessment and 
Management, grapples with this state-of-affairs and then lays out the case for why an 
adaptive management approach is necessary considering this information. He continues, 
criticizing previously popular management schemes which tended to focus on the 
economic and social goals first while secondarily considering environmental constraints. 
These schemes also attempted to enforce social, economic, and environmental stability; 
however, we now know that these systems exist in a kind of flux, more dynamic and 
complex than was previously understood. They were primitive in their environmental 
accounting, unable to accurately capture the inherent stochasticity present in natural 
systems and therefore led to unpredicted degradation. Curiously, little reflection on these 
continuous collapses took place. A few hundred years ago, resources seemed plentiful 
and the sources of them expansive. As Holling suggests, we have entered a crisis period 
where reflection on past mistakes is necessary if we are to adopt sustainable attitudes.159 
A new conversation brewed about how we ought to be interacting with one another and 
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our environments to ensure there will be something ‘natural’ left for future generations—
if we want that at all.  
Unfortunately, taking care of these resources is messy and indeed, one of those 
wicked endeavors. The many alternatives that exist (e.g. trial-and-error, expert driven, 
cost-benefit analysis, conflict resolution), have been relied on to move toward a 
fairer/more just allocation of resources, although this is not always the case in practice.160 
Theorists, practitioners, and attentive citizens, probably sooner, but most loudly in the 
middle of the 20th century, began to express their dissatisfaction with these existing 
management schemes. This disappointment would extend to Taylor’s scientific 
management although many of the failures of Pinchot’s former department—the United 
States Forest Service, which vociferously employed a scientized management system—
could be explained by regulatory capture. Either way, the need for a more reliable form 
of management was answered by C.S. Holling and Carl Walters in the late 1960s. Kai 
Lee, the third member of what I refer to as the adaptive management tripartite, would 
follow a couple of decades later. Some of their writings will be discussed in the following 
section.  
Theory. 
Unintended consequences and uncertainty have received considerable attention in 
contemporary management circles.161 It is mainly with this issue that adaptive managers 
continue to grapple as the world undergoes unprecedented changes and increased 
environmental variability. Importantly, adaptive managers profess to understand the 
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interconnectedness between human and natural systems, so we could be warranted in 
adding that social, economic, and political turmoil and unpredictability are, likewise, 
issues that environmental managers need to consider in designing their management 
schemes. This is usually operationalized in terms of ‘resilience’, a characteristic of a 
system that describes its ability to withstand perturbations and maintain essential 
functions, even if there is some reorganization. Resilience is the new mantra in the 
Anthropocene. That is, there is some consensus around the idea that all our management 
actions ought to be deployed in service to desirable social-ecological resilience.162  
One of the first earnest attempts to codify the adaptive management framework 
into a repeatable formula was undertaken in a book edited by C.S. Holling (1978) called 
Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. The collection was the result of a 
series of meetings where experts (whose experience included pest control in North 
America, to European agricultural development, to South American disease control, and 
much more in between) pooled their knowledge to create a set of recommendations for 
the implementation of what became formally known as adaptive management. Holling 
describes the impetus for this undertaking as stemming from the disconnect between 
policy and reality. He argues that this gap causes some consternation amongst policy 
makers and managers, hamstringing decisions and causing them to ignore the potential of 
surprise, even when it might be anticipated.163 This habitual misstep is an opportunity for 
the implementation of adaptive management which embraces the inevitability of 
perturbations and shocks. 
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Holling and his colleagues were among the first researchers to define resilience as 
a property of an ecological system, which, if taken into proper accounting in management 
schemes, would show that there is a “…need to keep options open, the need to view 
events in a regional rather than a local context, and the need to emphasize 
heterogeneity.”164 The idea here is that ecological resilience is best engendered by a 
series of adaptive actions from informed actors. These informed actors will know that 
surprising and unexpected events occur in nature (e.g. forest fires) and are indeed, often 
intrinsic to a system’s continued persistence. So, just to be able to imagine certain 
possibilities gives us, perhaps, the acumen to employ management activities in a way that 
‘absorbs’ these events. In general, the pathway to resilience can be juxtaposed with a 
more stable-seeking regime. Stability then, just means that management activities are 
designed to limit natural fluctuations and engender predictability.165 To put a practical 
face on the difference between resilience and stability one might look at policies 
necessary for the management of fisheries in the Bering Sea versus whatever policies and 
practices might exist for the Rainbow Trout Farm in Sedona, Arizona. Attempting to 
establish the same kind of command-and-control standards in a fish farm in a larger, 
more dynamic environment that is sensitive to external inputs will simply be a waste of 
time and resources. In order to not squander the limited opportunities that remain, it 
would be wise to establish sustainably extractive regimes. Holling, in the end, advocates 
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for a management framework that emphasizes resilience over stability.166 These 
resilience-building management schemes, according to Holling, need to possess the 
following attributes: 
(a) Environmental dimensions deserve equal consideration next to economic and 
social dimensions in the policy design stage. 
(b) The design should include interdisciplinary voices and rest on consensus. 
(c) The benefits of increasing social, economic, and environmental knowledge in 
areas where gaps exist should be incorporated into the design.  
(d) Managers, like laboratory scientists, can learn from change, therefore 
management activities that seek to fill in knowledge gaps should be treated as 
hypotheses.  
(e) Setting up monitoring procedures to capture expected changes is integral to 
testing these hypotheses.  
(f) Deciding how to deal with the unexpected is equally an important part of the 
design process. That is, there will be a decision between policies and activities 
that seek to reduce the significance of unexpected events and ones that simply 
react to them, which may be less expensive. 
(g) Actors will need to be comfortable with and, in some cases, move to create 
institutional change. In many developed countries, engendering stability (not 
resilience) by reducing annoyances is, de facto, the management goal. This 
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might mean an unwillingness to implement adaptive policies which are 
designed to capitalize on disturbance, risk, and opportunity.167 
This narrative intentionally implicates both the professional resource manager and the 
everyday citizen who may not be aware that their actions have rippling ecological 
consequences. To be able to earnestly describe our global community as sustainable, we 
need to bring about a sea change thereby leaving future generations as well off as we are, 
and not worse which is where we appear to be trending. The resilience framework 
therefore places the onus on us to behave in ways that add to or maintain/improve the 
resilience of (desirable) systems. Of course, the opposite is possible (maybe even more 
likely) where we are unhappy with the functioning of a system (e.g., degraded farmland), 
so appropriate and intentional actions would have to take place to reverse the course here. 
We could still describe such a degraded system as resilient—how resilient is just 
proportional to the effort it takes for the system to change its character. In service to this 
idea, Holling, repeats such a sentiment and continues, suggesting that the heretofore use 
of the word ‘assessment’ be cast aside for the more active and appropriate term for what 
is actually necessary: management.168  
Adaptive management, echoing much of Holling’s and Walters’s descriptions, is 
more than just blind attempts at getting something right. Another notable proponent of 
adaptive management, Kai Lee, extends these arguments with the useful metaphor of a 
Compass and Gyroscope, also the name of his most enduring work. The compass, 
according to Lee is the process of adaptive management, which is “...for us to use in 
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searching for a sustainable future.”169 The gyroscope—bounded conflict—is the perhaps 
Lee’s most well-known contribution to the theory of adaptive management and where, 
like Taylor was about the workplace, he is explicit about the social and political aspects 
of environmental management, mainly that they ought not be ignored. Lee explains this 
half of the metaphor as follows:  
Conflict can either enhance or prevent learning. Because learning requires 
that observations be made over times of biological significance and spatial 
scales that transcend property lines and political boundaries, conflict can 
thwart the learning necessary to reach sustainability. Yet conflict is also 
indispensable to defining, over time, a socially sustainable order, because 
it impels institutions toward such a search in the first place.170  
As Lee describes the necessity of conflict, he must also mean that there is a genuine 
openness of political proclivities, much like the generally free societies of currently 
developed nations. Clearly, there are some issues that extend past environmental 
management in countries where tyrannical authorities prevent the sharing of a productive 
dialogue. This is a concern that I will revisit plainly in Chapter 4 as a pluralistic, 
democratic society rests as the foundation of my core arguments.  
Lee defines adaptive management as the “treatment of economic uses of the 
environment as experiments, so that we may learn efficiently from experience.”171 
Recognizing the limitations of human cognition, very much in the pragmatic spirit, Lee 
invokes the idea of bounded rationality which just states that there exists some limit to 
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our mental resources and that running up against this limit, does not entail irrational 
behavior based on faulty decision making. The correspondence between adaptive 
management and bounded rationality (and, as I will argue in the 4th Chapter, a pragmatic 
epistemology) is quite striking. Lee states that decisions would, of course, be best if made 
on the full-sweep of information that is relevant to a given choice, but not only do we 
lack the mental capacity to wrangle with all the different alternatives, we cannot always 
have access to all them.172 Therefore, we make selections based on what is satisfactory at 
the time, a good enough choice on a restricted set of good enough options. In this context, 
management decisions are best described as tenuous given the possibility that new, 
conflicting information arises in the wake of such a choice or if actor’s preferences 
change. The results of any policy in an adaptive management scenario are thus 
susceptible to scrutiny based on the consequences it incurs. Alternatives in our restricted 
set can then be culled as new ones are added based on earnest monitoring and reflection. 
And the cycle continues forth as a mental hierarchy of good ideas is continually 
constructed and refined.  
Importantly, Lee does not merely proselytize for adaptive management. While I 
(and Lee) believe that it comports accurately with the way purposeful learning occurs in 
everyday life, there are institutional costs to consider. Firstly, some problem that requires 
an immediate resolution could find the tedious application of adaptive management 
problematic. A ‘catch-22’ for sure, time pressure is one kind of aggravating variable that 
makes a decision-maker want for the clearest understanding of the present situation—but 
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that takes time. As the decision zenith173 approaches, the stakes increase as do the costs 
of getting the decision wrong.174 Certainly though, if the adaptive manager was thrust 
into such a time-sensitive situation, the outcome is as likely to be desirable as if it were 
undertaken by a command-and-controller or natural resources manager, for instance. 
Indeed, it might even occur to the adaptive manager that there are others who might be 
more suited for the management of an environmental problem. A raging wildfire, for 
example, is unlikely to be successfully adaptively managed, so the adaptive manager 
might consider moving aside for someone with more experience. This common critique 
(i.e. that adaptive management is unfit for scenarios which require immediate results) 
assumes that an adaptive manager will only promote a final decision after multiple, 
smaller iterations have occurred to inform it. To be clear, the iterative process is essential 
to the establishment and achievement of long-term sustainability goals. However, no 
adaptive manager would threaten the whole system in service of any blind adherence to 
incrementalism but would indeed attempt to salvage the system so that long-run 
management is consequently viable.175 Indeed, the precautionary principle as outlined in 
the 1992 Rio Declaration suggests that practitioners should not point to incomplete 
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information as a reason for inaction where cost-effective measures exist.176 It’s perhaps 
possible that a period of inaction could include punctuated learning so that a more 
reliable course of action could be determined.  
Relatedly, the organizational burden for the proper implementation of adaptive 
management is real177 and indeed, is positively correlated with the spatial scale at which 
management activities are occurring.178 The more technical versions of adaptive 
management that are supported by most U.S. federal agencies (see: Stankey, 2005; 
Williams, 2009) are seemingly equal parts environmental and administrative leadership. 
These sorts of programs demand expert attention to set up and maintain the decision-
making, monitoring, and information disseminating apparatus. This all means that 
weaknesses at any of these points can threaten the efficacy of the whole project. For 
instance, early descriptions of some of these pitfalls came from examples where 
important tasks were not always assigned to the relevant stakeholders. Indeed, in one of 
the earliest examples of earnest adaptive management found in Holling’s (1978) seminal 
work,179 monitoring and interpretation were performed by a single person representing a 
group that would economically benefit from the presence of particular results.180 At least 
in this case, the monitoring and evaluation phase was underway, when in many others, 
managers become fatigued from constant “sampling design, data collection and 
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summarization, database management, and data assessment” and thus, “many managers 
are unable or unwilling to continue these activities for extended periods of time.”181 The 
burden on adaptive managers only increases when accounting for the ever-present 
financial constraints.  
Seemingly, any adaptive management scheme that can be considered a success 
appears to do so against the odds. Lee follows up these concerns with some reasons why 
this system of management should be preferred over others.182 Firstly, he argues that 
adaptive management is useful when intervening in the processes of large-scale 
ecosystems. It is likely, although not always the case, that the larger and more complex 
the system is, the more uncertainty initially exists within it. One manager (or group of 
managers) would be hard pressed to ‘know’ the innumerable causal relationships that are 
present in any given system. The process of adaptive management can gradually make 
these relationships clearer by using policies as experiments. Conversely, Lee suggests 
that types of interactions we can emulate in laboratories are not generalizable to open 
ecosystems that are susceptible to perturbations. Lastly, chances are that in most resource 
spaces there is already some management infrastructure or policy designed at the 
ecosystem level. We simply gather more information more quickly with large scale 
interventions (and monitoring). To expose my biases, these considerations can be 
distilled into the following conditional: 
1. Adaptive management is the best strategy to employ in uncertain conditions 
where there are likely to be surprises. 
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2. Managing living natural resources is typically an uncertain practice likely to 
produce surprises. 
3. Therefore, adaptive management is the best strategy for managing natural 
resources.  
Ideally, levels of expertise and source of knowledge means less than stakeholders 
reaching and acting upon agreeable terms. Adopting a democratic focus supports, in 
principle, the integration of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK),183 adding new 
perspective and (uniquely but not exclusively, qualitative) observations into the 
system.184 This need not refer solely to indigenous knowledge, but instead captures the 
practice and the experience of everyday life of involved stewards for instance. 
Coincidentally, Berkes et al. (2000) recognize parallels between the development of TEK 
and adaptive learning. That is, the information contained within any given TEK tradition 
can often be attributed to lessons learned from trial-and-error environmental management 
over generations.185 
If we agree that the persistence of humanity is desirable, then we ought to be 
looking for ways to engender sustainable behavior. Adaptive management channels this 
possibility. The real potency of the argument for adaptive management, at least in my 
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view, comes from the fact that it makes good sense even in the best of environmental 
conditions.  
Collaborative Management 
Collaborative, cooperative, or community resource management (shortened: co-
management) is intended to be an inclusive management strategy with potential for 
“bottom-up” outcomes. Many (e.g. Pinkerton, 1989; Curtin, 2007; Wyborn and Bixler, 
2013; Redpath et al., 2013) recognize that this feature is essential to getting resource or 
conservation projects to work long-term. Co-management has a diverse set of 
understandings, but one generally accepted conceptualization proffered by Carlsson and 
Berkes (2005) is that it is the process of social actors representing different strata of 
organization negotiating, deliberating, and deciding upon fair divisions of labor, 
resources, risks, and rewards.186 The authors admit the various and diverse impressions of 
co-management, but confidently acknowledge its benefits: Gathering information and 
implementing changes is more effective in reaching desired outcomes. Decisions 
regarding resource allocation and when/where to harvest and other logistical decisions 
are made by those who will carry out the actions, thus there is a keener eye (even 
implicitly) toward procedural justice. Longer-term planning including protecting land 
from degradation and over-exploitation (i.e. a common’s tragedy) and enforcing 
regulations is also made easier by including actors whose fates are tied with the resource 
in the decision-making process.187 Indeed, the simple act of bringing players together to 
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sit at the decision table is likely to reduce the conflicts experienced ‘in the field’ due to 
creation of more democratic and de-centralized agreements.  
Inquirers including centuries past philosophers, more contemporary evolutionary 
biologists and sociologists each devote a small portion of disciplinary interest to the 
question: how and why do we act collectively? This fundamental question of human 
behavior is significant to predicting and directing the trajectory of our planet’s limited 
resources, including biodiversity. Although implicating climate change and its comorbid 
social and ecological effects has developed into an intellectual trope, it keeps problems of 
collective action relevant for forward-looking academics, activists, and environmental 
management professionals.  
Here, I will briefly outline the collective action problem (CAP) as defined within 
the most well-known literature before discussing an approach that might most explicitly 
address them—co-management. This will involve referring to lessons learned from 
common-pool resources and institutions literature, from some empirical/experimental 
economics literature and a greater blend of literature in the behavioral sciences indicating 
that a truly interdisciplinary treatment is necessary for the resolution of CAPs and the 
adoption of a co-management framework (of which there are many). 
History. 
Some of the most notable, classical philosophical works involved deep 
discussions on the nature of collective action between people. References to cooperation 
and to cohesion amongst citizens can be found in Plato’s Republic, most notably in 
Book’s II and V, although references appear throughout this work and in Laws. One such 
example occurs in the dialogue between Plato’s Adeimantus and Socrates in Book II, 
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where Plato’s Socrates states, “…because we have many needs, and because one of us 
calls on another out of one need, and on a third out of a different need, we gather into a 
single settlement as partners and helpers.” He continues: “…if they share things with one 
another—if they give something to one another, or take something from one another—
don’t they do so because each believes that this is better for himself?” Adeimantus replies 
in the affirmative.188 Plato clearly thought that the contents of a peaceful and prosperous 
city involved the buy-in from its citizens. This view was parroted by Thomas Aquinas in 
Kinship (and many other renaissance era writers) and picked up again centuries later by 
renowned modern, political philosophers including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and 
David Hume, among others. In Leviathan, Hobbes speaks clearly about the necessity of 
cooperation amongst men (and women) lest we remain in a state of perpetual unrest, what 
he referred to as the ‘state of nature.’ John Locke appealed to a similar, raucous scenario 
referring to his own pre-civilized world as the ‘state of war’ in his fabled work Two 
Treatises of Government. Contained within the classic, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
David Hume’s interpretation of cooperation between people relies on self-interest. 
Nonetheless, Hume understands cooperation as a forward-looking contract between a 
person and her community. Once these contracts have been set, such as when you 
promise a favor to someone, not only might you be shamed or even ostracized, you’d also 
be acting immoral if sufficient reason did not exist for you to keep that promise. This 
‘fidelity’, according to Hume is a virtue that develops among interacting peoples and 
supports their continued, trustful interactions.    
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As it should be clear, despite their different interpretations on what might 
motivate us to cooperate, even collaborate with one another (as in, work together to reach 
some common end), these philosophers thought it was foundational for creating and 
maintaining a functioning society. Now that we have these ‘functioning’ societies, new 
externalities have arisen that require even more coordination and social ingenuity.  
Using different language, these early philosophers were indeed foreshadowing 
this problem that has now garnered much of our attention in sociology, economics, and 
biology. David Hume, for instance, spoke to the difficulty of coordination amongst 
sufficiently large groups, including how likely free-riding may be: 
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess 
in common; because ’tis easy for them to know each others mind; and 
each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his 
part, is the abandoning the whole project. But ’tis very difficult, and 
indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou’d agree in any such 
action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and 
still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free 
himself of the trouble and expence, and wou’d lay the whole burden on 
others.189 
Perhaps the most famous work on collective action, The Logic of Collective Action 
written by economist Mancur Olson in 1965, turns its attention toward to the common 
view that like individuals tend to form groups and these groups tend to direct their energy 
towards shared goals. With a simple analogy of companies in competitive markets, Olson 
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allows us to rethink the relationship of individuals to their respective groups: all 
companies have a shared interest in high prices for their goods, but they also want to sell 
more than their competitors, assuming their goods are substitutes.190 The result of this 
tension is that for any company attempting to maximize their profits (e.g., by increasing 
output to meet marginal costs), the market price for the good can be expected to fall 
following the logic of supply and demand. For any company that is interested in a higher 
price, it will take a shared effort by all its competitors to reduce output to achieve this 
increase, thereby inducing scarcity. However, it is simultaneously in any given 
company’s interest to pass costs on to other competitors by having them reduce output, 
while not abating itself.191 But this cannot be achieved without some sort of mutually 
assured destruction scenario. No company with any common sense would intentionally 
reduce output to allow competitors to produce more and therefore allow their competition 
to sell more at this inflated price. Through this simple market analogy, we can intuit that 
any given individual in a group has an interest in reaping benefits from the group’s 
activities, but is also interested in doing nothing to receive them. The upshot is that to 
sustain long-term use of resources, users need not think like a corporation and treat other 
users as competitors, instead, they ought to think of other users as collaborators. This 
explanation by Olson also mirrors the tragedy of the commons narrative, first recognized 
by Lloyd (1833),192 expanded upon in earnest by Gordon (1954),193 but popularized by 
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Hardin (1968).194 Avoiding the now famous ‘tragedy’ is really a collective action 
problem.  
As we’ve seen, in the Anthropocene we have encountered and will continue to 
encounter novel sustainability challenges that will likely test the limits of our 
collaborative capacities given the wide-spread impacts that are likely to occur. 
Organizing a culture of collective action absent sustainability challenges is, by itself, a 
monumental task. But perhaps, as will be detailed below, the urgency surrounding these 
challenges will instigate a shift in the collective consciousness.195 Co-management, 
according to management practitioners, is a logical approach to overcome resource issues 
through building and leveraging partnerships.196 The benefits and uses of a co-
management framework will be covered in the following section. 
Theory. 
A perceived threat is one of the key features that may jumpstart a collaborative 
enterprise. This is one of the conclusions detailed by social psychologist Michael 
Tomasello. He further articulates three conditions that facilitate collaborative activities 
(1) coordination and communication, (2) tolerance and trust, and (3) the presence or 
creation of norms and institutions.197 The existence of these characteristics together 
allows us to “engage in collaborative activities with a joint goal and distinct and 
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generalized roles, with participants mutually aware that they were dependent on one 
another for success.”198 Tomasello is keen to note that cooperation does not have an 
intrinsically normative direction. That is, cooperation is also used to further less than 
savory ends and certainly this issue has received plenty of attention as we have seen a rise 
in political tribalism.199 Due to the way we evolutionarily developed the capacities listed 
above (i.e. in localized groups) and due to our communities becoming increasingly 
transnational and sometimes geographically disconnected, Tomasello recommends that 
we attempt to redefine our groups to be more inclusive, to avoid hostility where possible 
and to not allow there to be an ‘enemy’. But others (e.g., Pelling and Dill, 2010; 
Brundiers, 2016; Mochizuki and Chang, 2017) think that this is an opportunity to turn the 
group-think toward a positive outcome. In some respects, many sustainability minded 
activists and environmentalists have for many years been attempting to demonstrate that a 
warmer climate is, indeed, antagonistic to our shared existence. The hope shared among 
these activists and nature sympathizers is simply that adaptations and behavioral 
corrections occur before any tragic events (e.g. natural disasters) unfold on unsuspecting 
and ill-prepared peoples. Even if we are not able to move quickly enough, emerging 
research suggests that there are opportunities that are borne from disasters.200 Importantly 
then, we ought to ask what management tools we have at our disposal currently that may 
abate—to the extent possible—the effects of climate transience and the effects that may 
precipitate. Taking the cue from psychologists like Tomasello and the robust research 
tradition in natural resources management, clearly, cooperation will be necessary. 
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Conceptual and analytic frameworks have recently taken center stage in an attempt to 
understand how we can best cooperate (i.e. define and reach objectives) to get ahead of 
local resource collapse. 
Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) provide a deep dive into the management of 
common pool resources. To reiterate, a common pool resource is such that one’s use of it 
deprives other’s use, but those others have unlimited access to the resource; that is, the 
resource is rivalrous but not excludable. The typical charge, as alluded to above, is that 
this type of resource will be quickly depleted as users compete with one another to 
acquire as much as possible.201 Despite the overall social benefit from cooperative use, 
and in the cases of renewable public goods, abatement, much of the early theory 
suggested that self-interest would always win out.202 If a user decides to secede from 
cooperative action, we would expect all other users to dissolve their agreements in turn 
and wantonly extract resources as a race to the bottom proceeds. Any optimist who abates 
in an attempt to sustain the resource would be worse off as resources all around them are 
taken up, just like the firm reducing output while its competitors sell more product at 
higher prices for their goods as in Olson’s (1965) example. Ostrom and her collaborators 
admit that tragedies do indeed occur, but so does sustained cooperative behavior, where 
conscious extraction, for instance, is instead the norm.203 As Ostrom (1998) recognizes, 
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we have so far prevailed because our predecessors learned “how to undertake collective 
action to solve social dilemmas.”204  
At least two levels of collective action problems are identified in the literature, 
often called first and second order problems.205 The first is the common sense 
understanding of a collective action problem: the over-exploitation of common pool 
resources (CPRs), the over-supply of negative externalities, free-riders in pure public 
good scenarios, etc. The second is more nuanced and nested. These are referred to as 
problems of coordination and enforcement that threaten the credibility of resolutions to 
first order problem.206 Social coordination itself can be understood as a public good in 
most cases because it is neither exclusive nor rivalrous in terms of participation and its 
proper working facilitates the rules set to resolve the common-sense, first order collective 
action problems that, again, are beneficial to the greater population. Largely, two 
strategies have been entertained to overcome the pitfalls associated with collective action 
problems in common pool resource scenarios. 
One such strategy entertained by early academics involved in deciphering 
collective action problems was the establishment of property rights. Before rights can be 
gainfully determined, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) argue that ambiguities lurking in the 
descriptions of the types of rights people had on their land need to be addressed. They do 
this by developing a conceptual schema intending to make clear the incentives an 
individual might have dependent on their level of authority over land (and the resources 
within it). The authors describe four types of positions: Owner, Proprietor, Claimant, and 
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Authorized User. The owner (which could be more than one person) has all kinds of 
rights, including access and withdrawal, management, the ability to exclude others 
(exclusion), and the ability to sell access (alienation). A claimant maintains all rights 
except alienation while a proprietor also loses the right to exclusion. Authorized users are 
just that, they have access and can use resources.207  
The tendency for us to rely on the establishment of property rights to resolve CPR 
problems is recognized in both the conceptual literature and in practice (see: Orensanz 
and Seijo, 2013; also briefly discussed below). Interestingly, the penchant for spatial 
rights-based institutions to emerge in common pool resources dilemmas has also been 
demonstrated in experimental settings.208 Janssen and Ostrom (2008), with the aid of a 
computer program, simulated a common pool resources dilemma and asked groups of 
students to navigate it, motivated by real cash rewards for average group harvest. The 
students were separated into groups and asked to capture tokens that would periodically 
respawn. Students were ‘competing’ with 4 other anonymous students in one bounded 
resource environment which they all interacted with from their own computer terminals. 
The authors state that the entire system was depleted quickly in the first simulation, but 
with subsequent rounds (and discussion between rounds, removing the veil of 
anonymity), the players began to develop rules of use, increasing their take with each 
round of experience. Relative to the first round of resource harvest, subsequent rounds 
showed a drastic and significant increase in resources collected by the groups, which was 
reinforced in a third and final round of harvesting (again, after a discussion). Interested in 
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the strategies that players used to increase their harvests, the authors created a spatial 
concentration index that identifies which player dominated which area of the resource 
environment. Because there were 5 players in each environment, the lowest concentration 
(i.e. the players harvested randomly throughout the whole environment) is a .2 in a given 
sector, with the maximum being a 1, signifying that only 1 player dominated that region. 
The groups with the highest harvests also had the highest spatial index, suggesting that 
their spatially constructed institutions, akin to spatial property rights, actually led to some 
impressive results.  
Certainly, the establishment and maintenance of property rights is seen as a kind 
of moral good in the United States and thus is often seen as the default solution to 
resource disputes, but does the management of CPR always require such a scheme? Over 
the years, a rights approach has indeed proved influential. However, an re-examination of 
the early rights concepts has been recently offered, suggesting that the management and 
relational landscape has changed in the 20 years since Schlager and Ostrom’s initial 
work.209 This update re-configures the conceptual schema of these rights and adds four 
new ones and while the details are not important, the impetus for this revision is: local 
resource management has become increasingly complex and the full sweep of actors no 
longer fit neatly into the categories determined by Schlager and Ostrom’s original work.  
Agrawal and Gibson (1999) demystify the one of the common assumptions 
persistent throughout natural resources management which seeks to engage local 
communities in their endeavors, namely that they are socially and economically 
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homogenous.210 Further, there is little reason to assume that every community (or 
member) is pro-environmental.211 These assumptions can be exacerbated when there are 
loose identities of community and communities that are too large. Olson (1965) noted 
that “the larger the group, the less it will further its common interests,”212 a sentiment 
later echoed in Ostrom’s (1990) well-known design principles.213 Incidentally, small 
communities of users can benefit from the self-interest of even a single user. In small 
groups, as Olson explains, the amount of collective benefits that are likely to be provided 
equal the highest demanding user.214 When insulated and closely connected communities 
are able to make management decisions to reap the benefits of collaboration and bear the 
costs of failure, creativity and originality is potentially the result. A widely cited example 
of this is Cordell (1972) who describes the unusual property arrangements made by local 
fishers in Valença, Brazil in their coastal estuary. Choice spots were well known as the 
fishermen understood the influence of the tides and congregating behaviors of the fish. 
Claims for these locales were made simply by declaring one’s intention to fish it in the 
coming days, known as publicano o lanço. Not only would a fisher have to state their 
intentions to fish, but they must show it by tying off their canoe in the desired fishing 
location one day prior to their harvest.215 A culture of retaliation against rule breakers 
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developed and mostly resolved externalities dealing with fishing in choice spots and 
entangling each other’s gear.  
Related to anxiety over how rights ought to be distributed, Wilson (2002) worries 
about another source of uncertainty. He emphasizes the need for better science due to the 
tendency that our uncertainty leads to political grid-lock and engenders distrust of other 
actors.216 Lack of trust, according to Wilson, has led to the downplay of user’s real 
economic hardships and dismissal of their collective, first-hand experiences, pitting the 
desires of scientists to manage with biological standards against users determined to 
maintain a livelihood.217 To account for these intricacies, Wilson (2002) advocates 
viewing resource pools as complex adaptive systems and to view scientific uncertainties 
as opportunities to learn.218 Wilson’s complex adaptive system approach suggests that the 
“’how’ and ‘when’ and ‘where’ rather than ‘how much’ matters as much or even more in 
management decisions.219 Complementary to the complex adaptive systems approach is 
the idea that most common pool resources naturally fluctuate within some limits and to 
understand the ecological processes that contribute to the resource staying within these 
limits will ultimately lead to the most scientifically sound management prescription. 
Wilson suggests that this ‘parametric’ management disentangles the competing 
commitments of scientists and resource users.220 In order for prescriptions to matter, they 
must be supported by the users and the perspective advocated by Wilson alleges to take 
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seriously and integrate the user’s experience with the ‘biological continuity’ of the 
resource under management.221  
The Valençian institutional structure worked well enough for their purposes (until 
the fishery was taken over by the government), but as Schlager (1994) notes, in most 
cases, fishermen do not account for the rivalrous effects of their fishing activities such 
that even when there are rules, they are not effective.222 Schlager (1994) extended this 
idea by presenting a survey of 33 fisheries groups, finding that even the most organized 
groups did not address this rivalrous effect, which she refers to as an appropriation 
externality.223 It has been speculated that because some fishers do not know if rising 
marginal costs are due to ‘natural’ variation in fishery populations or are due to their 
harvesting activity, they may find little incentive to abate. Of 115 Bangladeshi fishers 
surveyed, only 16% suggested that a decline in catch was due to having “too many 
fishers,” instead citing both natural flows and the unintended catch of young fish as 
primary causes.224 Schlager (1994) further asserts that fishermen would need much more 
information for abatement to become a convincing strategy. Population dynamics of 
stock, understanding how many fish constitute a stock, monitoring and counting all catch 
from particular stocks remain barriers to less sophisticated fisheries, even if they are 
considered to be ‘organized’ in some fashion.225 Harkening back to Wilson (1994; 2002), 
it appears that some legitimate biological knowledge is necessary for sustainable 
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Common-Pool Resources, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994): 251. 
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Economics 74, no. 3 (1998): 413. 
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management, and even in protecting cultural traditions, its integration might only help the 
long-term maintenance of resources. 
A co-management framework addresses some of these pitfalls associated with the 
rights-based structure, although it was not specifically designed as a response to some of 
these issues. Co-management, to reiterate, is the intentional division of responsibility and 
authority over a resource (or the space which contains the resource) between users and a 
government. It was imagined as an alternative to top-down management (of which, the 
assignment of rights by a state or national body could be included) intended to promote 
the lived-experiences of local peoples by treating them as equal arbiters in management, 
enforcement, and monitoring decisions. Orensanz and Seijo (2013) suggest that measured 
government interventions and therefore enabling more autonomous user control is a 
condition for success in some systems.226 Co-management is therefore seen as providing 
a sense of ‘legitimacy’ to the local people who otherwise might have no formal 
recognition of their land tenure outside of their community circles (although assignment 
of rights does this too). In this way, co-management can be viewed simultaneously as a 
process and as a tool for achieving specific outcomes. In such a context, the opinions of 
experts are spelled by local knowledge and experience, but importantly, outsiders bring 
the possibility of different biological insights, tools for improved monitoring and 
enforcement, and other resources if the community so desires/requires them; a norm 
missing from the tradition of rights assignment.  
This system, like the rights-based one, comes with caveats. Nearly 20 years of 
intentional research on resource co-management has uncovered cases where co-
                                                          
226 Jose Maria Orensanz, and Juan Carlos Seijo, “Rights-based Management in Latin American Fisheries”, 
FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper 582, (2013): 39. 
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management schemes have exacerbated an already existing power imbalance between 
governments and local peoples or have been used to create one.227 Relatedly, funding in 
some State run projects is contingent on engagement with local users in which case co-
management can be used as a façade to obtain money, neglecting the empowerment and 
inclusion ideals core to the co-management tradition. Another set of issues that pervades 
co-management arrangements from the State-side is a far too simplistic understanding of 
the communities, the natural system under management, what role they, as the State, 
ought to play, and finally they may not recognize that co-management is best treated as a 
relational and interactive process, rather than simply as a vehicle with which to reach 
some destination.228 Relatedly, users (or non-State actors) may be unaware of the various 
arms of any State government and that multiple arrangements are possible. This is 
sometimes referred to as an ‘ecology of games’ where some State-side actors are 
involved in multiple agreements with multiple other parties, hypothetically leveraging 
their positions during negotiations and deliberations in one agreement to affect another. 
Lastly, the State and the users share an obstacle to overcome: trust. Carlsson and Berkes 
(2005) briefly discuss the importance of recognizing the legitimacy of other collaborators 
stating that assurances to continued collaboration and mutual support develop a culture of 
successful co-management. Indeed, the trust in State institutions as it relates to our 
environment (at least in the United States) is at an all-time low at the time of this writing, 
making low trust perhaps a non-starter to co-management schemes and therefore the most 
important factor. According to the Pew Research Center, a mere 18% of Americans 
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expressed considerable trust in the federal government. Relatedly, 76% of Americans 
believe the government should be playing a “major role” in the management of our 
environment while only 44% believe it is actually “doing a good job”.229    
As global challenges result in localized effects (e.g. climate change), the co-
management framework reminds us of its inherent benefits and why many Canadian and 
American (United States) fisheries turned toward it in the early-to-mid 1970s.230 
Although these North American cases are by no means the first instances of organized 
collaboration, they seemed to have instigated a research tradition focused on typifying 
successful management of natural resources for replication in other areas. To speak more 
deliberatively about the benefits of resource co-management, they might best be captured 
in the following case studies. While co-management is best undertaken in a localized 
context, perhaps the additive effect of many co-management efforts in particularly 
sensitive areas can forestall some of the more drastic changes climate researchers are 
predicting will befall the planet. Even if this does not occur, one would be hard-pressed 
to convince me that a collective effort to engender ecosystem (and planetary) stewardship 
is a waste-of-time.  
Adaptive Co-Management 
The adaptive management and co-management narratives continued to cross paths 
in practice, especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As sustainability scholarship 
continued to mature and international committees organized around the perceived social-
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ecological predicaments, gaps in the theoretical literature were noticed and this linkage 
began to attract considerable attention, most notably by a group of researchers that 
founded the Resilience Alliance.231 One of the first, impactful mentions of adaptive co-
management as a distinct management framework232 in the literature were made by many 
of these initial Resilience Alliance authors in a report given to the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development on behalf of the Environmental Advisory Council to the 
Swedish Government in 2002 (which was later published in an academic journal).233 
This, among many other (inter)national councils (e.g. Initiative on Science and 
Technology for Sustainability, the Third World Academy of Science, the US National 
Research Council, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment) in this same time period 
began to bring attention to the absence of a robust structure with which the growing 
number of management case studies could be analyzed.234 The earnest development of a 
theoretical tradition might have started with the “Moving Beyond the Critiques of Co-
Management: Theory and Practice of Adaptive co-management” symposium, hosted by 
Wilfrid Laurier University in Ontario, Canada which took place in the early part of 
2005.235 Here, a series of papers were presented that would later become one of the 
foundational volumes in adaptive co-management—Adaptive co-management: 
                                                          
231 https://www.resalliance.org/ 
232 Assuredly, appeals to a cooperative decision making in an adaptive management scenario were not 
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235 Armitage et al., “Adaptive Co-Management: Collaboration, Learning, and Multi-level Governance,” xii. 
 
99 
 
Collaboration, Learning, and Multi-Level Governance—a signal that there was 
momentum behind this blending of narratives. 
The convergence of the adaptive management and co-management paradigms is 
as Armitage et al. (2007) suggest, “an important innovation in natural resource 
governance,” one which seeks to reduce weaknesses of both perspectives while also 
embracing the strengths of each.236 Indeed, the indelible adaptive tasks of diagnosis, 
monitoring, and learning is made all the more robust if done under the watch of the 
plurality of real stakeholders.237 Consequently, management decisions garner a sense of 
legitimacy if the principles of collaborative management are sincerely adopted. That is, if 
stakeholders are not just token in the decision-making process, but are legitimate 
contributors, then there will simultaneously be little tolerance for mismanagement or 
misrepresentation and a conservancy of the “social memory”. This latter idea describes a 
kind of reservoir of local ecological knowledge that is passed through generations which 
has been largely ignored in non-collaborative arrangements, to the detriment of 
managers, the resource under purview, and local users whose livelihoods are often tied to 
place.238  
Just as adaptive co-management inherits strengths from its component traditions, 
challenges to successful implementation are also hitchhikers. The next section, while 
brief, details some of the expectations that are borne from the adaptive co-management 
                                                          
236 Armitage et al., “Introduction: Moving Beyond Co-Management,” 4. 
237 Elinor Ostrom, Marco A. Janssen, and John M. Anderies, “Going Beyond Panaceas”, Proceedings of the 
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238 Toby Pillatt, “Resilience Theory and Social Memory. Avoiding Abstraction,” Archaeological 
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process. The section following will discuss some (but not all) of the challenges 
practitioners are likely to encounter. 
The Blend. 
According to Plummer and Armitage (2006), adaptive co-management schemes 
seek to enhance livelihoods through tangibles such as increased resources, but also 
intangibles such as collaborative agreements and legislation (where most of the just 
mentioned challenge areas do most of its damage if ignored). The existence of both types 
of outcomes—tangible and intangible—promote social learning and in turn promotes 
social capital and adaptive capacity.239 Ruitenbeek and Cartier (2001), another one of the 
first attempts at illuminating a coherent adaptive co-management theory, suggests that 
adaptive co-management is likely to have self-emergent properties such that policies 
designed around it should either promote its emergence or remove barriers to 
emergence.240 The dictation of an adaptive co-management regime, they argue, is likely 
to undermine the process which is supposed to promote and develop through 
participation, not coerce or demand it. Consequently, they wonder whether it is possible 
for imposed systems of adaptive co-management to lead to success. To foreshadow this 
point with a case study I cover in Chapter 4, the answer is yes.241 Nevertheless, it should 
                                                          
239 Derek Armitage, Melissa Marschke, and Ryan Plummer. "Adaptive Co-management and the Paradox of 
Learning." Global Environmental Change 18, no. 1 (2008): 89. 
240 Jack H. Ruitenbeek and Cynthia Cartier, “The Invisible Wand: Adaptive Co-management as an 
Emergent Strategy in Complex Bio-economic Systems,” Center for International Forestry Research 34, 
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241 While I would argue the system is imposed, interviewees suggested that there were some enabling 
conditions for the adaptive co-management process to take hold when ‘imposed.’ More on this in Chapter 
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be clear that there exists many ways to 
introduce, formulate, administrate, and 
facilitate adaptive co-management schemes. 
Although the field is still relatively 
young, the plurality of understandings 
presented a difficulty when trying to compare 
cases and distill out some factors that have led 
to success, as Plummer et al. (2012) attempted 
to do. In their systematic analysis of 108 
articles related to adaptive co-management, the 
authors sought to wrangle-in the diverse and 
assorted concepts present in the literature at the 
time of their study. In Table 3. are twelve 
themes which received the most attention in 
their corpus, (measured by frequency of 
occurrence within the articles) therefore are interpreted to be critical components (either 
as process factors or outcomes) in the management experience.242  
As is characteristic of any developing field, there appeared to be a lack of precision and 
consensus in the early stages. According to the authors, the adaptive co- factors which 
were reported as having contributed to success and those that contributed  
                                                          
242 Ryan Plummer, Beatrice Crona, Derek R. Armitage, Per Olsson, Maria Tengö, and Olga Yudina, 
“Adaptive Comanagement: A Systematic Review and Analysis.” Ecology and Society 17, no. 3 (2012): 8. 
 
 
 Description 
Bridging Organizations 
Conflict 
Enabling Conditions 
Incentives 
Knowledge 
Leadership 
Learning 
Networks 
Organizational Interactions 
Shared Power 
Shared Responsibility 
Trust 
 
Table 3. Most frequently reported 
components or variables of interest 
emerging within adaptive co-
management (adapted from Plummer 
et al. 2012). 
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toward failures through qualitative coding techniques (i.e. through careful reading, 
marking passages in text that jibed with a predetermined theme). A summary of these 
findings is present in Table 4. Critically however, over half of the studies that wrangled 
Present factors contributing 
to successes of adaptive co-
management 
Number 
of 
Items 
Number 
of 
Passages 
 
17 31 
Social networks 13 18 
Learning 8 16 
Participation of all relevant 
stakeholders in management 
5 6 
Generation, use, and sharing 
of information and 
knowledge 
3 4 
Development of necessary 
attitudes and skills 
2 2 
Government control over 
illegal resource use 
1 1 
Management flexibility 1 1 
Funding 1 1 
 
Present factors contributing 
to failures of adaptive co-
management  
Number 
of 
Items 
Number 
of 
Passages 
 
16 24 
Conflict of interests of those 
involved 
7 8 
Power asymmetries among 
those involved 
4 8 
Insufficient resources 
(financial, human, technical, 
etc.) 
4 5 
Restrictive policies or 
institutions 
3 3 
Absence of multi-
stakeholder commitment 
2 3 
Deficiencies/inconsistencies 
in communication, 
information, knowledge 
3 3 
Unclear privileges, 
guidelines, and 
responsibilities 
2 2 
Short-term outlook 2 2 
Inability to learn, adapt, 
problem solve, or self-
organize 
2 2 
Lack of leadership 1 1 
Lack of understanding of 
adaptive co-management 
process 
1 1 
Ecological disturbances 1 1 
Absence of social networks 1 1 
Inability to make decisions, 
problems with decision-
making process 
1 1 
Poorly developed civil 
society 
1 1 
Lack of homogeneity 
among resource systems and 
users 
1 1 
 
Table 4. Occurrences of factors reported to enhance (left) or under (right) adaptive co-
management implementation (adapted from Plummer et al. 2012). 
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either with variables leading to success or failure did not clearly define the objective or 
purpose of adaptive co-management implementation. Consequently, the authors 
wondered how valuable these reports of success and failure are if the evaluative criteria 
were not defined nor consistent across cases.243 The anxiety over the lack of a shared 
definition is warranted. We can expect this to clear up over time as the field matures and 
makes intellectual corrections to resolve issues that are identified in these review studies. 
Even still, a deep conceptual challenge needs to 
be addressed: there is an indelible elusiveness 
with determining ‘success’ as an outside 
observer. Indeed, each instantiation of adaptive 
co-management will follow a unique trajectory 
as the management foci are, at the very least, 
contingent on the resource conditions and the 
stakeholders willing to participate. The 
subjective nature of ‘success’ is exacerbated by 
temporal and scalar limits, and an implicit 
gradation in the idea of success. It suffers from 
the same conceptual ambiguity as ‘health’ or 
‘safety’ or ‘quality.’ In other words, best 
answers to these probably involve its 
juxtaposition or comparison to another thing 
                                                          
243 Ryan Plummer, Beatrice Crona, Derek R. Armitage, Per Olsson, Maria Tengö, and Olga Yudina, 
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Table 5. Frequency of types of 
reported successes through/with the 
adaptive co-management process 
(reproduced from Plummer et al. 
2012). 
 
Description Number 
of 
Items 
Number 
of 
Passages 
 
Actual 9 17 
Participation and 
involvement of 
relevant 
stakeholders 
6 10 
Conflict resolution 3 7 
Improved resource 
health 
4 4 
Collaboration 3 3 
Education 2 2 
Improved 
community well-
being 
2 2 
Transformation of 
institutions 
1 1 
Improved 
communication 
1 1 
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(e.g. more successful than….). The effort by Plummer et al. (2012) to gauge a collective 
understanding of adaptive co-management highlighted this very problem. Table 5 here 
contains the distilled, reported ‘successes’ experienced by participants in an adaptive co-
management scheme. Assuredly, the case studies that reported a resolution in conflict, for 
instance, experienced differing levels (e.g. strong vs weak) of agitation at different 
durations (e.g. long-term vs short-term) and over objectives of differing importance (e.g. 
main objectives vs auxiliary goals). To each researcher embedded in the management 
scenario, these contingent factors must play into the calculation through which success is 
deemed or rejected. Perhaps no conflict (or none that was notably perceptible to 
embedded researchers) existed in many of the case studies therefore the resolution of it 
cannot be reported as a ‘success’ variable.  
The contextual nature of environmental management adds to the difficulty in 
making recommendations for which scheme ought to be adopted in any given case. A 
possible way around this dilemma, unsurprisingly, begins with Ostrom’s (2007) initial 
development of a diagnostic framework for social-ecological systems.244 Taking 
inspiration from Ostrom’s foray into health metaphors, Plummer et al. (2014)245 and 
Plummer et al. (2017)246 begin developing a diagnostic framework for adaptive co-
management which grapples with the prevalent imprecision and inconsistency in 
concepts and method. As will be reviewed more in depth in the third Chapter, the 
                                                          
244 Ostrom, Elinor. “A Diagnostic Approach for Going beyond Panaceas.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 104, no. 39 (2007): 15181–87. 
245 Plummer, Ryan, Lisen Shultz, Derek Armitage, Örjan Bodin, Beatrice Crona, and Julia Baird. 
“Developing a Diagnostic Approach for Adaptive Co-Management and Considering Its Implementation in 
Biosphere Reserves.” The Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Beijer Discussion Paper, no. 245 
(2014): 0–19. 
246 Plummer, Ryan, Julia Baird, Derek Armitage, Örjan Bodin, and Lisen Schultz. “Diagnosing Adaptive 
Comanagement across Multiple Cases.” Ecology and Society 22, no. 3 (2017). 
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diagnostic metaphor represents a reversal in the initial approach to environmental 
management. Ostrom et al. (2007), Perrings (2007), Berkes (2007), and Brock and 
Carpenter (2007) discuss the pitfalls of so-called resource management panaceas, or 
policy cure-alls, that are said to be applicable in every environmental context. These 
mythical solutions have their origin with Hardin’s (1968) “Tragedy of the Commons” 
where he described a group of self-interested grazers desecrating shared grasslands to 
fatten their own cows who can only be dissuaded from engaging in this race to the bottom 
by government intervention. As our knowledge about the complexity of social-ecological 
systems has matured, researchers now understand the limitations in deploying similar 
interventions in disparate, uneven contexts. Thus, a diagnostic approach as configured in 
Figure 1. for adaptive co-management, is gaining traction as a preferred approach to 
social-ecological governance.247  Just as a physician will inquire about one’s medical and 
family history, allergies, and current symptoms before offering a diagnosis and 
corresponding treatment plan, the adaptive co-management diagnostic method begins 
with a surveying of the setting (e.g. institutional context, biophysical conditions, and 
social-ecological connections). Couched within the setting of the management challenge, 
                                                          
247 Plummer et al., “Diagnosing Adaptive Comanagement across Multiple Cases”, 3. 
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researchers, acting as diagnosticians, are encouraged to first analyze what pre-conditions 
exist and those that are missing (e.g.  communal properties, tolerance for collaboration). 
These pre-conditions are enabling factors that seem to support the whole adaptive co-
management enterprise.248 Secondly, the processes of collaboration and learning 
(adaptation) requires analysis. This involves looking closely at not only the 
characteristics but also the structure of each component. For example, the existence of 
respect, trust, legitimacy, and pluralism, among others, through the collaborative process 
is expected to lead to greater satisfaction about decisions.249 Moreover, the structure of 
the networks that form have some influence on the emergence and maintenance of these 
                                                          
248 This step involves taking an inventory of the factors referred to as ‘emergent properties’ by Ruitenbeek 
and Cartier (2001), discussed briefly at the start of this section.  
249 Reed, Mark S., “Stakeholder participation for environmental management: A literature review,” 
Biological Conservation 141, no. 10 (2008): 2417-2431.  
 
1. 
Antecedents 
Actors, 
activities, 
practices 
2. Process 
Collaborati
on and 
learning 
(adaptation
) 
3. Outcomes 
State of 
linkage 
between 
social-
ecological 
systems 
Context/Setting 
Figure 1. Diagnostic steps for adaptive co-management, adapted from Plummer et al. 
(2017). 
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collaborative qualities.250 A study conducted by Baird et al. (2016) suggests that while he 
development and strengthening of social ties, as observed through a social network 
analysis, are necessary pre-conditions and process qualities, they are not solely sufficient 
to place adaptive co-management on a successful path. The other half of the process 
picture are the learning activities at the individual and group levels. These learning items 
can be probed by survey instruments and through researcher observations.   
As Plummer et al (2012) and Plummer et al. (2014) lamented, connecting the 
outcomes of adaptive co-management had previously been a cumbersome task due to the 
lack of conceptual consensus in adaptive co-management literature. To address this 
concern specifically, as the last component of their diagnostic framework, the outcomes 
are accounted for on two fronts: results, which are the products of the adaptive 
collaborative arrangement; and effects, which are the consequences of these products. For 
instance, if a ‘result’ of adaptive co-management was the supposition and implementation 
of new county-level policy related to water conservation in a grassland, the ‘effect’ would 
therefore be something like ecological sustainability or changes in attitudes about 
conservation insofar as they can be measured. In this case, measuring water use before 
the policy and after could be utilized as a reliable proxy.    
                                                          
250 Baird, Julia, Ryan Plummer, and Örjan Bodin. “Collaborative Governance for Climate Change 
Adaptation in Canada: Experimenting with Adaptive Co-Management.” Regional Environmental Change 
16, no. 3 (2016): 747–58.  
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The characteristics of each diagnostic step sought by practitioners (grounded in 
literature) are offered in Table 6. The nested categories, inspired by Ostrom (2009),251 
improve opportunities for comparison across cases and offers a common language that 
can be utilized by researchers (and managers) in adaptive co-management schemes. The 
                                                          
251 Ostrom, Elinor, "A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-Ecological 
Systems., Science 325, no. 5939 (2009): 419–22. 
Table 6. Nomenclature of variables, reproduced from Plummer et al. (2017). 
 
Variables 
 
First-tier Second-tier Third-tier 
Setting Institutional context n/a 
 
Biophysical conditions (including 
ecosystem attributes) 
n/a 
 
Social-ecological linkages n/a 
Antecedents Actors Type diversity 
Level diversity 
 
Activities and practices Implementation 
Decision-making 
Monitoring 
Spaces for interaction 
Process Learning Individual as unit of analysis: 
 Cognitive 
 Normative 
 Relational learning 
Social group or organization as unit of  
analysis: 
 Single loop 
 Double loop 
 Triple loop learning 
 
Collaboration Collaborative qualities: 
 Legitimacy 
 Open communication, negotiation, and   
    mutual respect 
 Transactive decision-making 
 Pluralism and linkages 
Network structures: 
 Social cohesion 
 Heterogeneity 
 Centralization 
Outcomes Results First order tangible 
First order intangible 
Second order 
 
Effects Ecological sustainability 
Human livelihoods 
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first level (tier 1) are the three most general adaptive co-management components, 
namely, pre-conditions/antecedents, process, outcomes. Dissecting these three 
components into finer grains not only mirrors the real nature of these nested systems, but 
it aids in the organization of research objectives and subsequent methodologies. For 
instance, a researcher interested in collaborative governance might focus on the specific 
engendering factors (e.g. how legitimacy is generated, the level of attention to inclusivity 
and recognizing pluralism, etc.) and can therefore comprehensibly contribute toward the 
adaptive co-management literature. 
Challenges. 
Although adaptive co-management has been supported as a powerful resilience-
building tool, the principle challenge remains to justify its use.252 The diagnostic 
approach to case-studies, in theory, allows researchers to offer additional evidence 
towards this goal. Despite its promise in this diagnostic mode, the implementation of 
adaptive co-management is fraught with difficulties in coordination and justification, 
challenges that arise from the messy problems adaptive co-management intends to 
address. Based on my reading of the adaptive co-management literature, (e.g. Nepal, 
2002; Nadadsy, 2007, Berkes, 2000; Olsson et al., 2004; Doubleday, 2007), I have 
identified three significant challenges that practitioners within a given adaptive co-
management arrangement continue to face, namely, wrangling with the plurality of 
values, managing conflict and engendering democracy, and dealing with uncertainty.253 
These related attributes are seemingly unavoidable and their unsuccessful management 
                                                          
252 Plummer et al., “Developing a Diagnostic Approach for Adaptive Co-Management and Considering Its 
Implementation In Biosphere Reserves”, 15. 
253 These items are loose collections of underlined variables in the third tier of Table 6.  
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can alter the course of the adaptive co-management project. I consider these factors as 
meta-game components along the lines of Plummer et al. (2017), i.e., they are process 
objectives hidden within the typical social-ecological outcomes that adaptive co-
management pays most attention to. 
Challenge 1: Wrangling with the Plurality of Values. 
Value pluralism describes the differential prioritization of values by groups of 
people. Here, I generally take Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation of value pluralism which 
suggests that it is an “…account of the actual structure of the normative universe. It 
advances a truth-claim about that structure, not a description of the perplexity we feel in 
the face of divergent accounts of what is valuable.”254 Disparate values exists, tied to 
culture, religion, region, time period, language, economics, and so forth. This is really a 
self-evident position to maintain given the recurrence of incommensurate value 
judgements, what can be referred to as ‘competitive pluralism’.255 Adaptive co-
management purports to be an inclusive procedure, drawing in land owners, local 
stakeholders, and a diversity of resource agencies, non-governmental or otherwise.256 As 
a result of this decree, numerous personal perspectives and career related obligations and 
expertise interface with one another, hopefully toward a common goal. Common goals 
likely come from the most strongly held values in a group (hence the formation of a 
group). Not necessarily does this interface involve conflict and disagreement, but as a 
feature of a pluralistic society, it is nearly guaranteed. Ultimately, the swath of values that 
                                                          
254 Sivarajah, Mark, “Value-pluralism and Human Rights”, in Frontiers of Diversity: Explorations in 
Contemporary Pluralism, eds. Avery Plaw, (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 2005), 74.  
255 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK, 1986), 407.  
256 Ryan Plummer and Julia Baird, “Adaptive Co-Management for Climate Change Adaptation: 
Considerations for the Barents Region,” Sustainability 5, no. 2 (2013), 632. 
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are held in any collaborative endeavor will have to be prioritized and the collective 
ordering suggests which management strategy is proposed at any specific time. That is, 
each professed goal or desired outcome represents the rejection, at least momentarily, of 
many alternatives.  
 The plurality of values that are relevant within a collaboration also exposes the 
moral scopes of each member. That is to say that members likely have wider and 
narrower ranges of things that they believe can be valued. In a conservation context for 
instance, this may beget differential emphasis on particular species. Typically, what we 
see is a disproportionate regard for charismatic animals over smaller, scaled, and spiky 
ones. The White Tanks Conservancy collaborative (a case that will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 5) are planning to install wildlife corridors based on how they 
will most serve nine particular species, some mammals, most not. The value line has 
already been drawn at these nine species,257 but this also implies that there are some 
species which could lose out. Asking what makes them worthy of consideration, and 
ultimately prioritizing their projection less than others, is a revealing task. This 
counterfactual and others like it help elucidate the value-based decisions often underlying 
management decisions.    
Challenge 2: Resolving Conflicts and Engendering a Democratic Process. 
Conflict is, as was just discussed, a feature of a pluralistic society. Conflict is also 
essential to co-management258 and, by extension it is also an important component in 
adaptive co-management schemes. The political art of conflict management must also be 
                                                          
257 I recognize the possibility that this is a biological decision (i.e. these are all the animals we expect to be 
harmed by enclosing them), not necessarily a value-laden one.  
258 Kai Lee, Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science and Politics for the Environment, (Washington 
D.C.: Island Press, 1993), 114. 
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instantiated by researchers seeking to operate sound adaptive co-management projects. 
Adaptive co-management as a methodology works to its fullest extent only if managers 
and stakeholders intently learn from their experiences.259 Those experiences and learning 
moments do not occur absent conflict between engaged parties. But by first turning focus 
toward agreement, the necessity of conflict becomes more obvious. Once stakeholders 
come to the table, figuratively speaking, they are, at least at a very basic level, open to the 
idea of cooperation. In the context of an ongoing adaptive co-management scheme, little 
convincing about the benefits of cooperation versus either anarchy or imposition of one 
group’s ideals over all others should be necessary. They may have different reasons, but 
each party who acts in good faith recognizes why one ought to cooperate by virtue of 
their participation and involvement. Of course, there are actors that do engage in the 
collaborative process with ulterior motives like co-option.260 
Even though it is somewhat coercive, the simple threat of top-down governance 
has actually been shown to improve cooperation in co-management scenarios.261 This 
negative reaction towards top-down imposition suggests that stakeholders prefer some 
level of autonomy and an adaptive co-management scheme supports such a virtue. The 
initial commitment to cooperation can be used as leverage by investigators (say, within a 
boundary organization) when necessary. Ideally however, the group enters into a social 
contract of sorts, agreeing that they recognize the present plurality of viewpoints, 
experiences, and expertise. This begins to engender a community that accepts a 
                                                          
259 Ryan Plummer and John FitzGibbon, “Connecting Adaptive Co-Management, Social Learning, and 
Social Capital through Theory and Practice,” in Adaptive Co-Management: Collaboration, Learning, and 
Multi-level Governance, eds. Derek Armitage, Nancy Fikret Berkes, and Nancy Doubleday (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2007), 39. 
260 Prateep K. Nayak and Fikret Berkes, “Politics of Co-Optation: Community Forest Management Versus 
Joint Forest Management in Orissa, India”, 708. 
261 Norton, Sustainability, 245. 
113 
 
deliberative environment laid upon democratic ideals which can then participate in a 
discussion about their differences and also possibilities for convergence.  
 Engaging in co-management efforts at its core, is, as Enengel et al (2011) 
suggests, really a decision about whether the benefits to participation are expected to 
outweigh both the risks and importantly, the transaction costs.262 This calculus, of course, 
requires that any potential participant first believes in the promises and advantages of 
collaboration. Co-management is a special type of collaboration however, so further 
embedded in this belief must be some consideration about the efficacy of local 
government and institutions. Next to keeping participants at the table, getting them there 
in the first place might actually be the most difficult task. In other cases, where 
livelihoods are inextricably linked with the harvesting of local resources, few other 
options may exist.  
 In the case of the North Atlantic golden tilefish fishery in the northeastern United 
States, cooperation between fishers and government officials seemed like the only option 
to save both the depleting stocks and the livelihoods of fishermen.263 Partly in response to 
an ‘overfished’ designation made by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council,264 a 
Fishery Management Plan (FMP) was put into place in the latter half of 2001.265 Before 
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the management plan was developed, fishers reported excessively rivalrous conditions 
that led to longer hours and longer trips and therefore, increased health and economic 
risks. Rather than continue to compete in this way, a Fishery Management Plan was 
adopted that set out the specific goals of preventing overfishing and rebuilding stocks to 
sustainable levels. The FMP took historical catch levels, placed vessels into one of three 
categories, and granted each of those categories a percentage share of the 905 live tons 
allowed to be caught. The FMP did not explicitly state that collaboration between 
fishermen was required, but it became clear that in order to achieve the desired results, 
collaboration was necessary. Indeed, the council itself represents a good model of 
collaborative management (see note 264). In response to the development (and 
acceptance) of the FMP, local associations began to form to carry out and influence these 
directives in an organized manner.  
As should be clear, there are multiple ways in which an adaptive co-management 
scheme can proceed towards a conflict resolution, but perhaps the most likely is an 
iterative process of deliberation and weighting for the following reasons: After making 
the initial commitment to cooperate, the group should acknowledge that one view does 
not count more than any other. The group can collectively, either through qualitative 
imagination or through assigning number values, decide which concerns weigh how 
much. This isn’t the same as the blanketing of utilitarianism or units of intrinsic value, 
but more like a ranked-choice. Multiple, divergent perspectives are polled, but at least 
one commonality—the commitment to cooperation and democracy—adheres the whole 
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process together.266 As context changes, this weighting process allows different criteria to 
either fall or come to the forefront. It operationalizes decision making and provides a way 
for communities to make obligatory cooperative and conciliated choices.267  
Challenge 3: Relieving the Anxiety of Management with Uncertainty. 
Resilience building is one way in which environmental managers handle social-
ecological uncertainty.268 The methodology and outcomes of adaptive co-management 
are well-suited for resilience building and, indeed, resilience is typically considered the 
main goal of adaptive co-management schemes.269 Resilience building adaptive co-
management schemes are such that they attempt to address both current problems and 
problems that are yet unknown by remaining flexible in the face of new information. This 
does not come without challenge however. Anthony Charles (2007) identifies two 
implicit attitudes in environmental policy that fail to address uncertainty:  
The illusion of certainty. Resource systems are among the most complex 
and uncertain, yet many resource management institutions exhibit a 
perverse tendency to ignore major elements of uncertainty; these 
institutions suffer from an “illusion of certainty,” in which policy, 
management, and/or operating practices take place as though major 
elements of uncertainty could be ignored, or even as though the world 
were somehow certain and predictable. Far from recognizing and working 
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within the bounds of the uncertainty, the illusion of certainty leads to the 
opposite result.  
The fallacy of controllability. Natural resource management is intrinsically 
an imperfect endeavour, with resource systems at best partially and 
imperfectly controlled. Unfortunately, this is by no means universally 
recognized. A “fallacy of controllability” is often in place, reflecting a 
perception that more can be known, and more controlled, than can be 
realistically expected in the real world.270 
Myopic policy (sensu amplo Ostrom, 1990), which often treats management as an 
engineering problem, precludes managers from instituting practices that are effective in 
the long-run.271 By remaining blind to contingency, uncertainty, and change, managers 
will struggle to meet defined goals and thus risk failing in the face of new crises and 
surprises.272 This would be akin to having no management response to new possibilities, 
to doing nothing when presented with a novel problem. Therefore, to prevent such 
gridlock and inaction, Folke, Colding, and Berkes (2003) advocate that we learn from 
crises faced and that we integrate our new knowledge back into the system to build 
resilience against future disturbances.273 This attitude leads to something like adaptive co-
management where learning-by-doing is an important resilience-building component 
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from the adaptive perspective, but also where diversification and risk sharing among 
stakeholders serves to build social resilience, a feature of the co-management perspective. 
Given that adaptive co-management is ultimately concerned with establishing resilience 
in resources, it is not always the case that what is desired by some populations is 
‘resilient’. Indeed, Gunderson (2003) worries about inescapable uncertainty being 
wielded as a resource in itself to maintain a status quo by management agencies and 
researchers;274 this is something like a “wait and see” or “we do not have enough 
information” scenario such as what seems to be happening with current climate policy.  
 Conclusion 
Transitioning toward management styles that engender resilience will require us 
to continue reshaping the way in which we interact with our environments. So far, the 
response has been akin to a global geo-engineering effort to meet the increasing demands 
of a burgeoning population. Brian Walker and David Salt (2006) open their discussion 
about resilience as a state-of-mind which, if adopted, produces sustainable behaviors by 
first pointing out the kind of purely market-driven arrangements that led to our current 
ecological dilemma.275 These myopic attitudes that merely focus on short-term supply 
meeting short-term demand need to be shed for more long-term view which is responsive 
to stochasticity, surprise, and most importantly, degradation. What we have done, Walker 
and Nash state, is induce a state of optimization, where yield is the measure of success.276 
When the objective is to control the components of the system that confer the most 
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benefit, we create externalities that are rarely addressed. As of 2012, we are utilizing 
about 11 percent of the global land area (roughly 1.5 billion ha) to feed the 9 world’s 
billion people, although this food is assuredly not equally nor fairly distributed.277 To 
meet this demand felt by increasingly developed countries, we have engineered high 
yield crops that are planted year-round and then supplemented by chemical fertilizers.    
There remains cause some optimism however. The message is not simply that we 
should do something, anything, but instead, do this. The Resilience Alliance is a group of 
researchers that specialize in the maintenance and management of social-ecological 
systems—the kind of systems we exist in and rely upon for continued prosperity. 
Accordingly, they have promoted adaptive management as a response to the inherent 
limitations we have in our management abilities exacerbated, of course, by a transient 
climate.278 It could be argued that adaptive management has been occurring for many 
millennia in a more informal composition. Indeed, many of the ideas now suggested as 
tenets of adaptive management are like those practiced by small-scale or traditional 
pastoral farmers. While interventions are not necessarily viewed through the lens of the 
hypothesis-testing, they are conducted by land-users anticipating certain results. If those 
results do not conform to their expectations, new interventions, including new 
technologies, are injected into the system, again anticipating specific results.  
Simultaneously, the rife mismanagement of, mainly, fisheries sparked an 
increasing collaboration between resource extractors and governmental bodies who 
                                                          
277 Food and Agriculture Organization, World Agriculture: Towards 2015/2030, ed. Jelle Bruinsma 
(London: Earthscan Publications, 2003). http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4252e/y4252e06.htm#P4_3 
278 “Adaptive Management,” Resilience Alliance, accessed May 1, 2017, 
https://www.resalliance.org/adaptive-mgmt. While they simply refer to the management system as adaptive 
management, they recognize that it must be deployed as “…a social as well as scientific process.” 
119 
 
oversaw extraction. Realizing their resources were often spread too thin, agencies saw an 
opportunity to engage with the communities of users who already had a stake in the 
continued persistence of their environmental resources. This bred the management 
system called co-management. Co-management is a special kind of collaborative 
management whose participants seem to understand that large-scale resource use, 
maintenance, and protection does not occur in isolation. Instead, participants recognize 
that these systems demand attention from all levels of social organization, from 
stakeholder groups to business leaders to non-profits to government agencies in some 
cases.  
Given the increasing urgency surrounding our impaired natural resources and the 
vast socio-political interconnectedness now prevalent, it seemed natural that these two 
strands of management merge together to form the suitably named adaptive co-
management. This brand of management is accurately described as a social learning 
enterprise where management actions/interventions are viewed as hypotheses and 
outcomes are likewise viewed as either affirmation and refutation in the same vein as the 
adaptive management tradition. Adopting the principal strengths from co-management, 
this process is made more robust by engaging with a collaborative community, making 
steps in the adaptive management process more digestible, and indeed, more efficient. 
For instance, the tasks of data gathering, scenario planning, implementation, monitoring, 
re-invention, etc. are shared amongst collaborators and therefore so are the risks in 
failure. The diversity of collaborators provides a resiliency buffer, akin to response 
diversity in an ecosystem.   
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Do we have a panacea in adaptive co-management? Not likely. Echoing Ostrom 
et. al (2007), I share some reservations about the idea that any particular management 
system is likely to work in all cases.279 Indeed, in the previous chapter, I spilled a lot of 
ink over the claim that the hunt for a universal solution is a mistake we have inherited 
from a time when we could not imagine how complex the world is. It is worth noting that 
in that very same paper, the authors discuss moving beyond panaceas by referring to a 
general methodological approach which involves “diagnosis, monitoring, and learning.” 
Specifically, the author’s state:  
The study of the governance of [social-ecological systems], and of 
sustainability science more generally, is an applied science like medicine 
and engineering, which aim to find solutions for diverse and complex 
problems. In diagnosing problems, the applied scientist examines 
attributes of a problem, layer by layer, and focuses on traits that are 
thought to be essential in a particular context. When an initial solution is 
adopted, considerable effort is made to dig deeply into the structure of the 
problem and to monitor various indicators of the system. On the basis of 
this information, applied scientists change their actions and learn from 
failures.280 
Admittedly, it then seems strange to prop up the adaptive co-management 
framework as providing the most effective advice on navigating environmental 
management challenges, while simultaneously maintaining that no problem-
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solving framework is best suited for all dilemmas. What I am comfortable in 
staunchly supporting then, is whatever behavior that incorporates the management 
ethos of the sustainability pursuer—diagnosis, monitoring, and learning. Given 
the evidence that adaptive co-management is perceived (by participants) as 
producing better outcomes relative to the strength of collaboration,281 I also firmly 
believe that a collaborative or community aspect is necessary to the establishment 
of a sustainable regime. Many others would agree.  
This conclusion has been a kind of foreshadowing for the next chapter. The task 
there is demonstrate the connection between this rich and increasingly popular 
management tradition—adaptive co-management—to concerns felt by certain 
environmental ethicists, such as Bryan Norton (and me for that matter). This connection 
has been tacit throughout the first two chapters of this dissertation but will be explicated 
in the fourth by turning the discussion toward method. There is, evidently, a deep 
epistemic connection between the adaptive co-management framework and pragmatic 
environmental ethics. Environmental philosopher Bryan Norton has spent considerable 
time developing and enriching the epistemological connection between adaptive 
management (while only recently turning his attention to the collaborative expansion). In 
one of his many important books in the field, Norton seeks to provide clarity on what is 
exactly meant by sustainability. In Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem 
Management (2005), he suggests that we lack precision on all issues surrounding 
sustainability and therefore perennially come up short on solutions because, at the core, 
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we do not know how to effectively communicate with one another. We lack shared 
definitions, concepts, and ideas, and we do not have a shared method to resolving these 
disparities. His proposal relies on a deliberative, public-facing philosophy that “is capable 
of establishing a progression, of creating a more and more inclusive experiential basis for 
our expanding set of shared beliefs.”282 Although I do not share his optimism, a claim I 
have repeated in the first Chapter, Norton sees a practical role for philosophers involving 
the translation of policies into normative claims and, in general, acting as an attendant to 
the method of democratic deliberation.  
A reader familiar with Norton’s more recent volume, Sustainability and 
Sustainable Values, Sustainable Change (2015) will notice several significant similarities 
between his discussion and the approach taken in the next chapter. Both the method I 
develop and Norton’s rely on similar truth-seeking/workable283 practices toward the 
solution of complex environmental problems couched in pragmatism. But there are two 
areas in the next chapter where I take things in a somewhat different direction. For 
example, Norton effectively disposes of dominant alternatives to deliberative decision 
making,284 but appears to take for granted that consensus will emerge in deliberative 
contexts. In co-management scenarios, the idea and rules of consensus are infrequently 
transparent as there is an implicit power imbalance between stakeholders and state actors. 
The rules surrounding consensus can change the course of the entire management 
venture. The establishment of these rules is itself a problem of consensus.    
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One other area that Norton has yet to develop centers on what you might describe 
as the sociological dimensions of environmental management. Is there a special meaning 
underlying environmental collaborations? Does it mean that we do indeed obtain shared 
values if we are willing and engaged participants? These questions, and more, are the 
subject of what I have called engaged pragmatism and are briefly discussed in the next 
chapter. Such a sociological understanding, I believe, can help to shed light on some of 
the linguistic failures that Norton identifies.  
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4. THEORYCRAFTING: HOW ADAPTIVE CO-MANAGEMENT 
OPERATIONALIZES A PRAGMATIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
As mentioned earlier, one of the prominent works on the topic of ACM, Adaptive 
Co-Management: Collaboration, Learning, and Multi-level Governance, features a 
preface by the book’s editors indicating that they hope to find “potentially fruitful 
directions for the evolution of co-management in an adaptive age.”285 Multiple intellectual 
traditions, namely, “social science, economic, and ecological theory,”286 comprise the 
forward-thinking book, but interestingly, environmental philosophy goes unmentioned. 
This exclusion might indeed make sense given the overwhelming focus in environmental 
ethics (the most applicable branch of environmental philosophy) on articulating an all-
encompassing, singular theory of environmental value. An active management practice 
such as adaptive co-management, which requires recognizing and balancing multiple 
stakeholder values (including both instrumental and intrinsic value claims) is therefore 
misaligned with the value structure and aims of a monistic environmental ethics. Given 
the inclusive and experimental orientation of ACM, environmental ethics therefore risks 
continuing irrelevance to environmental managers and stakeholders—some of the very 
people ethicists have long hoped to inform and influence.  
I addressed this nagging concern in first two chapters of this dissertation, which 
focused on the practical and philosophical limitations of traditional environmental ethics 
and the promise of a more pragmatic approach in the field. Chapter three then explored 
one key area of environmental practice and management via a study of the ACM 
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tradition, which, as we’ve seen, has become a key feature in the attainment of 
sustainability goals. This chapter brings these two streams—environmental ethics and 
environmental management—together by examining a proposed methodological 
connection between the type of truth-seeking behavior promoted by American 
pragmatists (and an environmental ethics derived from the same philosophical school, 
that is, environmental pragmatism) and adaptive co-management. I argue that this 
connection is further strengthened by a related epistemological sympathy shared by the 
two traditions. Here, I develop a pragmatic method applied to the environment and 
contrast it to the ‘method’ conferred by a monistic environmental ethics. Drawing from 
the management scholarship, I present the stylized method of adaptive co-management 
and compare it to the pragmatic method uncovering a peculiar coherence. The 
comparison sheds light on some procedural hang-ups in the implementation of adaptive 
co-management while viewing the process through a pragmatic lens. This filter, for 
instance, can add moral force to the collaborative elements in the management process, 
that, at times, can effectively amount to tokenism due to power imbalances or the lack of 
a genuine democratic orientation. Collaborative mishaps then, are not just procedural, but 
moral failures. Further, this combination exposes significant challenges for pragmatism; 
i.e., that since the pragmatic epistemology relies on deliberation within engaged 
communities, the mechanisms that engender this arrangement come under scrutiny.  
Ethical Methodology and Epistemic Value 
I began this study with the premise that environmental ethics has lacked public 
and political influence despite the activist and applied mandates widely adopted in the 
field.  So far, I’ve given a historical and philosophical account as to why this might be the 
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case. I now want to offer what I believe to be the practical differences between 
mainstream environmental ethics and the pragmatic alternative. That is, what would 
distinguish a decision-making methodology based on the epistemology and ethical 
positions advocated by principlist environmental ethics from one issuing from a 
pragmatist environmental ethics?  And relatedly, which methodology – principlist or 
pragmatist - is more likely to secure its ethical objectives? 
Principlist Methodology. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that the basis of mainstream environmental ethics is a 
foundationalist epistemology. This just means that there are some beliefs—those that 
might be argued to constitute knowledge—that do not rely on their coherence with other 
beliefs. They are instead supposed to be reflective of the metaphysical reality, composed 
of true statements about the nature of being, existence, etc.; a “mirror of nature” as 
Richard Rorty would put it.287 These beliefs are foundational in that they act as the initial 
premises from which ethical conclusions are derived. For example, consider the 
following argument extraction, a tool in propositional logic that is used to expose the 
deductive form of arguments: 
1. All living things contain intrinsic value. (basic) 
2. Things that contain intrinsic value should not be valued for its utility. (basic) 
3. Therefore, a living thing should not be valued for its utility. (1,2) 
The basic premises in this example are standard for environmental ethicists that might 
call themselves intrinsic value theorists, non-anthropocentric moralists.288 They protect 
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these claims by asserting that forms of non-intrinsic valuation allows for “selling out.”289 
The debate between non-anthropocentric moralists and anthropocentrists of all 
persuasions occurs at the level of the first two premises. The anthropocentric crew does 
not buy the non-anthropocentric assertion that any kind of value can inhere in natural 
objects without a valuer, and even if it does, we cannot possibly know. Even hedging 
towards the existence of intrinsic value, anthropocentrists are likely to desire more 
nuance, perhaps constraining the types of things that can have intrinsic value or couching 
intrinsic value theory in environmental contexts.290 They challenge the basic-ness of the 
claim that “all living things contain intrinsic value” and would perhaps settle for a claim 
that took the form: “some living things contain intrinsic value.” Regardless, non-
anthropocentrists believe either as a matter of metaphysics, as high-ground in a moral 
sense, or as a practical position (explained below) that environmentalists ought to 
promote the intrinsic value of nature.291  
The fundamental adherence to the intrinsic value of nature then must inform the 
type of behaviors we ought to engage in, namely, to protect those things that, as a matter 
of necessity, fall under the purview of a non-anthropocentric value theory. Otherwise, we 
can be charged with engaging in and supporting immoral thoughts and behaviors. 
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Schematically, a methodology adopted from this non-anthropocentric, foundationalist 
position can be displayed as follows in Figure 1. The figure illustrates the way in which 
the two primary foundationalist alignments (and corresponding commitments) in 
environmental ethics approach an environmental management issue.292 Any hypothetical 
management focus could be replaced with any other hypothetical conservation or 
environmental concern, but because similar preferences with respect to one’s 
philosophical alignment are likely to result, the specific issue actually matters very little. 
This appears to be the case due to the unwaveringness built in to the foundational 
positions. The moralist is committed to the promotion of the intrinsic value of some 
entities (an area of considerable debate in this brand of ethics), but assuredly that 
promotion will come down to sequestering the entity under threat. Under certain 
circumstances, removing the threat could be an appropriate measure given that the 
threat’s intrinsic value, insofar as it has any, is not violated. For instance, capturing and 
relocating animals to suitable environments is less ‘violating’ than say shooting-on-sight. 
While a defender of non-anthropocentric moralism might take issue with the way I have 
presented their simplified decision structure, they would likely agree with the way the 
aggregator is presented here. The charge is not that developers or those solely interested 
in economic growth are somehow evil actors, but more often than not economic growth 
comes at the expense of the environment and surrounding human communities and, 
according to some experts, will continue to do so.293 In other words, the goal is seemingly 
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to convert natural capital into financial or manufactured capital while externalities related 
to development are passed off onto the public in the form of a reduction in ecosystem 
services or more tangible things like water or atmospheric pollution. Because the leading 
cause of biodiversity loss is habitat fragmentation,294 the condemnation of unfettered 
development is widespread among all environmental camps. Although it may seem 
strange to include the aggregator in this example, she is still, in my mind, possessive of 
an environmental ethic. That ethic is just a view of nature as a kind of storehouse of 
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Philosophical Alignment 
Non-Anthropocentric Moralist Economic Aggregator 
Commitment 
Promoting the Intrinsic Value of 
x 
Maximizing Utility 
Encountering a Management Challenge 
Likely Intervention 
Strict Nature Protection Land Conversion/No Action 
Figure 2. Decision accounting in a fictional example for a foundationalist in environmental 
ethics. 
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goods better put to human use than left alone. The difference here generally tracks with 
two historical adversaries, John Muir and Gifford Pinchot, where Muir is the Moralist 
and Pinchot is the Aggregator.  
Throughout this section, I have borrowed Bryan Norton’s nomenclature which 
describes the two foundationalist perspectives in environmental ethics, what he terms 
“moralists” and “aggregators.”295 Norton discusses this polarity most thoroughly in his 
1991 book, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, one of the classic, early statements 
of the pragmatic approach in environmental ethics. Both positions lack sensitivity to 
different contexts and, in some sense, might both be described as aggregators. Instead of 
units of utility, moralists think in terms of intrinsic value. For instance, if the 
management problem in Figure 2. was a declining stock of wild species, each animal in 
this artificial management scenario is “worth” some amount of utility and/or one unit of 
intrinsic value (presumably something cannot have more intrinsic value than another 
thing). With this perspective, sheep are ‘worth’ the same as a frog, or an eagle, or a 
resurrected mammoth should it exist. Accounting for endangered-ness or keystone-ness 
or any other characteristic that ought to be integrated in management decisions becomes 
problematic for the moralist whereas, the economic or utilitarian aggregator is likely to 
prioritize conservation targets based on either differential dollar amounts or some 
measure of utils, depending on the method with which they weigh their preferences. 
Clearly, amongst the potential problems with this ‘version’ of an environmental ethic is 
that land conversion is almost always a more profitable venture than, say, instituting a 
breeding program for wild sheep. This move represents what is perhaps the principle 
                                                          
295 Bryan Norton, Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 9. 
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worry of Moralists. Namely, that Aggregators are permitted to value natural objects in 
strict financial terms. Moreover, doing nothing is morally acceptable as the investment 
into conservation, especially the conservation of something potentially trivial like wild 
sheep, is unlikely to yield an economic return. This is not to say that all aggregation is 
inherently objectionable. There are cases were utility functions produced by 
environmental economists have actually suggested more stringent restrictions on take 
(something akin to sustainable harvest) than what we might believe to be a reasonable 
conservation target (based on effective population perhaps).296 However, a real concern is 
that non-charismatic species or species that are not implicated in desirable ecosystem 
services are easily traded-off in this view. An empirical question here would be whether 
other kinds of utility have offered sufficient justification for protection when economic 
incentives simultaneously exist. Likewise, Biodiversity Offset, which has been on the 
receiving end of criticism from environmentalist groups, is increasingly used to achieve a 
“no net loss” in biodiversity, but ideally as a last resort.297 
From both principled viewpoints, practical progress toward conservation goals 
has been difficult (and at the expense of human autonomy at times) and indeed, elusive. 
The philosophical alignments I have presented are generalizations and, to some extent, 
stereotypes. Certainly, there will be scenarios where management prescriptions are made 
that do not fit neatly into the heuristic I have constructed here. The point is that if you 
take the moralist position to its logical conclusion, then there would be more wildlife 
                                                          
296 Nick Hanley and Edward B. Barbier, Pricing Nature: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Policy, 
(Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2009). 
297 Anne-Charlotte Vaissière, Harold Levrel, and Pierre Scemama,”Biodiversity Offsetting: Clearing up 
Misunderstandings Between Conservation And Economics To Take Further Action,” Biological 
Conservation 206, (2017): 258-262. 
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fortresses and nature preserves than habitable places for humans. One could argue that 
aggregators have had their way so far using a brief survey of ecology, climatology, and 
conservation literature as evidence.  
Pragmatist Methodology. 
Where traditional environmental ethics seems to have run aground is with the 
willful rejection of our pluralistic reality. Instead of deducing from first principles the set 
of appropriate management and policy practices, environmental pragmatists prefer to 
start the other way around.298 The pragmatic methodology, committed to a democratic 
process, first internalizes a problem or conflict and considers what practical moves are 
available given a diversity of concerns and priorities (e.g., legal doctrines, economic 
resources, social norms, moral commitments, etc.) within a particular context. The 
experimental and experiential mandates supported by the pragmatic theory of knowledge 
requires investigation into the situational context. As a reminder, the pragmatic 
epistemology suggests that even if there is some reservoir of foundational knowledge 
which might dictate our realities, we do not have access to it. We must rely on our own 
experiences in order to generate knowledge, but we know this generative process creates 
errors in comprehension and corresponding judgement. Making informed decisions, at 
the very least, requires the intake of information, followed by a two-level consideration. 
The first level is acknowledging that there may be information or perspectives absent 
from the decision circle and the second is a foray into the apparent options. In the 
environmental context, effects of any intervention are likely to be felt by a number of 
local stakeholders, therefore their consultation should be solicited as the perspectives of 
                                                          
298 Minteer et al., “Environmental Ethics Beyond Principle? The Case for a Pragmatic Contextualism,” 141.  
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these stakeholders will inform what options ought to be pursuable. Welcoming the 
involvement and engagement of local partners jibes with the pragmatic mandate of 
creating critical communities, but also reflects a well-studied idea about the longevity and 
success of many environmental projects.299 Social learning can take place. Transparency, 
trust, accountability and other desirable features can emerge. Legitimacy can materialize 
while power (decision making authority) is shared among different engaged groups and 
enables diversity. Resiliency is not only the end-game, but a feature of the entire 
collaborative enterprise.  
Developing a Methodological Pragmatism. 
Stakeholders’ values, interests, and preferences can be balanced against the other 
two kinds of informational intake pertinent in environmental interventions: ecological 
and political. These options are, again, contextual. Assuredly there are economic barriers 
to be considered in addition to legislative concerns that can constrain choices—these 
might be wrapped up in a full accounting of political concerns. Likewise, certain 
ecological conditions are likely to produce a list of priorities to be considered. Once this 
information is taken in, figuratively or literally as part of a review, deliberation is likely 
to occur. This is where the critical community shines in the pragmatic methodology 
constructed here. The buy-in of each stakeholder is not petitioned, nor can it be expected. 
Indeed, the pragmatic commitment to plurality necessitates a respect for individual 
autonomy.300 Following this dictum, the only recourse is to faithfully engage with 
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receptive interlocutors and engender a sense of understanding based on empathy and even 
compassion to reach agreement.  
A problem that plagues deliberative arenas is the question of what is exactly 
meant by agreement or consent. According to Landemore and Page (2015), we can 
characterize consent (general agreement) in three distinct collaborative applications: as a 
goal, a stopping rule, or as an outcome.301 The difference between goals and outcomes is 
just the difference between intentional consensus seeking activities in a deliberative 
context (such as life history sharing)302 or the belief that it will emerge as a by-product. 
Procedurally speaking, determining a so called ‘stopping point’ where deliberation ceases 
and some action derivative of the conversation takes place (i.e. what is the rule for when 
deliberation should momentarily cease?) is, itself, a decision that could be subject to John 
Stuart Mill’s tyranny of the majority. Here, Dewey has some additional insight: the 
perception of a tyrannical majority should never arise if the dialectical method preceding 
decisions is properly wielded.303 That is, while camps may form and opinions and values 
move participants toward different ends, there ought to be some sense of satisfaction 
amongst participants that this division was reached without controversy. Participation in a 
democracy has, for Dewey, an educative effect, whereas other forms of governance, and 
in this case, forums for decision-making do not proffer such an opportunity. 
The type of problem-solving or consensus-building technique that a coalition 
employs will rely on the exposure the stakeholders and facilitators have to these sorts of 
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methods. This is the first of two points that, in my view, don’t receive enough attention. 
Dewey recognizes that “the problem of the public” is our infantile understanding of 
deliberative components including debate, discussion, and persuasion.304 Thusly, we have 
relied on ‘social-elites’ to take up this task, acquiescing to a kind of oligarchy whereby a 
select few make decisions, even in a pseudo-deliberative context, without consultation or 
inclusion of the masses who would be affected by their choices (this should sound 
familiar). Prophetically, Dewey claims, “the world has suffered more from leaders and 
authorities than from the masses.”305 While the consequences of expert or intellectual rule 
in an environmental collaboration are subdued compared to the effects of this public 
complacency toward the decisions made by large governmental bodies, lessons should be 
taken to heart here. As we will see, the two land management and conservation cases I 
will examine in detail in the next chapter—the Cienega Watershed Partnership and the 
White Tank Mountains Conservancy—both suffer from this exact problem (although to 
different extents). Dewey goes on to suggest that insofar as there is tolerance for 
expertise to guide decision making processes, it might as well be public intellectuals (and 
philosophers) since the class chasm which separates the common person from the 
intellectual is narrower compared the very real division of economic classes.306 The public 
intellectual does not seek to suppress the masses, and indeed, might be well equipped to 
include them, while the oligarch derives their power from suppression.  
Secondly, there is some debate in decision theory and among deliberative 
democrats suggesting that consensus is subject to a difference in appeal based on whether 
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collectives are attempting to make predictions or to solve problems.307 The debate 
revolves around a requirement that collective decisions are made merely based on a 
majority or through unanimous consent (e.g. Cohen, 1986; Habermas, 1991).308 
Landemore and Page (2015) again discuss the many roles agreement plays in deliberative 
contexts, specifically, what the larger purpose of deliberation is. Collectives that employ 
deliberation typically coalesce around some common purpose. That purpose can take the 
form of a problem-solving coalition (e.g. city planning) or one designed to offer 
predictions about some future events (e.g. economic forecasts). The lines here are not as 
clean as theorists would like—assuredly collective enterprises like adaptive co-
management contains a predictive, or at least anticipatory element in addition to the 
coalescing around a perceived problem. For any suggested treatment, it must rely on 
some potential and likely normatively desired state-of-affairs that would not be seen 
through implementation if some weighting of benefits to costs did not occur. If it were 
possible to offer resolutions without any evaluation (i.e., before prediction), the idea of 
consensus appears to be the most attractive.309 This would just mean that no one person 
would disagree with the path taken, no other ideas went unconsidered. But this thought 
experiment here is perhaps too idealistic to be commonly applicable. Accordingly, we 
might adopt a norm of ‘positive dissensus,’ counter to this Habermasian unanimity model 
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in some deliberative situations.310 As Landemore and Page (2015) suggest, the 
Habermasian bar would be exceptionally high and, in some cases, could hamstring the 
evaluative/predictive phase of deliberation. For example, imagine if a president-elect 
garnered all possible votes, but could not be seated unless everyone agreed on the 
reasons, she was the better candidate. The resolution in this counterfactual is likely to go 
unachieved given the lack of access to an objective list of reasons to support said 
president-elect. Pragmatists believe that since we have no list, we are essentially 
engaging in a predictive task (where the problem-solving phase is akin to party primaries) 
as we cast votes every four years; therefore, the Habermasian ideal is unlikely to actually 
occur, but can still serve as an ideal model and a normative desire in smaller decision 
circles.311  
The nature of deliberation, as eluded to above, is to offer an arena for the 
exchange of ideas. Along with moral and political, deliberation has epistemic value. 
Engaging with others opens one’s claims to scrutiny on grounds of accuracy, the 
appropriateness of mental models, or conceptualization of the problem itself. To 
deliberate about the features of one’s preferences could ultimately mean that one’s 
choices change throughout the process. Theoretically, a deliberator could enter the 
process at point A and move toward B through deliberation, even as the rest of the 
collective begins to settle on A. The nature of dissensus, then, is in accordance with 
                                                          
310 Habermas seems to support a view he called rational consensus where not only is unanimity required for 
decisions to be made but convergence is the result of similar reasons. He assumed that, in problem-solving 
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deliberative problem-solving norms which just asks that we engage honestly with one 
another and give reasons for our positions. The process is the good.   
Deliberative and democratic arrangements are of course open to a number of 
criticisms. Chief among them is the supposition that not only should the process engender 
egalitarianism, but it must do so by bringing new, uncomfortable, foreign, and even 
reprehensible views under its umbrella.312 How this can be done is empirical in nature, 
thus it might be momentarily prudent to view deliberative democracy (and its standards) 
as an ideal at the end of a continuum of good governance.313 Each of our inadequate 
attempts at solving problems and achieving political agreement can then be seen in 
service of this end, if that is what we want at all.314  
Acknowledging the conundrums of deliberation, the pragmatic methodology, at 
each point engaged in and committed to learning moments, then demands a reflection of 
the outcomes to see how closely the collective decision was to expectations. The purpose 
of the critical community is to assesses the outcomes of decisions and re-inject this new 
information into decision-making apparatuses, improving their accuracy over time. This 
process—from problem emergence, to information gathering, to problem-solving 
(proposing solutions and making predictions), to deliberation (which is deciding on the 
‘best’ solution) through implementation and monitoring—might be displayed 
schematically in Figure 3.  
                                                          
312 Jack Knight and James Johnson, “Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic 
Legitimacy”, Political Theory 22, no. 2 (1994): 289. 
313 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, trans. Ciaran Cronin, 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008): 84. 
314 There is no shortage of literature that might be summoned in service to the deliberative and decision-
making processes. What has been offered here is not adequate to resolve any of the challenges prescient to 
the critical reader or skeptic of democratic institutions. It simply serves as an acknowledgement and an area 
where further learning on my part can and will occur. 
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As might be apparent, the pragmatic methodology supports the discovery of 
integrative and innovative management solutions by appealing to the process of 
democratic deliberation. It is therefore true that the focus of ethical commitments derived 
from particular philosophical perspectives (i.e. an adherence to the intrinsic value of 
nature) plays a lesser role in this deliberative process. Arguably, this subdued role is 
necessary in democratic environments where there are few instances where one 
commitment ought to always override all others (with obvious exceptions like protecting 
human rights for instance). A side-effect of the rejection of first-principles philosophy is 
a focus on context and situational uniqueness. For instance, a preference for an 
endangered species over an abundant one, a preference for a functionally important 
species that has no substitutes, or one for a pharmaceutically valuable plant is not 
unconditionally condemned, but instead made possible. Pragmatists in an environmental 
context are not paralyzed by their inability to make managerial trade-offs due to an 
obligation toward nature’s intrinsic value, but they also are not only motivated to cash-in 
on unprofitable species.315 Either of these results that can of course occur given the 
constituency and their level of participation in the decision-making process.  
                                                          
315 To be clear here, pragmatists can indeed come to value natural objects as if they have intrinsic value, 
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The differences between Figures 2 and 3 are considerable. The pragmatic method 
begins with an encroaching management problem while the principlist model will always 
view a problem through a non-anthropocentric lens. This lens has a blinding effect on the 
constituent concerns held by other relevant actors whereas the pragmatic one requires the 
consideration of fellow stakeholders and community members. Importantly, there is no 
need of an adaptive mandate in the principlist approach as the preferred outcome is not 
sensitive to the decision context, although it would still be wise to incorporate learning 
processes. On the other hand, the pragmatic method does not compose a decision without 
first ingesting the wider context including the social and ecological barriers and 
opportunities.  
In the most ideal process depicted in Figure 3, a multiplicity of community 
concerns are relevant topics of deliberation since conservation efforts are relatively local 
enterprises and thus almost always implicate locals (green, “Stakeholder Survey” box). 
Attention toward local communities is already a growing trend within international 
conservation efforts.316 The contents in the connected blue rectangle are just some 
example responses to a conservation challenge in which these stakeholders are engaged. 
These ideas are taken to the deliberative arena (purple oval). Additionally, it is likely, 
especially in the United States that there will be some formal conservation agency, 
governmental or otherwise, that takes an interest in proceedings here, and indeed, may 
even be responsible for coordination and facilitation. Even if this formal entity is not 
present, some ecological data, including traditional or alternative, is best gathered to add 
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additional environmental context to the deliberation. The remaining piece, “Political 
Reflection” marks the entry of other social factors that can constrain the possible 
responses to the conservation challenge. In ecological management terms, this is akin to 
having a capacity to respond.317 With the focus on experience as the origin of facts and 
values, the environment is where we have experiences, the “field where experience 
occurs.”318 The knowledge (read: facts and values) we have and ever will have is the 
result of ongoing participation and exchanges with the environment and our relations 
with others. This is to say plainly that moral claims in the deliberative context are 
considered on equal footing as that of economic or political or ecologically-based claims. 
Political reflection here does not just mean state governance but is an attempt to capture 
the constellation of public and private concerns that need addressing as part of the 
collaborative process. For instance, legal and procedural rules or even moral and religious 
claims that may weigh on the type of policy that an individual could support as the result 
of the deliberative process. I tend to think of this as a kind of winnowing, where you 
begin with every real or imagined management option and given the available data 
brought by the plurality of stakeholders, a policy agenda can be set after deliberation. 
Each of these submissions to the deliberative arena (purple oval in Figure 3) must 
be done in good faith and with a flexible mind. This is not to say that you should be 
swayed in your opinion given inputs brought by other collaborators, but you understand 
that it is possible, that you can be swayed. Even if done in good faith, there are no 
guarantees that deliberation will lead to better outcomes. Take for example, collaborative 
                                                          
317 Chris Ansell and Alison Gash, “Collaborative Governance in Theory,” Journal of Public Administration 
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318 Kelly Parker, “Pragmatism and Environmental Thought,” Environmental Pragmatism, eds. 
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arenas where there are significant power imbalances. It could be the case that the state 
seeks to maintain control, provides limited information or restricts access to resources, 
and engages in this process as a kind of tokenism—to say, “hey, we’re collaborating.” 
But this misses the point entirely and indeed, is rife moral failings.   
As noted in Chapter 1, the Deweyan perspective here is that engagement with 
your environmental context followed by a reflective phase where value determinations 
can be made (e.g., “that experience was worthwhile and I would like to do it again”), is 
something like the ‘good life.’319 To Dewey, the environment in which this 
acting/reflecting rhythm takes place is as important as the actions within it. The 
pragmatic attitude then is to take seriously the multitude of environmental contexts, 
including the urban setting which has traditionally been ignored by environmental 
ethicists, although that trend is changing somewhat.320 Environments are unique and the 
way people react, live, and derive value within them are equally unique. In the pragmatist 
landscape, values are both created and destroyed by the deliberative, reason-giving 
process that takes place after cognizant action occurs. In this way, action is treated like an 
experiment and the reflection is the evaluative phase where we either reject or accept our 
hypotheses about what leads to the best outcomes (abstaining from certain behaviors or 
instigating them respectively) in each context. These characteristics lay the foundation for 
an ever-evolving plurality of perspectives that are sometimes challenged and sometimes 
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reinforced by our communities. That which survives this social scrutiny may take hold 
over time.  
Engaged Pragmatism as Meaning Making. 
Up to this point in the dissertation, much has been said about the pragmatic 
epistemology as experimental and empirical but only briefly did I touch on the aesthetic 
consequences and value dimensions of this epistemology in the previous section and in 
Chapter 2. The current discussion allows me to summon a related, additional source of 
influence that bears on the pragmatic method as described here, namely, the sociological 
framework of symbolic interactionism (SI) as proffered by the colleagues of George 
Herbert Mead (1863-1931). 
 G.H. Mead, who received post-humous credit for SI, much like the pragmatic 
tradition, developed these ideas as a response to the dominant sociological theories of the 
early 20th century which suggested humans were not interested in creating meaning, 
rather they were merely willing subjects of continuous conditioning by social norms and 
dominant institutions.321 Contraposed to this uninspiring analysis of human identity, Mead 
believed that humans derived meaning (understanding of and ways of relating to the 
external world) and self-identification through interactions with other individuals. Our 
identities are reflexive (read: adaptive) to societal expectations and this identity, this 
conception of self, plays into our interactions (e.g. with whom we associate, modes of 
communication, etc). When taking these interactions of mindful humans as a whole, we, 
in turn, define communities of increasing size and eventually society.322 Stryker (2008) 
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summarizes this triangular relationship as “society shapes self shapes social 
interaction”323 where I would add the last leg for closure and emphasis: shapes society. 
The import the theory of symbolic interactionism has in this context is to aid in the 
explanation of both why participants might engage in collaborations (or any other type of 
social organization) in the first place, as well as what keeps them committed to them (or 
not). It offers a theoretical basis couched in sociology for the so-far scantly mentioned 
value dimension of pragmatic epistemology.  
If, according to the thesis of symbolic interactionism, interaction with our 
environments presents the possibility of creating (and recreating) one’s self—namely, 
recognizing/altering desires, preferences, and values—our behaviors are then physical 
manifestations of assigned meaning,324 akin to the aforementioned Deweyean aesthetics 
position of the consummatory experience.325 We navigate unknown situations and come 
away with greater understanding, with new or solidified interpretations that engage our 
reflective selves. We reflect and we learn by manipulating our environments such that we 
answer whether unfamiliar stimuli are what they are perceived to be.326 A bidirectional 
influence between the actor and the objects or people that she encounters allows this 
learning to occur. Most pragmatists attempted to explain away the relativity that peeks 
out of this working description: that given two actors in similar contexts, each navigating 
through uncertainty, they might settle on different meaningful interpretations. Dewey, 
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Peirce, and to some extent James appealed to the forces of the community to resolve this 
indeterminacy. They thought that the social process of actors engaged in community 
membership would eventually settle upon, “meanings [that are] objective as well as 
universal.”327 For Mead, the significance of meaning is made concrete by the use of 
symbols, or language specific to the description of the object that is shared among those 
who ascribe meaning to it. For instance, most Westerners readily perceive the presence a 
shiny stone adhered to a metal band on the left fourth digit as a symbol of commitment to 
a significant other. The first pair to signal their marriage in this way presumably had 
interactions with others who then emulated the wearing of a ring. As interactions and 
encounters spread, many cultures that exist under the Western umbrella now share similar 
interpretations of wedding rings; it has achieved associated meaningfulness by a large 
number of people. Wedding rings are likely the most obvious example, but the point is 
that everyday behavior, including thoughts and language, can also be understood as a 
manifestation of meaningful interactions.  
For collaborative enterprises with environmental objectives, we can utilize this 
theory to help situate the multiplicity of perspectives that might obtain in a group. 
Practicing symbolic interactionists have indeed done similar work. While I cannot be as 
charitable in my articulation as a professional sociologist, I think the lesson here is that 
participants have ascribed either positive or negative meanings to their continued 
engagement with collaboratives (i.e., a belief that participation will preserve or instantiate 
some collective value equivalent to their own personal beliefs, or, conversely, that the 
group is working to prevent or snuff out certain possibilities that may be dis-valuable). 
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When persistent collaboratives reach the point of fatigue328 and participants are no longer 
attentive, the possible interpretations here are the following: subjective value of any 
individual did not change throughout the course of the collaboration and the group was 
ineffective in identifying and relating with said value. So, despite best efforts, value 
consensus was not attained, and therefore, the opportunity cost to participation became 
too high and attrition took hold. Or, subjective value of any individual did change, and 
therefore the meaning initially crafted with and by participation in the collaborative did 
not persist. In other words, movement (perhaps to extremes) in individual values through 
the course of participation proved incommensurable. The SI theory also allows for the 
collaborative unit to be analyzed as if it were an actor. Dewey confirms, "The individual 
and society are neither opposed to each other nor separated from each other. Society is a 
society of individuals and the individual is a social individual,"329 which comports with 
Mead: “He [a man] constitutes society as genuinely as society constitutes the 
individual."330 Shared, collective values have the ability to shift overtime, thereby leaving 
participants with the choice to rally for their steadfast perspective or become decreasingly 
influential in charting the collective’s trajectory. It is also possible that the shared 
meaning becomes diffuse and separate incompatible camps form that fracture the 
collective identity.  
Connected to this notion of meaning-creation qua interaction is the idea that these 
transactions occur within a specific physical and temporal context, an environment. The 
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argument that pragmatism is an earnest environmental ethic made in Chapter 2 is 
bolstered here by the empirical work environmental sociologists conduct when examining 
the meaning of spaces. Some have pointed out that while meanings of space are 
susceptible to manipulation from the State and other, larger forces, the composition of 
spaces is perhaps the main import for meaning construction.331 This means the plants, 
animals, geography, and ‘presences’ or a ‘connectedness’ in a space can be treated as 
independent variables.332 Indeed, a study taking the SI perspective conducted by Leap 
(2015) seems to suggest that the values and attitudes citizens held toward a Wildlife 
Refuge in Missouri fundamentally shifted once the keystone Canadian geese changed 
their migration habits, visiting the Refuge less frequently. The collective meaning 
attributed to the Refuge commuted from avid birdwatching, research, and conservationist 
hotspot to merely an outdoor recreation site despite the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
running educational programs to bolster the Refuge’s previous attractions. With the 
missing geese, the Refuge changed in meaning. While, pre-Darwinian philosophy was 
characterized by Cartesian dominance, therefore the principal epistemological questions 
concerned the relation between the body and mind, Darwin’s insights on natural selection 
represented a sea-change and brought to light the importance of the relationship between 
the organism and its environment,333 essentially providing the sociological locus of 
analysis. McLaughlin and Dietz (2015) discuss this relationship in terms of responses to 
climate change and how effective vulnerability research really hangs on “a socially 
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constructed adaptive landscape” combining “sociologists’ insights into structure–
environment interactions, constructivists’ attention to agency, language and culture as 
well as critical theorists’ concerns with political and economic power, inequality and 
processes of marginalization.”334 SI theory, and pragmatism more generally, has import 
in many of these defined areas.  
The temporal components of action are often understated. Pragmatism is an 
anticipatory perspective in that actions are undertaken with certain expectations. Actions 
are swollen with previous experience, but nevertheless contingent. SI also aids in the 
theoretical exploration of pragmatic anticipation by offering a similarly aligned temporal 
component to its observational methodology. That like Dewey’s description of the 
knowledge-building rhythm, SI suggests that actors, in their search for meanings are not 
in stasis, but are reflective of the previous experience and act in anticipation of imagined 
results that the individual hopes are affirmatory of established meanings.  
The dissolution of collaboratives ought not be surprising. Indeed, the opposite is 
what many early sociologists believe to be true: The persistent coordination and 
management of shared, meaningful interactions is to be lauded. Participants in these 
schemes begin to self-identify as collaborators,335 and while that identity is continuously 
put to the test by uncertainty and unexpected challenges, it remains a motivating and 
cohesive force.  
  
                                                          
334 Paul Mclaughlin and Thomas Dietz. "Structure, Agency and Environment: Toward an Integrated 
Perspective on Vulnerability." Global Environmental Change 18, no. 1 (2008): 108. 
335 Anonymous interviewee, personal communication, November 2018. 
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Principlists and Pragmatists: A Compact. 
The discussion extended here is not wholly inapplicable to the principlist 
methodology. Indeed, the principled individual should be invited to participate in 
collaborative environmental processes, but we can quickly see how, by remaining plainly 
rigid in one’s environmental valuations, we reach an impasse. Reconciliation is unlikely, 
compromise is out of the question, common ground is improbable. Whether or not the 
creation of innovative policy proposals through the deliberative process is tantamount to 
a violation of any one’s principles is a legitimate worry. This is one of the critiques 
leveled against the pragmatic method.336 Friendly critics of environmental pragmatism 
like Willis Jenkins, who would celebrate the inclusion of what he refers to as 
‘cosmological approaches,’ seem to gloss over the issue that we have experienced little 
cultural movement based on the adherence to non-anthropocentric environmental ethics 
as discussed in Part I of this dissertation. Many of these non-pragmatic positions which 
enjoy mainstream support in the field of environmental ethics have yet to move the 
needle towards addressing sustainability issues (and I think despite this ‘failure’, 
increasing awareness is to be commended, although some principled ethicists may not 
feel the same way).337 
My preference for a pragmatic approach is not based on avarice, one-upmanship, 
or any strong desire for vindication. It is however a kind of bet, that if I had limited 
resources, limited time, limited knowledge, limited capacities for change, little (but 
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increasing) cultural inertia338, shouting “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community!”339 cannot suffice. While I may 
even agree with such a statement, my belief is that we need to generate workable policy 
proposals that can lead to actual outcomes while keeping a keen eye on all forms of 
justice, including environmental. My dissection of the 
mainstream/principlist/foundational/cosmological method in this chapter leads me to 
believe that, within that framework, it is unlikely to come to pass. Before pressing on to 
connect the pragmatic view to existent management approaches, there are a few points 
that I would like to restate: 
Any indictment of mainstream environmental ethics here should be viewed as 
both a friendly critique of the field, but also of the larger systems that entice pro-
environmental thinkers to turn toward problem-based approaches. I cannot say with any 
certainty that my adoption of a pragmatic environmental philosophy would carry the 
same potency if we lived in a principlist utopia where humans and nonhuman species co-
existed without violence nor dilemma. For now, I think that we can be diverse in our 
approaches, we can view the plurality of perspectives as tools in a tool-kit.340 Secondly, 
engagement with the pragmatic method is not to say that any one person should be 
resigned to contentment with the results of the decision-making process, the 
                                                          
338 For instance, House Resolution 109 of the 116th Congress, colloquially known as the Green New Deal 
quickly garnered a plurality of public support, even from politically opposed constituents. See: Abel 
Gustafson, Seth Rosenthal, Anthony Leiserowitz, Edward Maibach, John Kotcher, Matthew Ballew, and 
Matthew Goldberg, The Green New Deal has Strong Bipartisan Support, Yale University and George 
Mason University. New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (2019). 
339 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1949), 88. 
 
340 Ben A. Minteer and James P. Collins. "Ecological Ethics: Building a New Tool Kit for Ecologists and 
Biodiversity Managers." Conservation Biology 19, no. 6 (2005): 1803-812. 
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implementation, the outcomes, etc. In the end, the pragmatic method makes a promise of 
both procedural and resultant improvement based on a belief that social-learning and 
coordination around specified problems is likely to occur.  
Adaptive Co-Management Methodology 
By now, it should be clear that there is some coherence between the pragmatic 
worldview and the management tradition known as adaptive co-management. While 
much ground was already covered on this front in Chapter 3, I want to be explicit with 
my conception of adaptive co-management and its corresponding methodology for 
proposing solutions to environmental management problems. The exercise that follows is 
an attempt to propose a direct linkage between the methodology of a pragmatic 
environmental ethic as I understand it and participation in an adaptive co-management 
scheme. Concurrently, the exercise should also expose the methodological deficiencies 
with the mainstream environmental ethics position.  
Thinking of a management actions as a chain of events has proven useful to 
analyze potential influences toward a desired outcome, a kind of causal mechanism 
analysis.341 Baird et al. (2018) utilize a process tracing methodology that looks earnestly 
at the relationship between initial conditions and outcomes while offering evidence from 
a case study of the different causal mechanisms that are indeed at play. Their case study 
demonstrates that the perceived existence of some environmental threat can spur so-
called entrepreneurs (leaders, organizers, advocates) to seek out resolutions developed by 
actors from similar ecological contexts and, while in-group coalitions begin to form to 
                                                          
341 Jens Newig, Edward Challies, Nicolas W. Jager, Elisa Kochskaemper, and Ana Adzersen. "The 
Environmental Performance of Participatory and Collaborative Governance: A Framework of Causal 
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tackle these problems, out-group members slowly involve themselves due to a desire to 
be heard in the decision-making process.342  
A working theory in environmental management is that collaboration not only 
exemplifies a good, just process by legitimizing a plurality of worldviews, sharing 
decision-making authority, providing a space for learning, etc., but also has the added 
benefit of resulting in more acceptable outcomes (i.e. these outcomes would be viewed as 
equal or better compared to products of some other decision-making process like central 
authority).343 This comes even with the recognition that collaboration has associated 
administrative requirements (e.g. development, organization, financing) and participatory 
demands (e.g. time, dedication, communication), all of which can be considered 
transaction costs.344 Adopting an iterative management philosophy itself requires comfort 
with sets of challenges such as the acceptance of failure, missing the desired target, and 
understanding that the learning process can take multiple management cycles. Despite 
these costs, there are some factors, such as the perceived severity of an ecological 
problem, that can inspire initially opposing groups to not only form, but engage long-
term with problem-solving coalitions.345 Further, the learning that takes place within these 
groups is naturally augmented through an open process of hypothesizing, testing, and 
monitoring (i.e. adaptation).346 Each of these steps (see Figure 4) contains finer grain 
                                                          
342 Julia Baird, Lisen Schultz, Ryan Plummer, Derek Armitage, and Orjan Bodin, “Emergence of 
Collaborative Environmental Governance: What are the Causal Mechanisms?”, Environmental 
Management 63, no. 1 (2019):16-31. 
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concerns like those echoed in the preceding pragmatic section (e.g. how decisions are 
reached, what consent and agreement means).  
Having said that, the literature covering both the collaborative and adaptive 
aspects of environmental management is increasingly vast. Even the most generous 
attempt to relay the growing knowledge about best practices is likely to miss out on 
essential contributions. At the same time, a breakdown exercise, like the one that follows, 
can help elucidate the many moving pieces that exist in a management effort and allow a 
closer look at some of the trade-offs or turning points that might be potent enough to, in 
the end, steer a project’s trajectory. I will impose a linear structure over what is assuredly 
a dynamic process that ebbs in flows and make a few comments on each of the following 
ACM
Environmental 
Problem
Coalition 
Building
Problem-
Solving
Making 
Predictions
Implementation
Evaluation
Figure 4. Stylized process of Adaptive Co-management. 
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pieces: problem emergence, coalition building, problem solving and making predictions, 
implementation and evaluation, and lastly, capturing adaptation.  
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Problem Emergence. 
This is perhaps the least controversial block in the process, but because it both serves 
as the impetus and object of organization, some considerations are worth mentioning 
here. The socio-ecological context in which this problem emerges as well as the pre-
conditions for cooperation347 are relevant factors which can influence the perceived 
urgency of a problem.348 For instance, in a sensitive ecosystem characterized by 
individualists with low social cohesion and a subsistent economy, it’s likely the 
management problem, say, an invasive species, would be fairly characterized as severe. 
With so little capital, coordinating a response will be costly and perhaps out of reach in 
some communities. Even if a problem that threatens shared values is identified, there may 
be little or no capacity (e.g. human, social, economic capital) to respond to it.349  
Coalition Building. 
Before a project might be earnestly referred to as a collaboration, the coalition 
building phase is integral to reaching said designation. The level of ‘openness’ a 
collaboration, insofar as it can be called one, is the first (even implicit) choice.350 This 
forces a discussion over inclusiveness, over what level of participation is deemed 
appropriate by those that, by luck, are part of the initial salvo of collaborators. This has 
been diced up in three ways to aid in the measurement of participation: breadth of 
                                                          
347 Baird et al., “Emergence of Collaborative Environment Governance: What are the Causal 
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involvement, communication, and power delegation.351 True co-management 
arrangements should score highly on each of these measurements. 
This analysis speaks mostly to the importance of context and the relevance of 
initial conditions (including key-actors) in the developmental phase of self-emergent 
environmental collaborations. Certainly, there are many cases where despite these extant 
conditions, the resultant outcome is not a product of faithful and open attempts at 
collaboration. This speaks to the kinds of decisions that occur in all phases of a 
management effort. For instance, key-actors or entrepreneurs can forestall the inclusion 
of outsiders, essentially squelching the potential for a plurality of environmental concerns 
to be raised as part of the planning process.352 The goal of collaborative arrangements 
however, is to leverage the collective swath of skills and expertise to facilitate the 
efficient achievement of shared goals and share the burdens (and rewards) fairly.353  
Problem Solving and Making Predictions. 
As before, the generation of alternatives is the key piece to problem solving, 
while the predictive phase amounts to making a choice about which alternative will work. 
Collaborative arrangements are particularly suited for both tasks.354 The first step here is 
to define the unit of analysis.355 This will not only be informed by the magnitude of the 
                                                          
351 Jens Newig et al., "The Environmental Performance of Participatory and Collaborative Governance: A 
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problem, but the composition of stakeholders from the coalition building phase.356 
Certain collaborators may have expert policy or scientific knowledge which opens or 
closes management opportunities. In the process of sharing knowledge, taking note of 
who has other areas of expertise, where they are best put to use, and formalizing the 
distribution of labor, works towards efficiency and fairness. Research also seems to 
suggest that successful integration of a plurality of knowledge bases as part of the initial 
problem solving and predictive process leads to innovate results.357 A plurality of 
experiences, expertise, and value is also key to recognizing structural uncertainty (i.e. 
how the system will react to management), which again feeds back onto the weighting of 
alternatives.358 Coursing through this phase is also the process of conflict resolution and 
deliberation (and potentially debate) 359 after which begins the process of implementation 
followed by evaluation.360 
Implementation and Evaluation. 
 Here is perhaps the most appropriate space to talk about the iterative learning 
process indelible to the adaptive management scheme. This learning occurs post-
implementation, during the monitoring and evaluative phase.  Learning in collaboratives 
has been described in multiple ways (e.g., learning communities or epistemic 
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communities) but, at the core, is a learning-by-doing attitude. This approach has shown 
useful in systems of high uncertainty with inherent unpredictability and stochasticity as 
repeated iterations confers more and more knowledge about the system.361 I follow 
Cundill et al. (2012), who define learning that takes place in adaptive collaborative 
systems as inherently social:  
the collective action and reflection that takes place among both individuals 
and groups when they work to understand the relations between social and 
ecological systems; it is conceptualized as a process of transformative 
social change in which participants critically question and potentially 
discard existing norms, values, institutions, and interests to pursue actions 
that are desirable to them.362 
Knowledge that is generated through the collaboration builds social capital and 
creates a capacity to respond to future collective challenges.  
Capturing Adaptation. 
Advocates such as Kai Lee (1993), Lance Gunderson (2003), Craig Allen (2011), 
and others suggest that environmental management ought to be viewed as 
experimentation and that iterative learning is essential to managing natural resources and 
“establishing” or “enhancing” the resilience of a desired state. Practitioners of adaptive 
management recognize inherent uncertainty in ecosystem level knowledge and 
manipulations. But rather than take surprises and miscalculations as failures, they are 
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viewed as opportunities to learn. This requires management flexibility and the 
exploration of alternative strategies for achieving desired outcomes. Wherever possible, 
new information learned through careful monitoring and measuring of trials-and-errors is 
injected back into the management scheme. Managers have the opportunity to implement 
plans that either create a desired set of outcomes or respond to system perturbations (new 
development fragmenting a wildlife corridor, for instance) to ensure the current state of 
affairs is maintained. In addition to following models of learning (i.e. constructivism) and 
developing alternative strategies, recognizing the political options to create and use an 
evaluative framework is essential to properly wield the theory of adaptive co-
management.  Taking advantage of the ability to inherit the collective experience to plan 
for the future requires some reflective steps when certain outcomes are desired.  
However, using resource management policies as experiments comes with 
familiar costs such as operating with imperfect information and the political risk of 
embracing failure. That is, the development of other possible strategies is, at some level, 
the recognition that one or many may not reach the desired goal. An added dimension to 
adaptively managing scarce or depleted resources (or endangered species) is that costs of 
operating are likely higher and a risk averse actions are preferred. Accepting failure and 
working with an imperiled management object are typically at odds. Thus, they are both 
potential barriers to adopting a strategy of adaptive management which tends to work 
best when there is adequate time for monitoring, learning, and reiteration. This process is 
also potentially a “top-down” venture, excluding many of those who might be influenced 
by the decisions made.  
161 
 
Adaptive management is also possibly very technical and inaccessible to laymen 
or citizen scientists interested in contributing to the process. Carl Walters, one of the 
early pioneers of adaptive environmental management for instance, dedicates roughly 5 
times the number of pages to mathematical models detailing various contextual 
approaches to measuring ecological response as he does to speaking to the basic 
principles of adaptive management in his most eminent work.363 Nevertheless, the lessons 
are clear that, in cases where management is deemed necessary, one-shot interventions 
are inadequate for the long-term sustainability of resource systems.364 
Synthesis 
Here, I have attempted to demonstrate a methodological correspondence between 
adaptive co-management and a pragmatic method applied to an environmental context. A 
side effect of this correspondence is that it exposed the practical deficiencies with a 
principlist (namely, non-anthropocentric position) orientation in environmental ethics. 
The principlist who follows their strict methodology can only show support for activities 
that protect the intrinsic values of management objects, which, practically speaking, 
would be to deploy countless miles of fencing and establishing areas of refuge absent 
human presence. The principlist will often be disappointed. Conversely, the 
pragmatic/ACM method invites the principlist to open dialogue and considers their nature 
protection position as a live option. Ultimately, the composition of the deliberative group 
will influence the selected management activity, but regardless of this composition, the 
                                                          
363 Carl Walters, Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources, (NY: MacMillan Publishing Company, 
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process needs to be adaptive. That is, if the principlist’s position receives a degree of 
lesser priority in the first implementation, results of other activities could force 
reconsideration.  
The benefits of this project were not so clear in the initial, formative stages. In a 
true learning-by-doing fashion, multiple constructive thoughts have since occurred, some 
with import from conversations with environmental management experts, Drs. Lance 
Gunderson and Ryan Plummer.365 Namely, that this relationship has the potential to 
address practical and theoretical areas of concern for pragmatism and adaptive co-
management alike in at least five ways.  
1. Adaptive co-management and pragmatism together suffer the same burdens of a 
deliberative, democratic process where actors, whose values and attached-meanings, can 
muck up the process and simply lead to ineffectual paralysis. A conversation with Dr. 
Ryan Plummer in January of 2019 touched on this point. Adaptive co-management 
assumptively provides an arena for deliberating perspectives, values, and desired 
outcomes, among other procedural tasks. The optimistic reading suggests the deliberative 
form of decision-making will generate more equitable and effectual policy proposals 
(which is proceeded by implementation and monitoring). In my view, the pragmatic 
approach straddles the philosophical line between a consequentialist and a deontological 
assessment of ethics. This is important to note because this carries forth the classical 
reading of pragmatism proffered most notably by James and Dewey that truth is what is 
                                                          
365 Each interview began with introductions and a detailed explanation as to why I had requested a 
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useful and combines it with a focus on the process through which reaching this ‘truth’ is 
possible. The Categorical Imperative for pragmatists, insofar as there can be one, is the 
deliberative process to be found within critical communities. What this means for its 
application to a practical natural resource problem, is that we can be equally attuned to 
what the outcomes are and how we go about achieving them. Dr. Plummer also pointed 
out that this latter point has often been lost on resource managers that are not exposed to 
different ways-of-knowing, or more plainly, any form collaborative management, instead 
opting for traditional command-and-control management styles, that while adaptive, 
focuses on the results of intervention, not on how to intervene. I’ll call this potential 
benefit an avoidance of outcomes tunnel-vision.  
2. Biodiversity conservation and natural resource management more generally 
cannot be divorced from value claims or even implicit ethical orientations. Given the SI 
discussion above, I believe this can be said for any occupation, but is especially true in 
the fields of education, medicine, and of course, ecosystem management among others. 
Indeed, you’d be hard pressed to find a biodiversity conservation undergraduate engaged 
in a four-year program of study that has no underlying pro-animal perspective (not to 
mention any potential student debt). Students in this field are increasingly receiving 
training in environmental ethics and related science and society courses, but once they 
enter the professional field, rarely do their jobs require them to adhere to an 
environmental ethical code (but assuredly a professional one). What this might mean is 
practitioners are not being continuously exposed to, in my view, the necessary ethical 
toolkit that will help them obtain a sensitivity to communities in which they work (e.g. to 
understand a community member’s environmental ethic and how it explains meaning and 
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values locals attach to places and/or species). Conversations with Dr. Lance Gunderson in 
February of 2019 substantiate this view. We discussed the difficulty associated with 
attending to all the component pieces of both adaptive and collaborative management 
schemes. It becomes incumbent on the practitioner to develop said sensitivities, but 
scarcely are they prepared to undertake this task. The larger role of philosophers then, is 
as I argue in Chapter 2, to aid in the translation of values, to act as a conduit to improve 
the coordination between resource management efforts and communities that are affected 
by the persistence of sometimes invasive or restrictive, management activities. This can 
also apply to situations that are not deploying the adaptive co-management schema.  
Relatedly, adaptive management in an ecological context primarily developed in a 
technical sense, as a tool. Dr. Gunderson admits that adaptive management construed 
merely as an instrument for ecological intervention could have difficulty responding to 
“non-scientific” questions like the ones raised by environmental ethicists. Therefore, the 
attention adaptive management has received from philosophers like Bryan Norton (and 
might I humbly add, myself) is welcomed. Clearly there are normative dimensions 
inherent in the adaptive process and greater attention to these dimensions should be 
illuminated.  I’ll call this value-laden.  
3. Related to the discussion that took place with Dr. Plummer, he and I wondered 
whether the alternative framing of pragmatism held the potential to add justification to 
the adoption of adaptive co-management in contexts where it had not yet been 
considered. The idea seems to be that some systems are the result of social-ecological 
traps (highly resilient, yet undesirable states-of-affairs).366 The causes of this are many-
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fold but included among them is systemic illiteracy amongst key actors, especially if 
those actors maintain hegemonic control.367 An environmental pragmatism in such a 
system could prove useful to frame the imbalanced power structures, among other 
imbalances (e.g., inequitable access to some resource for an unjustified reason) as an 
ethical issue We can refer to this benefit as transformative.  
4. As I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation, ethicists, even in a generous 
reading, are not leaving a lasting impact on some of the most influential actors, namely 
environmental policy makers. Even if we can only improve our relations, I believe there 
is an opportunity here for the applied philosophy of environmental ethics to attain greater 
relevance in a society that is experiencing rapid ecological change. I cannot be sure that 
the progenitors of environmental ethics proper understood that in half a centuries time, 
the intellectual foundation they laid would be, in my view, desperately needed. 
Unfortunately, as I discussed in the first two chapters of this dissertation, we have not 
learned the value of abatement or restraint, much less ingested any understanding of the 
intrinsic value of nature. Now, I think, we as philosophers and ethicists should relax our 
expectations, become flexible in our own principles in order to address the increasingly 
large number of wicked sustainability problems. This means diversifying our approaches, 
attaching ourselves to related bodies of work (as I have attempted to do here), and as 
Dewey said, help ‘philosophy recover itself.’368 I call this recovery.  
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5. Lastly, this exercise gives us an opportunity to plainly consider some of 
pragmatism’s own deficiencies (perceived or real) in light of this exposure to ACM. As 
touched on in the first section of this chapter, pragmatism, as a philosophical perspective 
is often applied across disciplines and typically runs against the dominant theory in those 
disciplines. Pragmatism can therefore be exhausting: it requires genuine faith in process 
and people, it requires determination and engagement and constant articulation, and it can 
be as enchanting as any other position. As a philosophy and as a method, the 
acknowledgement that a plurality of values inheres in groups of people is, to some, 
tantamount to a relativistic value theory. That is, because the pragmatic philosophy is one 
about process, not principles, it is seen as incapable of rejecting certain values that are 
prima facie immoral. The ACM process here might give some insight toward this 
apparent handicap (although I think there are other good, meta-philosophical rebuttals to 
this claim, see: Lo, 2009). The social-learning and experiential piece of the pragmatic 
method is often hard to capture. Because the process is contextual, there will be different 
understandings of what social-learning is, how it can be measured, how to best facilitate 
it, etc.  
  Despite these open questions, there is an undercurrent that I believe is a kind of 
fundamental understanding about what will fly and what won’t in a pragmatic circle, a 
circle that requires a pseudo-democratic political context. To illustrate this point, we need 
only look at the commonly invoked 1st Amendment protections, namely the guarantee to 
free speech in the United States. There are, along with this seemingly objective or 
‘unalienable’ right, types of speech that are unprotected. Ensuring that minority values 
and perspectives receive respect is different than a rigid inclusivity, determined to 
167 
 
amalgamize and conciliate all views into one. There is no directive within the pragmatist 
or ACM charter that necessitates the support of a minority view that, in many other social 
circles, is considered deplorable. In an environmental management context, it’s hard to 
even imagine what a view like this might be—using inhumane species removal 
techniques perhaps? Setting forests ablaze? Contaminating streams? These are the sorts 
of ideas that the critical, collaborative communities would reject. Based on the 
methodological steps discussed here and elsewhere in this dissertation, I feel that 
pragmatism is more robust as a framework for collective action as any other.  
Up to this point, we have been exploring the theoretical connections based on a 
methodological and epistemological similarity between pragmatism and adaptive co-
management. The following chapter, and the beginning of the third part of this 
dissertation, will seek to further this cause with the use of case study research. The 
primary aim in Chapter 5, therefore, is to seek solid ground for these ideas. As a practice 
of descriptive ethics, I am curious about the ethical motivations participants and 
coordinators of adaptive co-management schemes actually carry forth in their 
management efforts. In particular, I’m interested in whether a form of environmental 
pragmatism, distilled from several semi-structured interviews, is to be discovered in the 
inner-workings of the Cienegas Watershed Partnership within the Las Cienegas Natural 
Conservation Area near Tucson, Arizona and the White Tank Mountains Conservancy 
Wildlife Corridor project near Phoenix, Arizona. The result of the following investigation 
therefore completes a trilateral argument on the virtues of adopting a pragmatic 
perspective in environmental ethics.  
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PART III: Empirical Argument  
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5. CULTURES OF COLLABORATION IN THE SONORAN DESERT: 
EMPIRICAL PRAGMATISM THROUGH ADAPTIVE CO-MANAGEMENT 
CASE STUDIES 
Across the environmental management landscape, local collaborative efforts are 
increasingly understood as an essential element for realizing sustainability outcomes. 
Many scholars are now encouraging local communities to rally together to respond to 
natural resource scarcity and mismanagement, with the idea that a mosaic of local efforts 
build enough inertia to transform the larger socio-ecological systems in which they 
persist.369 Among many other challenges, collaboration around environmental objectives 
pits the values of stakeholders against one another, highlighting the need for leadership, 
resource capacity, and effective communication skills.370 
At the same time, ecosystems are complex and therefore difficult to sustainably 
manage long-term. Coupled with inherent uncertainty, ecosystem management has many 
cross-scalar effects in which surprises and unexpected consequences, sometimes 
devastating, may emerge.371 Adaptive management has developed as an appropriate 
response to this complicated task.372 Adaptive management is a learning-based approach 
that emphasizes careful policy crafting, but with the caveat that outcomes may not 
                                                          
369 Lars Carlsson and Fikret Berkes, “Co-management: Concepts and Methodological Implications,” 
Juornal of Environmental Management 75, (2004), 65-76; Carina Wyborn and R. Patrick Bixler, 
“Collaboration and Nested Environmental Governance: Scale Dependency, Scale Framing, and Cross-scale 
Interactions in Collaborative Conservation, Journal of Environmental Management 123, (2013), 58-67. 
370 Fikret Berkes, Johan Colding, Carl Folke (Eds.), Navigating social–ecological systems: Building 
Resilience for Complexity And Change, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 352-387.  
371 Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling, Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human And 
Natural Systems, (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002). 
372 Derek R. Armitage, Ryan Plummer, Fikret Berkes, Robert I. Arthur, Anthony T. Charles, Iain J. 
Davidson-Hunt, Alan P. Diduck, Nancy C. Doubleday, Derek S. Johnson, Melissa Marschke, “Adaptive 
Co‐Management for Social–Ecological Complexity,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 7 (2009): 
95-102.  
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materialize in the way most desired.373 This means then that adaptive management is 
iterative. The effects of previously implemented policies can be monitored and evaluated 
to inform the next policy proposal where it will, in turn, receive monitoring and 
evaluation. Careful consideration of management policies and their effects requires some 
territorial knowledge however, whether that is scientific or ‘traditional.’374 These 
challenges, among others, have led to a marriage between learning-based adaptive 
management with the community focused co-management schemes.375 This chapter is an 
examination of two cases in Arizona that have both adaptive and collaborative elements.  
The arena of investigation here are two groups of collaborators that have 
coalesced around environmental causes in Arizona. Case 1, the Cienega Watershed 
Partnership (CWP) in the Las Cienegas National Conservation Area (LCNCA), 
represents a nationally recognized example of successful collaboration (see: Caves et al., 
2013; H.R. 2941)376 which has served as a model for other collaborations in the state of 
Arizona.377 Case 2, the White Tank Mountains Conservancy (WTMC) corridor project, is 
best described as a developing collaboration with lofty, but no less important, 
environmental targets. A true case comparison would likely enjoy at least some 
synchronicity in the procedural phase (e.g. both cases would have reached the same 
                                                          
373 C.S. Holling and Gary K. Meffe, “Command and Control and The Pathology of Natural Resource 
Management,” Conservation Biology 10, (1996), 328-337. 
374 Fikret Berkes, “Evolution of Co-management: Role of Knowledge Generation, Bridging Organizations 
and Social Learning,” Journal of Environmental Management 90, (2009), 1692-1702. 
375 Armitage et al., “Adaptive Co‐Management for Social–Ecological Complexity,” 95-102. 
376Jeremy K. Caves, Gitanjali S. Bodner, Karen Simms, Larry A. Fisher, and Tahnee Robertson. 
“Integrating Collaboration, Adaptive Management, and Scenario-Planning: Experiences at Las Cienegas 
National Conservation Area,” Ecology and Society 18, no. 3 (2013); An act to establish the Las Cienegas 
National Conservation Area in the State of Arizona, H.R. 2941, 106th Cong. (2000).  
377 Cameron Childs, Abigail. M. York, Dave White, Mike L. Schoon, and Gitanjali S. Bodner, “Navigating 
A Murky Adaptive Comanagement Governance Network: Agua Fria Watershed, Arizona, USA,” Ecology 
and Society 18, no. 4 (2013). 
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process milestones). Unfortunately, Case 2 did not progress as quickly as hoped. We can 
however compare how its trajectory comports with that of Case 1.  
In addition to providing some whole-case commentary, interviews conducted with 
stakeholders in each setting uncover management characteristics which correspond to 
philosophical pragmatism. A codebook developed from relevant features of 
pragmatism378 is used to employ a thematic analysis with the following aims: (1) discuss 
the coherence between adaptive environmental collaborations and a pragmatic praxis 
applied to the environment, (2) discuss challenge areas relevant to the cases at hand and 
how these challenges might be addressed with an explicit pragmatic orientation (3) 
discuss areas of deficiency within the pragmatic tradition in light of the cases. Whereas 
case study examinations in the philosophical pragmatism literature have been primarily 
utilized secondary sources,379 this final point, and to some extent, the second, is a novel 
contribution to the literature.  
Case Study Settings 
Case 1: Cienega Watershed Partnership in Las Cienegas National Conservation Area 
Las Cienegas National Conservation Area (LCNCA) is situated 40 miles 
southeast of the Tucson metropolitan area. The LCNCA exists centrally within the 
borders of the Empire-Cienega Resource Planning Area (ECRPA) which itself is 
bounded by Interstate 10 to the north, State Highway 83 to the west, the Whetstone 
Mountains to the east, and the Appleton-Whittell Research Ranch of the National 
Audubon Society to the south (Figure 5). This makes the ECRPA roughly 266 square 
                                                          
378 Codebook is available in Appendix B.  
379 Bryan G. Norton, Sustainable Values, Sustainable Change, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2015), 237-273. 
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miles while the LCNCA is 
about 71 square miles. 
Additional designations of 
concern are the Cienega 
Watershed Partnership 
(CWP) and the Sonoita 
Valley Planning Partnership 
(SVPP). In true co-
management fashion, the 
latter was the initial group 
comprised of the Arizona 
Department of Game and 
Fish, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife, U.S. Forest 
Service, Phoenix Zoo, The 
Nature Conservancy, and 
numerous locals interested 
in influencing the direction 
of the planning partnership 
among other non-profits.  
The story of this collaboration can be traced to the 1960s when developers 
purchased available lands in what are now the ECRPA borders. These developers sold 
their lots to a copper mining company who planned to utilize the Cienega groundwater 
Figure 5. Map of LCNCA area grabbed from Shela 
McFarlin, Proposed Las Cienegas Resource Management 
Plan and Final Environmental Impact Statement, special 
report prepared to fulfill Bureau of Land Management’s 
mandate to develop a management plan under 16 U.S. 
Code § 460ooo–4, June 2002. 
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for their mining operations in nearby mountains. The mining company cited an economic 
downturn as the reason to not establish long-term mining operations on the lot and 
offered the land up for sale instead. Local county officials, acutely aware of the city of 
Tucson’s continued growth, approached the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to 
consider purchasing the land—which they did—to protect and restore the watershed’s 
ecosystem services. Now that the BLM is the primary owner of the land, they are 
mandated to cater to a plurality of public values and uses, for instance, grazing 
allotments, biodiversity conservation, and outdoor recreation.  
Ecological Context. 
The LCNCA is characterized by high desert grasslands and the convergence of 
three waterways (Babocomari River, Cienega Creek, and Sonoita Creek) indelible to 
local people and wildlife, such as the endangered black-tailed prairie dogs, Gila 
topminnows, and Southwestern willow flycatchers. The planning boundaries include five 
increasingly rare habitat types: Cienegas, cottonwood riparian zones, sacaton grasslands, 
mesquite forests, and desert grasslands.  
Community Context. 
Preceding the designation (in 2000) of the of Las Cienegas landscape as a 
National Conservation Area, a semi-informal group of representatives of governmental 
agencies and locals that called themselves the Sonoita Valley Planning Partnership was 
formed in 1995. Once the BLM was able to acquire a large portion of the land, that was at 
the time (and remains) a mosaic of ownership (Figure 5), the planning process was able 
to begin in earnest. As above, this group coalesced around perceived threats to the 
watershed from the promise of nearby development. One interviewee recalls coming 
174 
 
across a flyer posted in a diner in nearby Elgin, Arizona asking for community 
engagement in the planning process. For 5 years, the SVPP reportedly met once a month, 
steadily increasing in membership as participants recruited friends and neighbors. By 
2002, the mailing list exceeded 220 people, 30 local businesses including ranchers, 75 
NGOs, and numerous federal, state, county, and city officials and agencies. Although this 
is no gauge for level of collaborative activity and it is unclear how many members the 
SVPP began with, this level of growth is impressive.  According to another interviewee, 
it can be attributed to several factors, including a culture of stewardship and community 
cohesiveness, as well as a sensitivity to environmental issues in the southern Arizona 
region.  
Adaptive Co-management Process.  
Some disciplinary insights suggest that co-management functions best as an 
emergent process, rather than one implemented with intent. Arguments for what counts as 
emergent vs. intentional cannot be covered with any great detail here, but, simply put, a 
distinction between enabling factors and conscious implementation is primarily at issue 
(and the point at which pre-conditions can be said to coerce adaptive co-management). 
The adaptive co-management process in Las Cienegas, I suggest, benefitted from both the 
communal aspect as described above (e.g. enabling factors or pre-conditions) and the 
expertise that managers, namely, Karen Simms, brought to bear in the area. Simms had 
learned about what she referred to as collaborative adaptive management (CAM) as a 
student in the early 1990s and thought that it would serve as a significant improvement 
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over traditional resource management plans which had garnered public agitation.380 This 
agitation, again, was likely due to the strong sense of community and assuredly a desire 
for locals to control their environmental destinies.  
Early on in this process (late 1990s), the development of two large, umbrella 
planning groups—one more explicitly human-centered and the other more focused on 
environmental conditions—emerged in initial workshops where interests, expertise, and 
values were solicited. Under both umbrellas, smaller working-groups were organized 
based on the aforementioned participant interests. The ‘human’ umbrella included 
recreational interests, livelihoods (primarily grazing), and management of heritage sites. 
The ‘nature’ or environmental group coalesced around concerns over species 
management, water health, habitat restoration projects, and erosion control, among other 
concerns. Over time, the dualistic umbrella diffused and five primary planning groups, 
now known as biological planning groups, emerged: landscapes, uplands, 
riparian/aquatic, and heritage. Each team produced organizing documents, including 
statements of purpose, defined their geographical scope, and developed loose research 
questions. These groups have persisted to this day and continue to meet quarterly. Bi-
annual meetings occur in the spring and fall where all planning groups meet to share 
progress.  
Outcomes. 
Largely regarded as a success by its members,381 the Cienega Watershed 
Partnership has persisted for over 25 years, itself a signal that there are some perceived 
                                                          
380 Karen Simms, “Karen Simms Oral History Interview,” interview by Shela McFarlin, Arizona Memory 
Project, April 18, 2012. http://azmemory.azlibrary.gov/digital/collection/cienoral/id/15/rec/5 
381 Anonymous interviewees, in discussion with the author, September-November 2019.  
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benefits to continued collaboration. According to a recent evaluation report conducted by 
the BLM in 2015, overall satisfaction was expressed by participants.382 The survey did 
not dice up the results into the five existing planning groups under the Partnership’s 
umbrella, but instead provided some commentary on both general process questions and 
how resources have been affected by management decisions. Table 8 below summarizes 
the report’s findings based on my interpretation of the data provided. Responses solicited 
by authors were transposed to a Likert scale for quick comparisons.    
  
                                                          
382 Chris Horyza, Amy Markstein, and Karen Simms, “Las Cienegas Resource Management Plan 
Evaluation,” special report prepared to fulfill Bureau of Land Management mandate 43 CFR 1610.4-9, 
October 2015: 14. https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-office/projects/lup/77418/104709/128277/LCNCA-
RMP-Evaluation_FINAL.pdf 
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Table 7. Compiled results from Chris Horyza, Amy Markstein, and Karen Simms, Las 
Cienegas Resource Management Plan Evaluation, special report prepared to fulfill 
Bureau of Land Management mandate 43 CFR 1610.4-9, October 2015.  
Resource Relevant Partnerships Involved  Stakeholder 
Evaluation 
Cultural  Empire Ranch Foundation, BLM Tucson + 
Fire and Fuels Appleton-Whittell Research Ranch ++ 
Livestock Grazing Cienega Watershed Partnership, The Nature 
Conservancy 
~ 
Paleontological  BLM Tucson n/a 
Recreation BLM Resource Advisory Council -- 
Riparian Cienega Watershed Partnership ++ 
Soil, Water, and Air Appleton-Whittell Research Ranch + 
Special Designations 
(Areas of Critical 
Environmental 
Concern) 
BLM Tucson  ++ 
Travel Management BLM Resource Advisory Council - 
Tribal Interests BLM Tucson ~ 
Vegetation Agricultural Research Service, Appleton-
Whittell Research Ranch 
+ 
Visual  Tucson Electric Power Company -- 
Wilderness 
Characteristics 
 n/a 
Wildlife and Special 
Status Species 
Frog and Fish Restoration Outreach Group, 
Appleton-Whittell Research Ranch 
~ 
 
Key: extremely positive (++), positive (+), neutral (~), negative (-), extremely negative (-
-), no evaluation (n/a). 
 
Case 2: White Tanks Conservancy Wildlife Corridors Project. 
To the west of Phoenix, Arizona, the White Tank Regional Park consists of 
roughly 30,000 acres of mixed-use land. According the Park Master Plan, the park is 
designed to offer passive recreation to city dwellers without the need to travel to a state or 
national park. As such, the White Tanks, along with the other regional parks that 
surround Phoenix, offer a blend of unspoiled nature and a sense of remoteness. In 2015, a 
non-profit Conservancy was organized as an advocate for the protection of the species 
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within the park boundaries and the natural Sonoran Desert landscape that encompasses it. 
While Phoenix’s metropolitan area abuts the White Tank Mountains Range to the east, 
the south, and fractionally to the north, the entire western side, falling under the 
jurisdiction of the city of Buckeye, Arizona, is currently undeveloped, natural desert. 
Camelback Mountain is a notable range within the city of Phoenix that has become 
completely enveloped by urban development. Consequently, there is almost no native 
fauna and the flora is rapidly moving away from native conditions. The Conservancy is 
on record stating that their goal is to prevent a similar environmental situation in the 
White Tanks. 
The threat lies within the desert swath to the west of the White Tanks as plans for 
development are becoming more concrete. Up to 40 years ago, the area was an eclectic 
mix of State Land, BLM land, and private land. Much of that land is now in private hands 
and was annexed (as they lobbied for) into the city of Buckeye. Since then, numerous 
developments have had their master plans approved by the City of Buckeye.  
Ecological Context. 
The area under the Conservancy’s purview is the White Tank Mountain Regional 
Park. The accessible recreation spaces are within the Park’s mountainous areas which 
consist of multiple peaks, the highest—Barry Goldwater Peak—reaches 4,000 feet. The 
range and the surrounding Sonoran Desert are home to several endemic species such as 
the Sonoran Desert Tortoise, Gila Monster, Tiger Rattlesnakes and Kit Fox. More mobile 
species, like Mule Deer, Javelina, and Mountain Lion regularly migrate between a 
triangular patch of undeveloped desert to the west where the White Tank Mountain 
Range, the Belmont Mountains (~20 miles West), and the Vulture Mountains (~23 miles 
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northwest) act as primary natural boundaries. The Hassayampa River Basin, although 
usually dry, flows from north to south through the middle of this migratory triangle. 
Native raptors such as the red-tailed hawk and Harris hawk are particularly sensitive to 
ecological changes in this region as they prey on jackrabbits and other smaller critters in 
addition to utilizing native saguaro cacti and desert ironwood as places for observation 
and nesting.  
Community Context. 
The modern history of the land commonly referred to as Sun Valley was the 
subject of many newspaper articles detailing financial ruin, allegations of land theft, and 
even suicide in the late 1980s.383 The relevant part of the story begins 35 years ago when 
the Bureau of Land management traded nearly 50,000-acres of the at the time un-named 
land for ecologically sensitive acreage in the San Pedro River Valley in southern Arizona 
(only 20 miles south east of the LCNCA).384 The White Tanks Associates, an umbrella 
organization formed by the land-owner who proffered the BLM exchange, secured 
funding for a six-laned roadway to aid in this large-scale development process. The road 
was built in the late 1980s (see Figure 6). It should be noted that while the Sun Valley 
area has enticed many savvy developers, it remains largely undeveloped. The collection 
of roughly 30 remaining developers certainly have a vision for their communities (as 
evidenced by published master plans), but this is predictably different than the 
Conservancy’s desire for open-spaces and environmental continuity.  
                                                          
383 Barbara Deters, “Investor’s Suicide Blamed on Project,” The Arizona Republic, June 24, 1990, A13. 
384 Anonymous interviewee, in discussion with the author, May 2018, Buckeye, Arizona. Although I have 
not found a reliable source, an interviewee claims that BLM first acquired this White Tanks land as a part 
of another land swap involving an area north of Phoenix known now as the Agua Fria National Monument, 
which is itself the subject of an ACM project.  
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After Sun Valley was annexed 
into the nearby city of Buckeye in the 
mid-90s, city officials agreed to provide 
utilities and began rubber stamping 
development master plans. These plans 
stalled due to slow economic conditions, 
but, recently, the possibility of 
development has again become real. A 
new intercontinental highway—the 
Canamex Corridor—which would 
connect Mexico and Canada with an 
interstate pathway through Arizona, 
Nevada, Idaho, and Montana is 
seemingly inevitable. Current plans will bisect the Sun Valley region either by adopting 
the north-south portion of the current Parkway or by building a new multi-use pathway 
(car/rail/data/electricity) 15 miles to the west.  
The community composition remains somewhat unknown but based on the 
promotional materials and the profile of adjacent master-planned communities, these 
developments are targeting a wide diversity of family types. Each community master plan 
boasts K-12th grade education, a range of employment opportunities, recreation hotspots, 
and venues for nightlife among other modern amenities. The idea seems to be that each 
community is self-contained such that everything a resident could need or want can be 
found within the community boundaries.  
 
Figure 7. The proposed (and actualized) Sun 
Valley Parkway in the Sun Valley 
development zone. Credit to Matthew 
Chatterly of the Arizona Republic. 
Accompanying article appears on page 60 of 
Jun. 8, 1987 issue.  Image downloaded from 
https://www.newspapers.com/image/?spot=26
780745 in December 2018. 
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Adaptive Co-management Process  
The application of ACM by the White Tanks Conservancy is somewhat loose. 
According to interviews, organizing members are aware of the framework but did not 
adopt it in earnest like CWP organizers did. Further, the possibilities of adaptation in this 
case are somewhat restricted given the Conservancy’s relative lack of power to guide the 
decision-making process. This feature (or lack thereof) is related to its failure to engage 
all relevant parties, hamstringing their collaborative attempts. As a tactical matter, 
anxiety that they will fail to reach their goal is warranted. The Conservancy has no 
realistic expectation to be able to dictate the direction of development in the Sun Valley 
area because they hold no property rights. They wager that their best bet is to produce a 
ready-made plan that city-builders can easily adopt, if they can be convinced to. Again, 
the Conservancy’s primary concern is that any development to the west of the White 
Tank Mountain Range will greatly interfere with the ability for native species to engage 
in their natural migratory habits. Since development is seemingly inevitable, their interest 
has turned to the establishment of wildlife corridors that transect this western landscape 
and are preserved such that development goes around them. This complication makes the 
task of engaging in an adaptive co-management scheme, if they can be said to be doing 
this at all, incredibly difficult.  
I believe this arrangement is worth comparing to an earnest ACM attempt like 
CWP, for the following reasons:  
1) After the creation of a proposal for adequate wildlife corridors, the Conservancy 
must engage with the development community. At this point, it will be more 
reflective of a co-management arrangement as actors will include city, county, 
182 
 
and state officials, interest groups (NGOs), development companies, researchers 
and academics, and surrounding (and potentially) future denizens. Viewed this 
way, the project is in an embryonic stage of collaboration. Of course, it is entirely 
possible that an attempt at co-management could be foiled or rebuffed by 
developers since they maintain property rights. They can do almost anything they 
please. From an analysis standpoint, what unfolds post-developer contact will be 
of interest.  
2) A kind of adaptation is already part of the project’s process as they engage 
wildlife biologists and corridor specialists to create a set of proposals. There are at 
least four proposals that are internally ranked based on the “biologically best” 
design for nine sensitive migratory species. The Conservancy’s approach, which I 
have gleaned through interviews and sitting through planning meetings, is to start 
with the proposal that asks the most as a kind of bargaining tactic. If discussions 
can proceed to a deliberative stage with developers, then assuredly some 
adaptations that integrate the corridors into master plans will be made. The 
Conservancy then has other additional, albeit less preferable, options to offer. 
Further, if any option is incorporated into development plans, then there will 
simply be an end to the adaptive phase surrounding corridor design. In its place, 
project members will need to work together to support the use of the corridors by 
wildlife. Tracing this pathway is of interest given the common critique of adaptive 
management that asks: how much adaptation? Suffice it to say that this case will 
not offer an adequate answer, it, at least, represents a single data point with which 
a larger narrative can be told.  
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3) There are good reasons to categorize an object of investigation into accepted 
disciplinary boxes (e.g., it reduces theoretical and semantic ambiguity thus 
making analysis cleaner). Admittedly, along strict disciplinary lines, I would 
hesitate to call the White Tank Mountains Conservancy corridor project 
sufficiently collaborative and sufficiently adaptive. But it contains, or promises to 
contain, elements of both. In this case, three results (or a combination thereof) can 
seemingly occur:  
a. we can critically apply the evaluative frameworks for ACM as guidance 
(e.g., using what we know about ACM we can improve the current 
process, at least in theory);  
b. we are forced to admit that ACM is not the answer in this case (e.g., some 
other management framework is equally satisfactory or better suited 
towards steering this project toward its goals)  
c. we can widen this threshold for what counts as ACM.  
Further, the possible comportment and import of pragmatism into ACM schemes, will 
allow for a deeper critical comparison between those projects that utilize an earnest ACM 
framework and those that do not.  
Outcomes. 
There are no relevant ecological outcomes that can be attributed to the 
Conservancy’s collaboration so far. However, several beneficial institutional connections 
have been extended between the Conservancy and sympathetic organizations, local 
universities and their departments, and governmental agencies. As was stated previously, 
deliverables include fully mocked up master plans that include wildlife corridors with the 
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help of AZ Game and Fish and wildlife corridor expert Paul Beier. Additionally, a 3-D 
flyover video was created with the help of the School of Design at Arizona State 
University. These items are probably best viewed as marketable attempts necessary to 
convince developers that there is an opportunity to be innovative by embracing the 
surrounding landscape and local environmental sentiments in their community designs.  
Methods 
Case study examinations of environmental interventions are an increasingly 
popular methodology, but the neat conceptual schemes that have been built up through 
generations of research design have some difficulty corralling the aim of this study. 
Indeed, digging into past studies turned up no relevant literature to be used as a 
springboard for the approach and research questions at hand. Typically, researchers will 
designate a study that focuses on group interaction as ethnographic, while a historical 
study utilizes past-dated documentation to lay context and analyzes historical or archival 
events, and psychological studies target the connectivity of individual behavior to their 
beliefs. Sociological designs attempt to capture interpersonal relationships and group 
functioning within a given social context.385 There are, further, delineations regarding the 
scope of the research: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. That is, a focus on internal 
conclusions, generalizable results regarding particular issues, and a theory-building 
purview that typically aggregates instrumental cases respectively. To the present study, I 
see that there are several boxes in each category that might be checked. Group 
interaction, document analysis, investigation of values that signal a level of 
                                                          
385 Dawson R. Hancock and Bob Algozzine, Doing Case Study Research: A Practical Guide for Beginning 
Researchers, (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006), 33. 
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connectedness to one’s environment, and indeed, the interaction of multiple parties with 
one another as members of environmental collaborations are areas of interest here.  
The disciplinary perspective that I held as I approached the case studies was 
multi-faceted. As an environmental ethicist interested in the impetus and process of 
collaboration forming around objectives related to desired ecological traits, this 
investigation will be fully realized when it addresses pertinent questions in descriptive 
environmental ethics and when it can serve as a general instrumental (as defined above) 
examination into adaptive collaborative approaches, however, only the first prong will be 
broached here.386 
As a research orientation, true to its epistemological origins, pragmatism seeks to 
clarify the role of knowledge in dictating action and engagement. Following Peirce’s 
dictum, some similarly-minded pragmatists might maintain that the role of knowledge is 
simply its use for action.387 While I generally agree, I understand that knowledge could 
also be sought for a kind of cognitive satisfaction, that is, knowledge for the sake of 
knowledge or because one feels that knowing things is interesting, entertaining, 
enlightening, etc. is a legitimate aim. Pragmatism so conceived coheres with an 
interpretive approach to understanding the knowledge and value claims of others, so it is 
epistemologically and methodologically appropriate to adopt such an integrated 
                                                          
386 By the time this document is needed to fulfill the requirements of my dissertation, a codebook continues 
to be under development as a joint effort in Dr. Michael Schoon’s Col-lab at Arizona State University. This 
codebook intends to capture the characteristics of successful ACM implementations such that we might 
develop a typology for ACM schemes. Interview transcripts from both case studies will be analyzed with 
said codebook once that project is completed. The present information will only be used to address the 
concerns foreshadowed in the previous dissertation chapters and the title of this chapter. That is, can we 
find environmental pragmatism in adaptive co-management schemes? 
387 Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make our Ideas Clear,” Popular Science Monthly 12, (1878): 294. 
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perspective here.388 What this means for the study at hand is that my role as the 
researcher is not only to understand the experiences of interviewees and other active 
collaborators (the primary purpose of interpretation), but also engage with the problem-
solving communities as part of an exchange (a pragmatic mandate). I believe researchers 
(and as articulated in Chapter 2, philosophers too) should contribute where possible, not 
just investigate and extract.  
In this spirit, I designed and conducted semi-structured interviews with 
participants in both case study areas. Interviewees in both cases include recreationists, 
conservation activists, land planners, non-profit managers, business leaders, 
representatives from municipal governments, and citizens. Stakeholders in the WTMC 
case responded at a higher rate than the CWP collaborative, possibly due to the group’s 
novelty and excitement in broadening their base in addition to the collaborative fatigue 
experienced by Las Cienegas participants.389 Most interviews exceeded 80 minutes and 
were imagined as conversations, rather than stunted question-answer sessions. While I 
did not specifically employ a narrative approach, I did solicit a personal story to achieve 
clarity on experiences, beliefs, and environmental values.390 Additional, resource-
centered inquiries were also necessary to capture context and the ecological challenges 
that served as collaborative impetus. Sampling in these cases was mostly based on 
convenience and snowballing. While several dozen emails (and follow-ups) were sent, 
                                                          
388 Göran Goldkuhl, “Pragmatism vs Interpretivism in Qualitative Information Systems Research,” 
European Journal of Information Systems 21, no. 2, (2012): 135-146; T. A. Schwandt, “Constructivist, 
Interpretivist Approaches to Human Inquiry. Pages 118-137 in N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln, 
editors. Handbook of qualitative research. Sage Publications, London, UK. 1994. 
389 Anonymous CWP interviewee, 2018.  
390 Question sets can be found in Appendix A.  
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only a total of 12 interviews were able to be completed. Thus, a breadth of experiences is 
assuredly a limiting factor here.391 
Audio recordings of the interviews were transcribed with the assistance of Dragon 
NaturallySpeaking 15 (text-to-speech software) and edited by hand. Although interviews 
were semi-structured and often took on a conversational form, I attended to questions as 
the discussion allowed, usually taking a few moments at the conclusion of the interview 
to ensure all pertinent questions were addressed. The transcripts were segmented 
structurally (i.e., by answers to specific questions) which sometimes required segments to 
be rearranged to match the ordering of the interview guide. Interviewees have been 
anonymized and are represented here by a site-acronym (CWP for Cienega Watershed 
Partnership and WTMC for White Tank Mountains Conservancy) and a random number. 
Qualitative coding was done with MAXQDA Analytics 18.2.392 Themes were 
organized into five overarching categories reflecting the pragmatic commitments: (1) 
experiential, (2) experimental, (3) critical communities, (4) uncertainty and contingency, 
and (5) pluralistic.393 Each category was assigned multiple sub-themes (sub-codes) to 
further capture the interpretive ambiguity inherent in this process. For instance, the 
presence of theme five—value pluralism—could be understood in many ways, therefore I 
developed codes to capture multiple interpretations of what it might mean for value 
pluralism to exist in any given case. Here, value pluralism is borne out with the three sub-
codes: (a) presence of an environmental ethic held by stakeholder(s), (b) evidence that 
                                                          
391 It is important to note though that in the White Tanks case, I spoke to 7 of the available 8 interview 
targets. The CWP situation is more complicated. Multiple attempts were made to connect with interview 
candidates including securing an invitation to two bi-annual biological planning meetings scheduled to be 
held in the Spring and Fall of 2018. Due to unforeseen circumstances (weather and a government 
shutdown), both meetings were canceled, squelching face-to-face opportunities to solicit interviews.  
392 https://www.maxqda.com/ 
393 The codebook can be viewed in Appendix C.  
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there was a change in ethical attitudes, and (c) evidence that stakeholder is sensitive to 
other value claims. Codes were attached to text segments based on the acknowledgment 
of the code’s contents by interviewee. There is no judgement about the efficacy of any of 
the mechanisms I sought out. For instance, adaptation to changing conditions—under the 
experimental theme—was referenced in a majority of interviews, but whether it was 
successful or not is beyond the purview of this descriptive report. 
Coding Results and Discussion. 
 Because sample sets are not comparable in terms of the number of interviews 
completed between case settings, qualitative interpretation is the most appropriate and 
defensible approach here.394 As a reminder, a codebook was developed based on Richard 
Bernstein’s distillment of a pragmatic ethos: experiential, fallibility, critical communities, 
contingency, and pluralistic.395 Interviews from stakeholders in two distinct 
environmental management case studies were solicited for comparative analysis. The 
assumption from the outset is that each pragmatic theme is present in both case settings. 
Consequently, codes were applied to interview transcripts from both cases. The interview 
excerpts presented in the tables below are subject to a kind of confirmation bias in that I 
have selected them to convey a specific meaning to the exclusion of other interpretations. 
In practice, this bias means that I have done my best to choose coded texts which convey 
the closest representation of the pragmatic theme under which the code falls, from the 
                                                          
394 Greg Guest, Kathleen M. MacQueen, and Emily E. Namey, "Comparing Thematic Data," in Applied 
Thematic Analysis, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2012): 161-186. 
395 Richard J. Bernstein, “Pragmatism, Pluralism and the Healing of Wounds,” Proceedings and Addresses 
of the American Philosophical Association 63, no. 3 (1989). The sub-codes which are developed here to 
capture multiple understandings of a particular theme are very fuzzy. In development, I asked myself: 
“what are the kinds of things that occur in a management setting that might fit the thematic category?” The 
resultant coding structure is an attempt at answering this question. 
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available transcripts of course. Further, coded excerpts offered here are sensitive to the 
conversational context in which the quote was solicited and interpretations of coded texts 
are not different between cases as a result of my selection (if there is a difference at all). 
The import then, is to point out if there are different interpretations of thematic elements 
by stakeholders in their different contexts and elaborate on why this difference might 
exist. Further discussion follows the presentation of the results in Tables 9-13. 
Experiential. 
The first theme relevant to a pragmatic orientation is referred to as “experiential.” 
The theme and its sub-codes are derived from the pragmatic rejection of a foundationalist 
epistemology, which I described in detail in the first part of this dissertation. The 
pragmatic alternative to foundationalism is the view that the process through which we 
acquire knowledge is and can only be through lived experience. Learning is the process 
of empirical probing, which produces knowledge. In this case, it is worth specifically 
denoting that the generation of knowledge is a collective endeavor; that is, it is social.  
Further, adaptability—closely related to both social learning and monitoring/evaluation—
refers to the activity of integrating the results of intervention into future designs. Lastly, 
and importantly, the intervention policy itself should resemble a hypothesis so that the 
resultant management steps (e.g. intervention, monitoring, evaluation) can follow.  
Social learning in the CWP case is seemingly a by-product of the communal 
characteristics inherent in the collaboration. This excerpt is one of many (e.g., see 
excerpts in COH and CHG_ETH), that speaks to a connectedness between participants. 
Normally, social learning does not require such a high level of cohesiveness, but it aids in 
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multi-loop learning through continued participation.396 Inertia has built up within the 
collaboration and has produced confidence in their ability to respond to new management 
problems as a function of their attentiveness to learning. Social learning must be 
occurring in the WTMC to some extent, but it is difficult to gauge how serious of a 
concern this is. Expanding the base of collaborators can be construed as a social learning 
process.397  
In the ADAPT code, the CWP interviewee specifically referred to adaptative 
design in the context of grazing treatments, further adding that the stakeholders were 
committed to the adaptive process. Note takers were brought on in order to keep detailed 
records of treatments and results, demonstrating a deep commitment to the adaptive 
process. Indeed, in another area of the interview, the stakeholder mentioned that ranchers 
had previously sold their lots only on the condition that buyers had to participate in the 
CWP. Conversely, the WTMC does not enjoy the same deliberative freedoms that the 
CWP does, despite their commitment to learning collectively. Though it could be argued 
that the WTMC does conduct day-to-day activities in an adaptive and hypothetically 
driven manner (deliberation over recruitment strategies, for instance), the explicit mission 
of this collective is not adaptively driven.   
 
  
                                                          
396 Fikret Berkes, “Evolution of co-management: Role of Knowledge Generation, Bridging Organizations 
and Social Learning,” Journal of Environmental Management 90, no. 5 (2009), 1697. 
397 Ibid., 1697. 
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Table 8. Experiential theme and corresponding coded quotations. 
 
EXPERIENTIAL Cienega Watershed Partnership 
(CWP) 
White Tank Mountains 
Conservancy (WTMC) 
 
Attention toward 
social learning 
(SOC_LEARN) 
They come to the biological 
planning meetings, partly to be a 
part of something that’s 
happening very differently from 
the world around them right now. 
To participate in a group that is 
still civil and working things out 
and solving together making 
mistakes and moving on.  A little 
social refuge in a way (CWP1, 
42:51). 
 
The rationale for patience is that 
I don’t want the Conservancy to 
be misunderstood as only about 
the protection of these wildlife 
corridors. That’s a huge initiative 
but we also need people to help 
build and maintain trails and 
teach children about the desert 
and all these things that 
conservancies do. And there is 
some time, we have the benefit 
of time. We don’t have forever 
and now’s the time but we’re 
comfortable exercising patience 
because we don’t want to be 
misunderstood as cactus-hugging 
desert people that are anti-
development. So, we need to be 
patient in that effort (WTMC4, 
46:20). 
 
Management design 
includes 
adaptability 
(ADAPT) 
It was developed out of a new 
way of looking at grazing, to 
adapt to changing situations, 
which you can do in a great many 
grazing plans. It’s intended to 
guide decisions…how changes are 
made, where water goes. It is a 
way of doing business. It is so 
important that the major 
stakeholder, the leaseholder, 
actually paid for the facilitator and 
notes for the biological planning 
sessions… (CWP3, 43:04). 
 
Not found. 
Hypothesis (even 
informal) driven 
collaboration 
(HYPO) 
We got together and started 
identifying certain questions: what 
are the stressors on this 
component of the resource? What 
are we concerned about? Are the 
sites protected? (CWP2, 32:36). 
Not found.  
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There is a stark difference here in the level of ‘adaptiveness’ between the two case 
settings. Due to the focus on the outcome of the WTMC collaborative (namely, 
installment of wildlife corridors), the management problem would not be responsive to a 
long-term adaptive design. Given unlimited resources—which would require continuous 
construction and demolition projects—adaptive management would surely be a 
compelling approach aiding in the triangulation of effective wildlife corridors. Does this 
mean that adaptive management is not suited for all management problems? Perhaps, but 
the pragmatist can push back on this by underscoring the smaller adaptive learning cycles 
that still occur within the collaboration. This is related to the ‘outcomes tunnel-vision’ 
lesson in the concluding section of Chapter 4. Adaptive management is not just about 
reaching specific outcomes, but the process through which those outcomes fall out. 
Fallibility. 
 Fallibility is the recognition that knowledge garnered through experiential 
transactions have the potential to be mistaken. In a management context, this might mean 
that policies require monitoring and evaluative mechanisms to complete an adaptive 
mandate. Monitoring the intervention is imagined here as the data gathering process after 
an (experimental) treatment has been applied, where evaluation is the process of judging 
the efficacy of the treatment.  As ideas about improvements are created, evaluation can 
also be seen as the beginning of a new iterative cycle. In Table 10, the CWP, like their 
attentiveness to adaptative management in their resource management plan, here 
specifically speak to the importance of the monitoring and evaluative components. These 
pieces move adaptive management from theoretical construct into the realm of practice. 
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The running theme throughout the WTMC case is the handicapped adaptive process, 
including monitoring and evaluation. What this might mean is that while the process is  
ultimately a collaborative one, it does not have the capacity to adapt given the problem 
context. This will be addressed more thoroughly in the concluding section.  
 
Table 9. Fallibility theme and corresponding coded quotations. 
Critical Communities. 
Perhaps the most important piece of the pragmatic ethos (and the one that is often 
most difficult to move to praxis) critical communities refer to groups of people that are 
engaged in the decision-making process. And not just token engagement, but a real 
contributory embrace among the majority of actors. Although critical communities rarely 
reach the idealized versions pragmatists had in mind, the analysis below (Table 11) 
suggests that the CWP collaboration was slightly closer to this ideal than the WTMC. For 
FALLIBLE Cienega Watershed Partnership 
(CWP) 
White Tank 
Mountains 
Conservancy 
(WTMC) 
 
Monitoring of 
interventions (MON) 
That relies on us annually collecting 
data, and each year looking at how that 
data fits in with long-term trends and 
how those different ecological sites out 
there are changing through time 
(CWP2, 49:00). 
 
Not found.  
Evaluation of 
interventions (EVAL) 
Okay, well this method of doing this 
treatment is not working—why is it not 
working, what can we do differently, 
what is the feedback loop, is it having 
the impact that we want it to have? Why 
not? (CWP2, 50:26). 
 
Not found.  
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instance, while the WTMC expressed a similar kind of conflict resolution process (mostly 
informal and consensus-based), shared environmental values, and recognition of a threat 
to that value, the differences are clear in the cohesive narrative told by the CWP 
stakeholder compared to the WTMC stakeholder.  
 
Table 10. Critical communities theme and corresponding coded quotations. 
CRITICAL 
COMMUNITIES 
Cienega Watershed Partnership 
(CWP) 
 
White Tank Mountains 
Conservancy (WTMC) 
Cohesion among 
stakeholders (COH) 
And there’s just certain amount of 
spending time with people, and 
spending time out on the land with 
people that tends to speed the 
appreciation for who they are and 
what they bring and makes us 
more likely to both assume good 
intent and to say: “now I can see 
things more from your side” 
(LC1, 65:14). 
 
Everyone’s here for the long 
haul, and that’ll change, but 
we’re growing our stakeholder 
database for sure (WTMC4, 
60:01).  
Deliberative 
decision arena 
(DELIB) 
You come together as a group, 
you develop through a series of 
meetings or workshops or 
whatever, a long trust about what 
can and cannot happen (LC3, 
17:58). 
 
When we first rolled out the idea, 
we invited everybody, including 
the folks that we thought would 
be less receptive—developers so 
to speak. And there were a couple 
in the room and they listened and 
didn’t say anything for them most 
part and left. And then we went 
back in and met with them 1-on-1 
and some of the were anxious 
about that. The whole 
conversation, and some were like 
“we could figure this out.” We’re 
trying to bring them along at the 
appropriate time (WTMC4, 
57:43). 
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The CWP stakeholders have the advantage of homesteading within the 
management boundaries, perhaps giving more weight to the activities that occur there. 
The WTMC management location is primarily undeveloped, and while the organizing 
groups desire open space, it appears that there is a difference between the ‘in my 
backyard’ attitude present the LCNCA that is borne out in the level of cohesiveness 
Network 
connections (NET) 
Yeah there’s kind of a sense that 
if you miss it [planning meeting] 
that everyone will notice, and if 
you miss it you may not find out 
what everyone has been doing and 
how what they been doing might 
impact what you’re doing.  
There’s a certain amount of 
pressure, but people have a good 
time (LC1, 8:12). 
 
It was a group of non-profits that 
founded a non-profit in a space 
that was, you know, a super high 
potential space, and a space that 
none of us individually could 
concentrate on alone. So, if we 
all gave a little bit of our time, we 
could pull it off. We were all 
bringing out networks together 
and there’s some much power in 
that (WTMC1, 8:38). 
 
Existence of 
collective 
environmental value 
(COL_VAL) 
This area is a real value to the 
public. It’s history, it’s openness, 
it’s resources—biological and 
historical components. The land 
itself is a real glue. It kind of 
sucks you in we say. We always 
say, “oh yea, you go out there and 
it just sucks you in. The resources, 
the creek, the riparian zone… it 
really is important, and it was 
important long before the 
collaboration started…(LC3 
30:28). 
 
My initial thought, I guess, was, 
“here’s this beautiful 30,000 acre 
preserve that’s really at some 
point in the future going to 
become, what I call an urban 
wilderness, completely 
surrounded” (WTMC3, 10:31). 
Shared recognition 
of perceived threat 
to collective value 
(PER_THT) 
Looking at broadly at this, over 
the last 10 years or longer, the 
predominant issue is water. And 
that is one of the glues that holds 
it [collaborative] together, is 
water, is Cienega Creek. What’s 
the state doing? Who’s using 
water, what’s the quantity? What 
are the recharge factors? What are 
the models? So, water has been a 
really predominant theme in this 
watershed. (LC3, 8:43) 
 
This is going to be a cutoff 
mountain park…and, so without 
kind of coming to the…hey 
there’s a big problem here, I was 
like, okay, this is the way it’s 
going to be. And so when the 
Conservancy then came about 
and started to push for this, I was 
like, “I’m all in” because we 
gotta do something to continue to 
protect [it].   
(WTMC3, 11:07). 
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expressed by the CWP stakeholders and the WTMC group, whose livelihoods and land 
tenures are not strictly tied to the geographical space. The baroque language used by 
CWP folks compared to the WTMC’s matter of fact-ness signals, perhaps, a deeper 
aesthetic and emotional attachment to place.    
Contingency and Chance. 
Pragmatists, especially John Dewey, cite the pervasive contingency in our 
universe as the requisite impetus to develop a “reflective intelligence.”398 This 
intelligence is both the humble acceptance that future conditions are indeterminant and an 
inclination to face this chance head-on. We cannot, as Bernstein puts it, “hope to master 
unforeseen and unexpected contingencies.”399 Like these other themes, this idea has 
threads that run throughout the pragmatic discourse. Indeed, it is this acknowledged 
contingency which colors the pragmatic epistemology. The knowledge gained through 
experience and experimentation—which is the only way we can acquire it—is fallible 
because the contexts in which the learning process occurs has many possible orientations. 
Scientific discovery is dotted with these instances where accepted theories are falsified 
based on advances in technology.  
In the management context, this is borne out through an explicit planning process 
that incorporates responses to surprise and potential future scenarios (Table 12). It 
requires both time and imagination to develop management plans to effectively integrate.  
 
                                                          
398 John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (NY: N.Y. Dover Publications, 1958), 43. 
399 Bernstein, “Pragmatism, Pluralism and the Healing of Wounds,” 10. 
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Table 11. Contingency code and corresponding coded quotations.  
While scenario planning is not part of the adaptive management mandate, it has  
been an increasingly useful tool to move management teams into an anticipatory rather 
than re-actionary mode.400 Indeed, this was the goal established by the plurality of CWP 
                                                          
400 Garry D. Peterson, Graeme S. Cumming, and Stephen R. Carpenter, "Scenario Planning: A Tool for 
Conservation in an Uncertain World," Conservation Biology 17, no. 2 (2003): 358-66. 
CONTINGENCY Las Cienegas National 
Conservation Area (CWP) 
 
White Tank Mountains 
Conservancy (WTMC) 
Importance of 
explicit planning 
process (PLAN) 
The planning process could not be 
replicated today because it took 
too long, I think it took 6 years get 
it all nailed down (CWP4, 14:15). 
 
I’m hoping what we develop is 
going to be part of the community 
of today and tomorrow. When I’m 
saying tomorrow, I’m talking 50 
to 100 years, I mean, that’s what I 
look as vision because that we 
need to be to be aware of what it 
is that we can do (WTMC5, 
54:53). 
 
Imagined future 
conditions (FUT) 
Here are some plausible, not 
predictions, not guarantees, and 
not just wild ass guesses, these are 
some plausible possibilities. What 
would we do, what would be the 
right management response and 
the right preparation?  If these 
things came to pass?  What would 
we wish we had already done?  
What should we be thinking about 
ahead of time? (CWP1, 32:16). 
We have an idea, and that’s where 
we’re really trying to be 
champions of conservation, and 
sensitive to…to inspire them to do 
something different. And so that’s 
why we wanted to work with 
ASU to create something that they 
can see and touch and feel and 
even couple it with proformas, 
land use planning, repositioning 
of lots to protecting corridors. 
We’re trying to create models that 
they can look at and we can use 
those as a tool for conversation 
(WTM4, 29:53). 
 
Ability to address 
unexpected 
outcomes (SUPR) 
He really, you know, looks at the 
data, and listens to the concerns 
that other people have about how 
its being managed, how the 
pasture rotation should be, how 
should we adjust to unexpected 
things like wildfires (CWP2, 
47:18). 
 
It’s a problem, and I’m not really 
sure how we can address that 
[undesirable development] 
(WTMC4, 32:29). 
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stakeholders and has both served as an integral part of the adaptive process, but also, 
according to interviews, a process through which ties inside a critical community can be 
strengthened.  
Detecting this theme in the WTMC case is straightforward. The planning process 
included multiple designs for wildlife corridors through the desert landscape, followed by 
an exercise examining what those corridors might look like if overlaid upon development 
master plans. A 3-D flyover video was also produced to simulate the developed area with 
integrated wildlife corridors. It is unclear what role, if any, the WTMC collaborative will 
serve after development occurs with regards to the corridors. Perhaps the collaborative 
inertia will be directed toward newly defined goals that pays attention to the contingency 
of future socio-ecological conditions. The evidence here suggests, though, that the 
WTMC are currently constrained by their unequal share of decision-making power to 
explicitly address surprises in their management plans.  
Pluralistic. 
 Following Bernstein, the kind of pluralism in mind here is an “engaged 
pluralism.”401 There is a tendency for pluralism (and its colloquial, conceptual family 
members, relativism and subjectivism) to be weaponized, for it to be used as a token 
either for excusing the actions/beliefs of others or oneself in an uncritical way. Engaged 
pluralism is to express and act upon a “genuine willingness to listen and learn from 
others…”402 Engaged pluralism is therefore a kind of ethical responsibility because it 
requires effort to place yourself in the shoes of others so that you might come to a greater 
understanding of the perspectives they hold.  But there is also effort to guard against 
                                                          
401 Bernstein, “Pragmatism, Pluralism and the Healing of Wounds,” 15. 
402 Ibid., 15. 
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falling victim to the simultaneous temptation to always seek common ground. In some 
cases, no amount of sympathizing or empathizing will lead to shared values and surely 
there are cases in which this level of effort is unwarranted.  
Through the propositioning of conflicting ideas, groups typically coalesce around 
common identities. It is, however, the normative task of these bonded groups to maintain 
channels of openness and a willingness to engage in dialogical encounters. This just 
means that we begin discussions with the view that the ‘other’ has a contributory posture 
and is not, at the outset, seeking to antagonize or denigrate your own position. Of course, 
that veil comes off quickly and the dialogical encounter is no longer the appropriate arena 
for mediation. Counter to common criticism, pluralism does not commit anyone to 
unchecked tolerance. It helps that we have access to a history of bad ideas and a surface 
level understanding of bad faith actors that we can reference during the dialogical 
exchanges. Pluralism is, above all, a respect for autonomy, including one’s own.   
 After the formation of a group, there is already some glue which holds 
participants together and therefore more likely begets the dialogical attitude (and social 
learning, as discussed above). Assuredly, collaborators who seek common ends will   
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Table 12. Plurality theme and corresponding coded quotations. 
PLURALISTIC Las Cienegas National 
Conservation Area (CWP) 
 
White Tank Mountains 
Conservancy (WTMC) 
Conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms 
(CON_RES) 
It [the collaboration] was not 
explicitly consensus based, but 
that’s mostly what we tried to opt 
for. A kind of negotiated-consensus 
approach (CWP2, 12:43).  
 
It has arisen [conflict] and it has 
resolved itself primarily through 
consensus-building. You know, 
always come back to this is our 
focus and within each of these 
focus areas, we ask ourselves what 
is the most important thing? If 
you’re kinda looking at the 
organization of these types of 
groups, I think it was critical that 
we spent time really trying to set 
up the foundation of the 
organization. Here’s how we’re 
gong to organize, so we’ve got an 
executive board and then an 
advisory group. That was part of 
the initial discussions (WTMC3, 
47:20). 
 
Evidence of 
environmental 
ethic (BEG_ETH) 
The general impression I got from 
a lot of the people [unintelligible] 
was keep it [the landscape] 
primitive, minimize the use (CWP4 
37:14). 
 
One of the things we’ve always 
talked about as a group, is that 
there’s a lot of attention over the 
past, what, 20 years or so, on 
protecting the lions in the 
Serengeti, but yet we have lions 
right here we’re neglecting. You 
know, I mean, once they’re gone, 
they’re gone, and they’re really an 
icon of Arizona. From the heritage 
standpoint, they’re iconic 
(WTMC3, 50:13). 
 
Change in 
environmental 
ethic through 
collaborative 
process 
(CHG_ETH) 
We may be far enough along in this 
one [collaboration] that we’ve 
already, and many of us have 
already done the embracing of 
somebody else’s values.  It’s like I 
can understand why you care about 
this thing and then I can care about 
that also.  You may end up 
having…very often a broadening of 
values.  But there are just things 
that conflict (CWP1, 70:12). 
 
Not found. 
Recognition of 
diverse 
Here’s a place that’s just gotten 
designated as a national 
This whole thing has been about 
the protection of, the mountain and 
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experience conflicting opinions on how to achieve those ends. Ultimately it is the 
collective decisions that are likely to dictate action, but the adaptive, iterative approach 
gives promise to those minority voices which are momentarily neglected. Codes in Table 
13 are attempts at capturing an environmental ethical pluralism on the one hand and the 
more general procedural expectations that arise from pluralism in a management context 
(i.e., conflict resolution mechanisms). The CWP is evidently homogenous to the extent to 
which conflict was not widely experienced (or at least did not occur in any memorable 
instances). Whereas consensus appeared to form quickly between CWP stakeholders 
(even in the early stages 20 years ago), more conflict has been reportedly experienced 
between WTMC collaborators. This rivalry within the WTMC process is possibly due to 
a greater diversity of ethical attitudes and objectives that are begat from those attitudes. 
While the CWP has somewhat solidified in its membership and participation, the WTMC 
is still stumbling through this process. As a last note, conflict does not carry the negative 
environmental 
values by 
stakeholder(s) 
(VAL_DIV) 
conservation area, but it’s also part 
of that is because of its cultural 
value as a historic ranch site.  Well, 
there’s a big fat juicy question over 
whether the historic activity that 
people are so proud of as a heritage 
thing is actually compatible with a 
healthy ecosystem moving forward 
and whether it’s compatible with 
the protection of all the endangered 
species on site. So that was 
probably the biggest motivator for 
developing the CAM [collaborative 
adaptive management] process in 
the first place…to address that 
potential conflict, that interpersonal 
conflict and potential resource 
conflict (CWP1, 70:46). 
 
its natural habitat and all of this 
was here long before any of us and 
we ought to do our very best effort 
to not just preserve open space, but 
also be stewards of the land and 
the ecosystem. You know, there’s 
all kinds of stuff out there that 
deserves to be out there. And, it 
enriches all of our lives anyways. 
A hike where you come across a 
deer is a lot more meaningful than 
when you don’t (WTMC4, 61:04). 
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connotation that it normally confers. Here, it is simply a description for competing 
perspectives.  
Summary. 
Although the themes and sub-codes were solely based on the pragmatic ethos, 
these excerpts display overlap between pragmatic characteristics and the features of a 
‘successful’ adaptive co-management scheme. In comparing the two cases, the CWP has 
experienced little hardship while the WTMC is, in its infancy, finding it difficult to fully 
realize an adaptive collaborative approach. This could be cause by several factors such as 
lower social cohesion due to no livelihood attachment to the managed land, existing on 
the weaker end of a power imbalance, and/or hesitation in bringing in all relevant 
stakeholders (land developers, in this case). There is no guarantee, of course, that 
resolving these deficiencies would lead toward a successfully managed process. Further, 
this assumes that the stakeholders in the system are aware that these pieces (i.e. social 
cohesion and equitable distribution of power) are widely understood as necessary 
components toward long-term success.403 Further, the objective which they have 
coalesced around is not completely suited for adaptive management. This is not to say 
that collaborators expressed misgivings toward integral pieces of adaptive management 
such as social learning, evaluation, and monitoring, but that there is no specific 
mechanism in planning documents that accounts for these pieces. There is however, a 
more layman’s version necessarily at work that I believe still captures a pragmatic spirit. 
In my view, this learning-reflecting rhythm of adaptive management describes learning 
more generally. Collaborators must have had to learn, together, new sets of skills, 
                                                          
403 Georgina Cundill, G. Thondhlana, L. Sisitka, S. Shackleton, M. Blore, “Land claims and the pursuit of 
co-management on four protected areas in South Africa,” Land Use Policy 35, (2013), 171-178. 
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including social and deliberative skills. They must acquire the requisite knowledge about 
the landscape and the species at risk, along with the larger political dynamics in which all 
this must work. All these inputs, I’d argue, force groups of individuals to update their 
pre-conceptions about what is desirable, what is possible, and what is feasible. It breeds 
an openness in approach, and according to pragmatists, an empathy for values held by 
other relevant actors.  
 The current snapshot of the CWP benefits from having already experienced 
growing pains such as conflict and the existence of value pluralism. Assuredly these 
pieces persist throughout the course of collaboration, but it appears that once stakeholders 
overcame any substantial conflicts and rallied around objectives, the collaborative at once 
became social activity focused on process and a pursuit for legitimate ecological 
outcomes. Although not coded for here because it is, apparently, not crucial to the 
pragmatic method, the CWP benefited from strong leadership and expert facilitators that 
could address conflict, lay out the decisions, and provide system-wide knowledge to new 
collaborators. Interestingly, this relates to one of Dewey’s core concerns about public 
action.404 Namely, that only a few select actors are often left in charge to lead 
deliberation, to aid in coordination, to force decisions, and that sometimes this 
overreliance can backfire. Fortunately, the leaders in the CWP were well attuned to the 
adaptive co-management literature and understood their important roles in shepherding 
the stakeholders in the early, formative stages. Indeed, it appears that this awareness of 
the tenets of adaptive co-management have served the CWP well.405    
                                                          
404 John Dewey, The Public and its Problems, (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946): 208 
405 It should be noted, with emphasis, that each of these responses only represent a small and temporally 
constrained snapshot of the totality of the collaborative actors in each case setting. Perhaps unfairly in some 
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Future Directions 
Thematic analysis of interview data is just one possible approach that can be 
deployed as a cluster to further solidify the arguments being made here. More earnest 
document analysis, participant observations, surveys, and even focus groups represent 
additional data gathering techniques. More cases that are geographically distinct would 
be valuable. It would be particularly fascinating to analyze management cases outside of 
the United States given the American origins of philosophical pragmatism. Additional 
conferences with experts in the qualitative analysis and environmental ethics could help 
with several processes here, including codebook development, coding techniques, and 
interpretation of codes. Lastly, one linkage that might be possible in the future, is with the 
stakeholder-determined success of management implementations and whether they agree 
with the pragmatic themes as described here.  
Conclusion 
The aim here was to provide an empirical grounding, an illustration of the so-far 
theoretical connection between an environmental pragmatism and adaptive co-
management practice. The results of the interview process are intended to provide a 
                                                          
instances, each response might be interpreted as speaking for the group where, in fact, the selected person’s 
view or opinion differs from the group at large. Of course, the opposite might be true as well. I have tried to 
stay true to the mandate set in the Methods section—to only select the best available, paradigmatic 
examples of the pragmatic ethos—where the interpretation of selected texts reflects my insight into the case 
derived from observation and immersion in each setting. As a stakeholder myself in the WTMC case, this 
immersion is biased toward the WTMC. This gives me the requisite confidence that I have fairly 
represented the group’s collective thinking, if that phraseology is appropriate. The CWP interviewees were 
extremely forthcoming with information, detailing areas where their process has not been, for instance, as 
inclusive as it could have been. Their welcoming and openness, in addition to journal articles and other 
reporting materials, was a great help to conceptualize the ‘feeling’ of being a CWP stakeholder. I must also 
add that two planned trips to take prat in biological planning meetings and survey the landscape had to be 
canceled due to unforeseen circumstances. However, I do not get the impression that my interpretation of 
their offered quotations would change if those trips had taken place.     
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window into the thinking that occurs between stakeholders as they collaborate toward 
their environmental objectives. Interviews are a common methodology in management 
scholarship,406 but to my knowledge, this is a first attempt to use thematic coding of 
interview data to operationalize a philosophical identity in environmental management 
case studies. Certainly, there are conceptual, methodological, and analytical deficiencies 
and ambiguities present, but nevertheless, this study serves as a first foray into a new 
kind of investigation in empirical or descriptive environmental ethics. It’s one that 
perhaps can serve as a kind of model for experimental philosophers who are open to the 
utility of social science methods in informing their research. This is a relatively undefined 
field of inquiry that is only explained by its component pieces and corollary approaches 
in other areas of applied ethics.  
Further, as no such study currently exists (to my knowledge) which explicitly 
develops and applies a non-anthropocentric method of environmental valuation, the 
evidence suggests that pragmatism maintains the methodological high-ground for the 
moment. As repeated in Chapter 4’s conclusion, there are significant practical 
implications for crafting these sets of theories to be commensurate with one another, 
namely, the possibility of the pragmatic orientation to skirt around emergent social-
ecological traps when employed with an adaptive co-management schema (or indeed, 
acting as the impetus for trialing adaptive co-management in new contexts) and 
engendering increased sensitivity to the value claims of other collaborators. Pragmatism 
can bring deliberative tools to bear in management contexts and where appropriate, serve 
                                                          
406 See, for instance, Ryan Plummer, Julia Baird, Angela Dzyundzyak, Derek Armitage, Örjan Bodin, and 
Lisen Schultz, “Is Adaptive Co-management Delivering? Examining Relationships Between Collaboration, 
Learning and Outcomes in UNESCO Biosphere Reserves,” Ecological Economics 140, (2017): 79–88. 
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as ethical grounding for pursuing coordinated management efforts. That is, the pragmatic 
perspective is that the failure of collective action, the failure to create critical 
communities, is not just cognitive, but normative.  
Though there are seemingly many benefits, the results here do force pragmatists 
to ask how their perspective overlays onto non-democratic institutions as evidenced in the 
WTMC collaborative. There is internal democracy in the WTMC case, but it could be 
argued that the larger social system through which they must wade to achieve their 
ecological objectives, is undemocratic. The critique is, in my view, a valid one. In the 
WTMC, I have not detected the adaptive elements that normally compose a pragmatic 
epistemology. As I’ve stated here and elsewhere though, we do not know what new 
management objectives will be borne out of their momentarily haphazard process. Will 
lack of success (just hypothetically) change the way stakeholders and participants think 
about collaboration? About the importance of social learning mechanisms within adaptive 
management? Although not explicitly present now, does this reflect a ‘pragmatic’ attitude 
if learning, nevertheless, occurs? Can we determine where pragmatism begins and ends? 
These are tough questions for sure. Perhaps one appropriate response is to simply 
consider the pragmatic method an ideal, a goal for which pragmatists like myself must 
promote. It is easy enough to imagine how every activity in which we engage could be 
couched within such a perspective—that successes and failures of process confer lessons 
which we use to improve ourselves—and so as long as we have the ability to enter in 
critical communities, we might converge on a pseudo-pragmatic method.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation is an argument for a greater role for environmental ethics in 
policy and practice and an effort to lay the groundwork for a pragmatic reorientation. I 
organized this dissertation into three component parts—philosophical, methodological, 
and empirical—each of which furthered the dissertation’s overall argument. The first 
part, Chapters 1 and 2, examined the impact environmental ethics has had in applied 
philosophy and public environmental affairs. In Chapter 1, I hypothesized that no 
signatures of language diffusion would be present when analyzing the discourses of 
academic environmental ethics and parts of the temporally-correlated Congressional 
Record of the United States Congress. This hypothesis was tested with the help of an 
increasingly common textual analysis method called topic modeling. While 
acknowledging that there are compelling drawbacks in this instantiation of topic 
modeling, the evidence seems to comport with the results of an earlier study motivated by 
similar questions (i.e., Stone, 2003). The topic modeling results provide evidence to the 
claim that the language indicative of disciplinary nomenclature in environmental ethics is 
not appearing in the Congressional Record.  
Chapter 2 confronted both the philosophical reason why the topic modeling 
process turned up no language diffusion and the implications for a field of applied ethics 
whose directive is to be influential in policy areas and therefore find representation in 
places like the Record. In this chapter, I argued that while environmental ethics 
developed in a time of increasing global ecological consciousness, early theorists in the 
field did not shake their Western philosophical influences. Indeed, many of the first-
generation environmental ethicists were professional philosophers with environmental 
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sensitivities. Consequently, uniformity, universalism, and foundationalism as a result of 
wide-spread Cartesianism are features in the early and enduring formulations of 
environmental ethical arguments. While these arguments are, admittedly, psychologically 
satisfying, practical applications quickly disclosed deficiencies. Environmental scientists 
and conservation biologists are aware that their work is rife with trade-offs (e.g., it can be 
difficult to come to a decision to control a species that is charismatic, but ecologically 
destructive). But this seemingly mundane fact cannot be easily transposed onto 
unwavering ethical arguments.  
Take, for instance, biocentrism, a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic that 
supports ‘teleological centers of a life,’  a position that requires moral sensitivity to all 
life forms, from simple organisms to complex adult mammals.407 Such a view may find 
little support among conservation refugees forcibly removed from ancestral lands to 
protect threatened species who must cope with the economic, cultural, and psychological 
impacts of eviction (Zahran et al., 2015). As with most complex ethical perspectives, 
there is at least one instance where the perspective will seem ill-equipped to provide 
moral bearings. Do biocentrists, who must value individual plants and animals equally to 
individual humans, oppose such human displacement? Let me be clear: I do not indict 
biocentrism here because it cannot adequately respond to at least one scenario, real or 
imagined. I happen to believe that biocentrism is one valid approach in an abundance of 
ethical perspectives that could be used to flesh out dilemmas. In the case of conservation 
refugees, however, a more human-sensitive approach, perhaps based on an indigenous 
                                                          
407 Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1986). 
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rights framework that acknowledged both environmental and anthropocentric interests, 
could prove more just – and also more workable in practice.408 This tool-kit approach I 
have just described is concurrent with a pragmatic environmental philosophy.  
Based on the classical writings of Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John 
Dewey, the pragmatic philosophy is characterized most plainly as a deliberative ‘method 
of science.’409 It is a philosophy that is empirical, experimental, social, communal, 
educative, and pluralistic. The 2nd part of the dissertation began with Chapter 3. Here, I 
discussed at length the recent emergence of a management strategy developed to aid in 
the achievement of socio-ecological resilience called adaptive co-management (ACM). 
Like the pragmatic philosophical orientation, ACM relies on the principles of empiricism, 
experimentalism, socialism, communism, and pluralism to develop and grasp a resilient 
agenda.410 Although ACM has been deployed with varying success, the correspondence 
between pragmatism and ACM provides the opportunity, I argued, to aid in the 
development of an explicit pragmatic methodology applied to environmental contexts. I 
considered this method synonymous with an environmental ethic, one not defined by 
adherence to any one ethical attitude, but one that is faithful to the pragmatic process. 
The output of the process, given that all relevant boxes have been checked, is the moral 
course of action. ACM functions similarly, except practitioners might substitute ‘moral’ 
with ‘wise’ or ‘appropriate’ or ‘proper.’ My argument is an attempt to unify this 
language. It is worth remembering that pragmatists and ACM proponents do not believe 
that their corresponding processes are infallible; to the contrary. Both camps are candid 
                                                          
408 Indeed, these grounds are what activists have been  
409 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science Monthly 12, (1877): 2. 
410 Socialism and communism are not meant in the political sense here. It just means engaging in social and 
communal actions and relations respectively.  
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about the possibilities of poor judgment, or missing stakeholders, or little imagination, 
among a multitude of other potentially detracting processional features. Group reflection 
and reiteration acts as the corrective. 
The third part of this dissertation is an empirical test. Chapter 5 engaged with two 
environmental management case studies in Arizona. The first case closely examined a 
nationally recognized, enduring collaborative adaptive management arrangement in the 
Las Cienegas National Conservation Area,411 while the second case study tracked the 
development of an environmental management schema in western Phoenix, Arizona. One 
of the more fascinating aspects of this second case study was the early stage of the 
collaboration. This elementary state means that the adaptive aspects, if there will be any, 
have not yet materialized. Having established, in parts 1 and 2, the pragmatic consonance 
with ACM theory and implementations, stakeholders in both case studies were enlisted 
for semi-structed interviews. A codebook (Appendix B) based on the pragmatic ethos 
was developed. The questions (Appendix A) directed at stakeholders had dual aims. The 
first aim, which is not in the scope of this dissertation, was to achieve a level of 
comprehension needed in order to code the case elements itself. This first project—to 
develop a typology of successful collaborative management—is on-going work with Dr. 
Michael Schoon and Dr. Candice Carr Kelman’s Col-lab in Arizona State University’s 
School of Sustainability. The second and relevant aim had many facets but was mainly to 
demonstrate a correspondence between pragmatism in the ACM case studies by asking 
questions emblematic of socio-ecological inventories (e.g., about resources, about 
management processes, about stakeholders). This correspondence, in my estimation, has 
                                                          
411 This is essentially the same as ACM. The stakeholders preferred to use CAM instead. 
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the effect of operationalizing a pragmatic philosophy, uncovering various tensions and 
sympathies. For instance, the pragmatic epistemology is similarly multi-scalar. That is, at 
the individual meaning-making level, the collaborative level, and the social context in 
which that collaboration exists, learning and reflecting is persistent. On the other hand, 
the democratic and/or deliberative arenas that pragmatism imposes are imperfect and 
sometimes unfeasible.   
Certainly, there are weaknesses in each of the three tracks that deserve mention. 
The topic modeling undertaken in Chapter 1 is, even in the most generous terms, is 
deficient in at least three ways. The corpora were not balanced in terms of word counts 
and secondly, the Congressional Record corpora does not capture the full-sweep of 
policy documents where one might find earnest influence of environmental ethics. 
Conservation organizations often publish periodicals or have missions, visions, mandates, 
etc., available. Legislation that champions environmental protection like the National 
Park Service Organic Act of 1916 or the Clean Water Act of 1972 is also pertinent for 
topic analyses and other forms of computational text analysis. This methodological 
overhaul could provide a more compelling body of evidence than what is presented here.  
Pragmatic discourse is closely related to that of deliberative democracy, so 
critiques that apply to one are seemingly applicable to both. The fact that pragmatism is 
surreptitiously present in many aspects of our everyday lives makes it difficult to give 
good reasons for preferring pragmatism over other philosophical positions in all cases. 
Actually, pragmatism has the quality of being potentially self-defeating and therefore 
could be charged with inconsistency, inadequacy, or any number of psychologically 
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dissatisfactory characteristics.412 Relatedly, ACM, while gaining popularity, still has 
many detractors that suggest it has problems reeling in imbalances of power, giving 
preferences to expedient solutions and not necessarily the ‘correct’ one, and simply too 
costly to implement. Further, some want to know: how much adaptation is necessary? 
How much collaboration? Are there cases where it does not work? There are no easy 
answers here offered here—simply a commitment to resolving these questions. 
Lastly, the case study analyses were lacking in a number of areas. Namely, I 
conducted only half of the original number of interviews sought. Employing an additional 
transcript editor and transcript coder would have added much needed reliability to the 
cases. With a single researcher involved in question development, sampling, interviews, 
and transcription and coding processes, my bias has the potential to influence each of 
these pieces, potentially skewing the data to achieve results that I desire. Yet, despite 
these caveats and reservations, taken as a whole, the study seems to provide compelling 
support that this an area worthy of continued exploration.  
Environmental Ethics: Concerns for Future Generations 
 Continuing in this vein, I would be remiss to not offer some musings and a bit of 
informal reflection on the trends I foresee materializing in my generation of 
environmental ethicists and beyond. If this dissertation is a signal that there is an 
increasing appreciation for interdisciplinarity and methodological diversity in philosophy, 
then surely this is the direction the specified field of environmental ethics will trend. As 
an undergraduate in philosophy at Arizona State University, environmental ethics was 
                                                          
412 The claim here would be that in some cases, such as between hate-groups and their victims, deliberation, 
communal hearings, and social learning are simply not appropriate. How pragmatism deals with bad faith 
actors is an obstacle I have not been able to clear. I think in these cases we need to rely on other moral 
intuitions to depose of incorrigible individuals from our deliberative groups.   
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delivered with a kind of exotericism and broader awareness of the socio-political contexts 
in which these environmental issues arose, a credit to Dr. Ben Minteer. In my view, the 
entire philosophy department was attempting to descend from the ivory-tower and 
routinely offered courses in sustainability ethics, experimental philosophy, and bioethics, 
policy, and law, perhaps part of a more wide-ranging move toward interdisciplinarity 
across the campus. Cultivating a linkage between what is commonly viewed as a highly 
conceptual pursuit (philosophy) and applied problems has been a personal goal here, 
inspired by some of these formative courses and engagement with mentors who were 
indelibly diverse in their approach. I happen to believe that ignoring places where this 
linkage could occur is a disservice to both philosophy and adjacent fields of study where 
it might have lasting influence.  
Even in this optimistic reading, there are still numerous challenges that 
environmental ethicists will continue to encounter, if only because of this increasing 
trend toward interdisciplinarity. In the course of my research, I have suggested that 
philosophy—and environmental ethics specifically—cannot be passive spectators. In 
order to achieve and maintain relevance in the discussion of applied problems, we are 
going to have to insert ourselves. That means we must continue producing work that can 
overcome three kinds of barriers. 
 First, we must overcome the perception that philosophy is for academics who are 
not interested in applied work, more closely associated with a turned-up-nose and an 
intellectual pompousness. Secondly, we must produce work that can convince other 
academic communities of several things, chief among these, perhaps is the notion that 
environmental ethics is applicable and useful in thinking about and resolving 
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environmental problems, as well as enriching the normative discourse of sustainability, a 
fast-growing, interdisciplinary field spanning the sciences, arts, and the humanities.413 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for me, we must persuade the public that 
philosophical analysis has something to offer, that it is not metatheoretical nonsense with 
little purchase on inquiry and decision making. Pragmatists, beginning with William 
James and John Dewey and carried forth by Cornel West and Richard Rorty, have 
seemingly punctuated the discussions about philosophy’s public role. Does our changing 
media landscape make their causes—and the goals of environmental ethics—more or less 
digestible? Do we need a new approach focused on social media? Should there be 
community engagement events that do not take place on a university campus? There are 
many questions ahead to consider.  
Fortunately, there is a familial relationship between the kind of work that I have 
undertaken here and those of increasingly interdisciplinary departments and research 
centers (like my own, the Center for Biology and Society at Arizona State University) 
that do not force students into predetermined tracks of study and allow them to pursue 
questions of their own interest. This openness breeds and perpetuates a kind of intrinsic 
motivation for research and learning. It can also be unsettling to the degree that it 
demands a process of rapid, adaptive learning and creative exploration as a project moves 
forward.  But there’s a sense of independence that came with self-doubt and uncertainty, 
including a chance to see what we are capable of. Training and supporting future students 
                                                          
413 On a personal note, I recently spoke about environmental ethics in a recent job talk for an academic 
position in sustainability and, to my surprise, received many comments about how some of the concepts I 
covered and questions I entertained had the potential to reform the framing of sustainability problems in a 
plurality of undergraduate, and even graduate, courses. (I ignorantly thought that we would have the same 
baseline knowledge on some of the morally charged sustainability issues.)   
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to walk this tight-rope of intellectual and methodological possibility is, in my view, the 
best way forward for environmental ethics.  
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SEARCHING FOR PRAGMATISM INTERVIEW GUIDE 
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Network Questions 
• Can you tell me about your background?  
• How did you become involved in the project? 
• Where would you say your interest in the project arose from? 
• Who are the partners/stakeholders in the collaboration?  
• How often are meetings held? 
• Are the meetings with X partner/stakeholder productive for the achievement of 
the project goals? 
• How long has the collaboration with X partner/stakeholder been occurring?  Has 
it changed in form over time? 
• What is the nature of the collaboration with X partner/stakeholder, (e.g. is it 
mandated by law, is it constrained by type of funding, or is it based on shared 
interest?) 
 
Adaptive Co-Management (ACM) concerns 
• What are the resources being managed and what are the main threats to them? 
o Have these threats changed since the establishment of the collaborative 
network? 
• What are the biophysical characteristics of the area under collaborative 
management? 
• Can you speak to some of the long- and short-term goals of the collaborative? 
• Do you believe collaborative approaches, in general, facilitate a shift to resilience-
based ecosystem stewardship?  
• In your opinion, what are the limitations to the ACM style of management?  
• Do you feel that the organization of your group aids in overcoming challenges 
and reaching consensus? 
o For instance, is data collection/organizing easier? Monitoring? 
Organizing? 
• What challenges have you faced that you would uniquely attribute to the nature of 
collaboration? 
• Has the group sought to include voices that have some relevant expertise?  
• Has the group sought to include those that may be affected by your decisions? 
o Who might be missing from the discussion?  
 
Conflict Resolution Mechanisms 
• Do you feel that deliberation (e.g. discussion, give-and-take, debate) has helped or 
hindered the achievement of defined goals? Why? 
• How have potential areas of contention been addressed, if any? 
• In instances of disagreement, how was the disagreement resolved (voting 
procedure, discussion, other conflict resolution mechanism)? 
• Has the presence of conflict within the group, if any, become a distraction? 
 
Environmental Ethical/Pragmatic Concerns 
• Could you briefly describe the plurality of values held by some of the key 
members in the collaboration? 
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o For instance, do some members appear have more deeply held species 
conservation views compared other members, who may be more interested 
in recreation, or possibly community engagement? 
• Is the protection of these species a part of the project’s defined goals? Are some 
more threatened than others? More valuable in some way (and why)?  
• Has working toward species protection conflicted with other defined goals? How 
have you developed a list of priorities that is sensitive to multiple stakeholders? 
• Do you believe that the wildlife populations/individual animals themselves hold 
special value or are you concerned with the integrity of the ecosystem more 
broadly? 
o In general, do you value untouched, wild places over the developed 
landscape? 
 
Outcomes 
• Has the end of the ACM/collaborative approach been discussed?  
• Do you think that the health of the ecosystem could be sustained if another 
management approach were to be substituted in? 
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EXPERIENTIAL 
Mnemonic SOC_LEARN 
Description The openness of participants to share and draw on plurality of knowledge 
systems and resources, learning, in general, and social learning, in 
particular, is associated with effective local governance systems 
(Armitage et al. 2009).    
Schema Does the collaboration facilitate the development of venues in which 
collaborators and stakeholders can come together to share information 
and exchange ideas?   
 
Code if yes. 
 
Mnemonic ADAPT 
Description Experiential learning is a process of creating knowledge through the 
transformation of experience, learning-by-doing. Adaptive management 
relies on learning-by-doing process to test and explore integrated policy 
strategies (Armitage et al., 2008).  
Schema Do stakeholders identify an adaptive process in their management 
design? 
 
Code if yes.  
 
Mnemonic HYPO 
Description A collaborative that treats, even informally, policy proposals as possible 
hypotheses is a signal that collaborators are intending to pursue an 
evaluative phase, post policy implementation. This would be the 
beginning phase of a complete experiential attentiveness and integrate to 
a hypothesis-deductive model of adaptive management (Armitage et al., 
2008).  
Schema Do interviewees refer to policies for intervention as hypotheses? 
 
Code if yes.   
 
FALLIBLE 
Mnemonic MON 
Description A period of monitoring and data-gathering should occur after a policy is 
decidedly implemented. Careful monitoring of outcomes advances 
scientific understanding and helps in the adjustment of policies as part of 
an iterative learning process (Williams et al., 2007).  
Schema Is there evidence that the collaboration relies on monitoring mechanisms 
(formal or informal) to inform future management activities? 
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Code if yes. 
 
Mnemonic EVAL 
Description Evaluation is the second linear phase of the adaptive, learning process. 
Learning within the context of adaptive management derives from 
evaluation of previous management actions, the results of which are used 
to inform subsequent actions. After monitoring—the data collecting 
process—evaluation of the data should occur (Williams et al., 2007).  
Schema Is there evidence that the collaboration evaluates information gathered 
through a monitoring process?  
 
Code if yes. 
 
CRITICAL COMMUNITIES  
Mnemonic COHESIVE 
Description Participating in collaboration has the effect of developing a shared 
understanding in places where it may have not yet existed. A sense of 
community can pre-date the emergence of a collaboration however 
(Koontz, 2006).   
Schema Do the stakeholders in the collaboration acknowledge a shared identity 
and understanding? 
 
Code if yes. 
 
Mnemonic DELIB 
Description  “In order to ensure diverse players do not co-opt the process, an 
extensive amount of deliberation and consultation from a wide range of 
participants on specific strategies and objectives is usually necessary. 
Involvement in designing the process and having input into the product 
will more likely result in buy-in from all participants” (Reilly, 2008). 
Schema Is there evidence of a consensus-building process in negotiations among 
stakeholders, e.g., the stakeholders come together to discuss the issues 
and try to come up with mutually acceptable solutions? 
 
Code if yes. 
 
 
Mnemonic NET 
Description The importance of networks, in particular pre-existing networks, 
partnerships, collaborative efforts, or conflict appears foundational to the 
establishment of a robust collaboration. (Olsson et al. 2006, Ansell and 
Gash 2008, Plummer et al. 2012).   
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Schema Are there continued efforts to broaden the base of stakeholders and/or 
wield social connections to further collaborative goals? 
 
Code if yes. 
 
Mnemonic COL_VAL 
Description  A shared, collective purpose is indelible to successful collaborations 
(Reilly, 2008).  
Schema Does the collaboration have a baseline 
understanding/purpose/vision/goal toward which management activities 
can be directed? 
 
Code if yes. 
 
Mnemonic PER_THREAT 
Description There are many reasons to collaborate. In general, environmental 
collaboration spawns from some perceived threat (or prescient problem) 
to which management actions would be ineffective if greater amounts of 
human capital were not deployed.  
 
Carlson and Berkes (2005) simply states that co-management 
(cooperative or collaborative management) is a logical approach to 
overcome resource issues through the use of building and leveraging 
partnerships.  
Schema Although there may exist multiple reasons for a collaboration, here we 
are interested in whether the collaboration came about as a result of a 
perceived ecological threat by organizing members. Is there evidence that 
stakeholders acknowledge that perceived ecological threats as a primary 
reason for engaging in collaboration? 
 
Code if yes. 
 
 
UNCERTAINTY AND CONTINGENCY 
Mnemonic PLAN 
Description Management plans should be adapted to new understanding of 
uncertainty rather than striving for optimization based on past records 
(Berkes et al., 2003).  
Schema Do management activities incorporate a planning process designed to 
reduce future levels of uncertainty? 
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Code if yes.  
 
Mnemonic FUT 
Description Imagining and planning for future scenarios is also a way to reduce 
uncertainty and be able to quickly respond future conditions. Scenarios 
will be more informative and useful if they can incorporate multiple 
perspectives. Scenario building that includes joint deliberation about 
what is known and what is not known provides an ideal space about 
questioning assumptions made by different disciplines and different 
perspectives (Berkes, 2009).  
Schema Is there a scenario building component or some other method employed 
to make management activities sensitive to (even imagined) future 
conditions? 
 
Code if yes.  
 
 
Mnemonic SUPR 
Description Adaptive collaborative management by its very nature can reduce the 
impact of surprise, and indeed, may allow managers to view surprise as 
opportunity.   
Schema Is the collaboration sensitive to surprise?  
 
Code if yes. 
 
PLURALISTIC 
 
Mnemonic BEG_ETHIC 
Description  It is critical to understand the values that stakeholders enter into 
environmental collaborations with. Often, the interests they maintain 
become conflated with their group identity (i.e. nature preservers, 
environmentalists, hunters, developers, etc.) and the range of 
Mnemonic CON_RES 
Description The persistence of conflict in deliberative arenas is not necessarily a sign 
of disfunction. Indeed, the sorting of competing claims and attention to 
the autonomy of other collaborative members is one of the functions of 
deliberation.   
Schema Is there evidence that stakeholders acknowledge conflict resolution 
mechanisms as an indelible component of collaboration?  
 
Code if yes.  
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management alternatives they are likely to promote and/or agree with are 
constrained to this group identity. 
Schema On interpretation, is there evidence that there was environmental ethical 
alignment employed/held by stakeholder prior to involvement in the 
collaboration?   
What, if any, environmental ethic was held as the collaboration formed 
(e.g. before deliberation took place)? 
 
Code if yes.  
 
Mnemonic CHNG_ETHIC 
Description A change in ethical attitudes (e.g. widening of acceptable values, 
shirking of incompatible worldviews, etc.) is an indicator that exposure, 
deliberation, and contact with other perspectives has the potential to 
challenge assumptions and otherwise foundational ethical positions.   
Schema Is there evidence that ethical positions, regardless of what they were 
initially, changed as a result of collaborative activities (e.g. planning 
meetings, deliberative arenas, town halls, other social events)? 
 
Code if yes.  
 
Mnemonic VAL_DIV 
Description 
 
Schema Is there evidence and/or recognition by stakeholders that other 
collaborators maintain a (mental or physical) list of individualized 
priorities? E.g. A stakeholder that is concerned with clean water while 
others care for wildlife. 
 
Code if yes.   
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EXEMPTION GRANTED 
 
Michael Schoon 
Sustainability, School of 
480/965-0919 
Michael.Schoon@asu.edu 
 
Dear Michael Schoon: 
On 3/24/2017 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
Type of Review:    Initial Study 
Title:    Collaborative Governance for Improving Biodiversity 
Outcomes 
Investigator:    Michael Schoon 
IRB ID:    STUDY00005941 
Funding:    
None Grant Title:    
None Grant ID:    
None 
Documents Reviewed:    • Consent Form.pdf, Category: Consent Form; 
• HRP-503a.docx, Category: IRB Protocol; 
• 050115 Recruitment script.pdf, Category: 
Recruitment Materials; 
• Rojas Interview Guide IRB.pdf, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions); 
 
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 3/24/2017. 
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
Sincerely, 
IRB Administrator 
 
cc:       Christopher Rojas 
Christopher Rojas 
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Ben Minteer 
Life Sciences, School of (SOLS) 
480/965-4632 
Ben.Minteer@asu.edu 
 
Dear Ben Minteer: 
On 11/29/2018 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
Type of Review:    Initial Study 
Title:    Exploring pragmatic origins of adaptive co- 
management 
Investigator:    Ben Minteer 
IRB ID:    STUDY00009276 
Funding:    None 
Grant Title:    None 
Grant ID:    None 
Documents Reviewed:    • ACM Email Recruitment.docx, Category: 
Recruitment Materials; 
• HRP-503a-ACM-ROJAS.docx, Category: IRB 
Protocol; 
• ACM Question Set.docx, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions); 
• Consent form-ACM Archi.docx, Category: Consent 
Form; 
 
 
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 11/29/2018. 
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
Sincerely, 
IRB Administrator 
 
cc: Christopher Rojas 
Christopher Rojas 
Ben Minteer 
